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ABSTRACT 
 
 Despite its tremendous economic potentials, until now there is no mega-
regional FTA covering all corners of the Asia-Pacific. Backed by the United 
States (US), the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is the recent attempt to do so and 
is promoted to be the „high quality 21st century agreement‟. The research basically 
discusses Southeast Asian perspective on the FTA, focusing on why Malaysia and 
Vietnam decided to join whereas Indonesia decided not to. Positioning TPP within 
the existing literature on Southeast Asia trade policy-making, the research is 
important for two particular reasons. First, existing literature tend to be domestic-
driven, while the „US factor‟ embedded within TPP means that international 
factors are important to understand the behavior of these countries. Second, the 
prevailing assumption of „state-domestic business influence on trade policy‟ is no 
longer true for the TPP case as more various actors, including within the state, 
have concerns over the impact of the „high-quality‟ agreement. 
 The research finds that economic gain is not the only reason why a country 
joins an FTA. In fact, just like the Great Powers, small and medium countries in 
Southeast Asia align their trade strategy with political and security objectives. The 
decision on TPP intersects heavily with how they regard the position of China and 
the US in the Asia-Pacific, namely whether the former is seen as a political-
security threat, whether it is important to engage the latter as part of hedging 
strategy and whether the latter‟s TPP maneuver aligns with their regional foreign 
policy priorities. Moreover, the high-quality nature of TPP means that accession 
decision relates to political debate among various domestic actors on whether a 
country needs to conduct economic reforms. Specifically, the research finds that 
the interest of the leader and the Ministry of Trade on economic reforms, rather 
than the state as a whole, as well as their maneuver to deal with protectionist camp, 
play important role in determining Southeast Asian countries‟ decisions on TPP. 
 
Keywords: US‟ pivot, trade and security linkage, 21st century FTA, domestic 
support on economic reform 
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CHAPTER I - INTRODUCTION  
 
I.1 Background 
 The Asia-Pacific is a site where economies grow tremendously dynamic. 
The region is home to several of the most advanced economies such as the United 
States (US) and Japan, Newly Industrializing Economies (NIEs) such as South 
Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong and Taiwan, and also new economic powerhouses, 
such as China, Vietnam and Indonesia. The region covers a vast area including 
Northeast and Southeast Asia, Western Pacific, North America and Latin America. 
The Asia-Pacific is such an important region that it covers almost 55 percent of 
the world‟s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and contributes to 40 percent of world 
population and 44 percent of world trade.
1
   
 Despite such potential, the region has yet to establish a region-wide Free 
Trade Agreement (FTA). Asia-Pacific only has the Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC), which basically serves as an economic forum where leaders 
can discuss with each other without any legally binding agreement. Within APEC, 
the idea of a mega-regional FTA has been developed since the mid-1990s through 
the introduction of Early Voluntary Sectoral Liberalization (EVSL). However, it 
is not only that it was a mere sectoral rather than comprehensive liberalization, but 
also it failed to materialize in the APEC Summit of 1998. There are several other 
attempts under a more limited geographical scope. The North American Free 
                                                          
1
 What is Asia-Pacific economic cooperation? (n.d.). Retrieved from http://www.apec.org/about-
us/about-apec.aspx   at December 1, 2013, 11:00 PM 
2 
 
Trade Area (NAFTA) and the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC)
2
 are among 
the most established one, yet it has never evolved into a bigger geographical 
region. There were many discussions on creating East Asian Free Trade Area 
(EAFTA) among the ASEAN + 3 countries (China, Japan and South Korea) and 
the Comprehensive Economic Partnership of East Asia (CEPEA) among the 
ASEAN + 6 countries (China, Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand and 
India), yet both proposal never materialized. Until recently, the idea of creating an 
Asia-Pacific FTA only exists on a bilateral basis, in which countries engage in 
cross-regional FTAs such as the Japan-Singapore FTA, South Korea-Chile FTA, 
etc. (Solis & Katada, 2008).  
 Despite of such failures, the idea of Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific 
(FTAAP) is not dead.
3
 After EVSL, the genuine idea of a mega-regional FTA had 
to wait for nearly one decade to revive. The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is 
among the most recent attempt by Asia-Pacific countries to materialize their 
economic potentials, where they try to open up their economies to one another 
hoping for greater economic exchange, growth and mutual prosperity.
4
 
Chronologically, TPP is the evolution of the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic 
                                                          
2
 ASEAN or Association of Southeast Asian Nations is a regional grouping among ten members of 
Southeast Asian countries, i.e. Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, the Philippines, Brunei 
Darussalam, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar.  
3
 See, for example, at Joint Statement of the 20
th
 APEC Economic Leaders‟ Meeting, “Integrate to 
Grow, Innovate to Prosper”, in Vladivostok, Russia, 8-9 September 2012, where leaders, 
“...recognize that Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP) is a major instrument to further 
APEC‟s regional economic integration agenda....” Retrieved from 
http://japan.kantei.go.jp/noda/diplomatic/201209/09apec_e.html  
4
 Besides the TPP, there is another attempt to create a region-wide FTA, namely the Regional 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). The RCEP is said to be the rival of TPP as its 
main promoter is China while TPP‟s promoter is the US. Although it is true that the RCEP is a 
mega-regional FTA (its GDP accumulation of participating countries is even bigger than TPP), it 
is not an Asia-Pacific FTA as it only consists of ASEAN + 6 countries. It remains to be seen 
whether the RCEP will add members from other regions. 
3 
 
Partnership (TPSEP), which is basically a FTA among Pacific-4 (P-4) economies, 
namely Brunei, Chile, New Zealand, and Singapore in 2005. However, since the 
US expressed its intention to join in September 2008, the supposedly peripheral 
FTA gained worldwide attention. It is the US status as the world‟s biggest 
economy as well as the world‟s remaining superpower that boosts TPSEP into the 
world‟s headline. After the US, more and more countries are lining up to join. 
When TPP conducted its first negotiation meeting on 15-19 March 2010 in 
Melbourne, Australia, the previous P-4 had grown into the P-7 by including the 
US, Australia and Peru. Afterwards, more and more countries have also joined, 
such as Vietnam, Malaysia, Mexico, Canada and, the latest, Japan. Until now, 
TPP has already concluded its 19
th
 round of negotiation.  
 Seen from Southeast Asia, the TPP is seen for its economic importance. 
The logical reason is for the US economy, which traditionally constitutes one of 
the biggest export destination for countries in this region. In fact, the US is such a 
big economy that it almost dwarfs others, by contributing 58 percent of the TPP‟s 
total GDP and 40 percent of its total population.
5
 The US is aways seen as very 
restrictive in selecting FTA partners, therefore, when it decided to join the TPP, it 
somehow sent temptation across the Asia-Pacific to take leverage of the US 
market. Not exceptionally in Southeast Asia, such an offer is very attempting 
since, as seen in Table I.1, only Singapore has sucessfully concluded a bilateral 
FTA with the US. Others, in search for market access, investment and other 
                                                          
5
 In fact, given its superior economic and political status, the US is very dominant in TPP until one 
can refer it as a US-led FTA. This point will be discussed in greater details in Chapter III. The 
proportion is calculated based on data from the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) Handbook of Statistics, 2012, pp. 412-418 and 454-471. 
4 
 
economic gains, direct their FTA on ASEAN frameworks and bilateral FTAs with 
countries all around the world, but fail to engage the US.  
 
Table I.1 – Southeast Asian Countries FTAs (Concluded) 
 Singapore Thailand Malaysia Indonesia Philippines Vietnam 
ASEAN 
Framework 
ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand, ASEAN-China, ASEAN-India, 
ASEAN-Japan, ASEAN-Korea 
Bilateral 
FTAs 
Australia, China, 
Costa Rica, Gulf 
Cooperation 
Council (GCC), 
Jordan, India, 
Japan, Korea, New 
Zealand, Panama, 
Peru, European 
Free Trade Area 
(EFTA), US 
Australia,  India, 
Japan, New 
Zealand, Peru 
 
Other: BIMST-
EC (Bangladesh, 
India, Myanmar, 
Sri Lanka, 
Thailand 
Economic 
Cooperation) 
 
 
Australia, Chile, 
India, Japan, New 
Zealand, Pakistan 
Japan Japan Japan 
Source: compiled from Ministry of Trade and Industry, Singapore, 2012; Department of Trade 
Negotiations, Thailand, 2010; Ministry of International Trade and Industry, Malaysia, 
2012; Directorate General of National Export Development, Ministry of Trade, Indonesia, 
2011; Department of Trade & Industry, the Philippines 2008; Ministry of Industry and 
Trade, Vietnam, n.d.a 
     
 It is the purpose of this research to seek explanation on Southeast Asia‟s 
response to TPP. Despite its temptation, the response by countries in the region is 
far from similar: some countries such as Brunei, Singapore, Vietnam, and 
Malaysia are in the negotiation table already while some countries are still very 
sceptical on the prospect, such as Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines. Given 
such a situation, it is very reasonable to ask: why do they choose such an 
approach? What kind of factors contributes to these behaviors? How does such 
international stimulus coalesce with domestic priorities and political context? 
How do the factors work to influence these behaviors? Therefore, the research is 
basically about the determining factors or motives of Southeast Asian countries 
5 
 
toward TPP. It seeks to explore why some countries participate in the negotiating 
process while some others do not. As part of the Asia-Pacific, Southeast Asia is 
far from immune to its dynamic, especially the TPP. In fact, as part of the 
economically dynamic East Asia that contributes to the „miracle‟ story and „rise of 
the rest‟ phenomenon, Southeast Asia is actually one of the main targets of US‟ 
charm through the TPP.   
 By doing so, the research would like to contribute to the existing literature 
on Southeast Asia‟s trade policy. Firstly, the research will adopt a political-
economy approach to explain these policies. Within the realm of international 
trade, the economic approach seems to prevail and leaves the political approach 
underresearched (Mansfield & Milner, 1999). TPP is indeed an economic measure, 
however, as it is situated within the very context of interaction among states, the 
political-economy approach becomes all the more important. Secondly, the 
research will adopt a comparative perspective by selecting 3 case studies: on one 
hand Vietnam and Malaysia as members of negotiating parties, and on the other 
hand Indonesia as the non-negotiating party. It is very important to follow such an 
approach as existing literature are far too concerned on single-country analysis. 
Thirdly, discussing TPP provides an opportunity to seek the nature of trade policy 
decision making in Southeast Asia. It is the TPP that mekaes Southeast Asian 
countries deal with the superpower, namely the US. So far, existing literature lag 
behind this insight by putting too much attention on domestic level analysis. Even 
more, within the domestic approach it is still far too occupied by unitary state 
perspective. It is through the TPP that one can determine that state is far from 
6 
 
unitary. It is also by investigating TPP that one can comprehend that in Southeast 
Asia, diverse societal groups actively look for opportunities to influence the 
decision-making process. 
 The following subsection will scrutinize those points even more. The 
literature review will be presented with special attention to the above-mentioned 
gaps. Findings from the literature review will lead to the formulation of research 
questions and objectives. The chapter will conclude by providing the structure of 
the research. 
 
I.2 Literature Review 
 Existing literature mainly discuss the more economically developed 
countries in the region, namely the ASEAN-5 (Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, 
Thailand, and the Philippines). Here, the literature review will focus on these 
countries with particular interest on the political aspect of Southeast Asian trade 
policy. Discussion on economic aspect has been far too robust, comprising of the 
potentials of FTA, existing FTAs‟ impact on GDP, income, labor and so on.6 
Despite its economic leverage, it lacks political importance, which becomes 
central for this research. It is found that the political aspect of Southeast Asian 
trade policy seems to be left behind, as there are only relatively limited 
discussions on it. This is especially true for the case of Vietnam, which becomes a 
                                                          
6
 The literature is particularly extensive for Vietnam, Malaysia, and Thailand and, to lesser degree, 
for Singapore, Indonesia, and the Philippines. For Vietnam, look at Athukorala (2009), Heng & 
Gayathri (2004), Jenkins (2004), and Thanh (2005). For Malaysia, look at Rasiah (2008), 
Devadason (2006), Nair, Madhavan & Vengedasalam (2006) and Yusoff (2005). For Thailand, 
look at Chirativat & Mallikimas (2004), Pungchareon (2005), Talerngsri & Pimchanok (2005). For 
Singapore, look at Sen (2005). For Indonesia, look at Basri & Patunru (2012a). For Philippines, 
look at Wignaraja, Lazaro & de Guzman (2009).  
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case study for this research, but there is no single dicussion on its political aspect 
of trade policy, let alone FTA (see Table I.2 below). For other countries such as 
Indonesia and Singapore, there are relatively more literature. For the sake of 
discussion, existing literature can be grouped into three parts: first, those focusing 
on comparative study; second, those on international aspect; and third, those on 
domestic aspect. Such division also reflects the main critics central for the 
research. 
 
I.2.1 Comparative Study 
 Discussion of this particular issue is one of the main weakness of the 
existing literature. Despite comprising ten different countries with varying trade 
policy behaviors and significance, it is quite surprising that comparative study 
never becomes the main focus. Comparative study is important, as it enables the 
researcher to make generalization, to test the strength of an independent variable 
to influence dependent variable, and to provide more diverse and richer account to 
a social phenomenon.  
 Hoadley (2007) is the only one taking such an approach. Comparing 
Singapore, Thailand and Malaysia, the research provides identification of trade 
policy characters of each country as well as its contributing factors. Singapore can 
be seen as a true champion of FTA, with agressive deals with as many as 15 
parties in 2006. At the same time, Thailand is in the middle, with its passion 
toward FTA liberalization while retaining domestic protectionism, and Malaysia 
is in the other spectrum with its cautious path toward cross-regional FTA. 
8 
 
Reasons behind Singapore‟s agressiveness are market access, fear of trade 
diversion, its security partnership with major powers (as seen in US-Singapore 
FTA), and the „demonstration effect‟ for other countries to play more active role 
on FTA. For Thailand, similar factors also play roles in addition to the politically 
influential „export-oriented cosmopolitan enterpreneurs‟ and the quest for 
international prestige. Malaysia‟s low profile is basically due to its adherence to a 
multilateral scheme (World Trade Organization - WTO) and pressure from 
protectionist groups. 
 
I.2.2 International Factor 
 International aspect highlights another major gap within the existing 
literature on Southeast Asian trade policy. For the sake of TPP issue, of particular 
importance here is the linkage between trade policy with efforts to approach Great 
Powers, especially the US. Among the limited literature, a work by Pang (2007) is 
the only one that qualifies this criteria by highlighting US-Singapore FTA. He 
argues that Singapore‟s motive to conclude the deal is because of the city-state‟s 
inherent vulnerability to regional conflicts, such as territorial disputes, terrorism, 
muslim neighbors, Taiwan strait, North Korea‟s nuclear issue, and so on. Signing 
on FTA with the US will provide the ground for closer interaction and 
interdependence among the two countries. In fact, the FTA was followed by other 
security initiatives, such as a security cooperation agreement in July 2005 and 
Singapore‟s US$ 1 billion purchase of military aircrafts and US$ 800 million of 
missiles, ordinance, parts and components in December 2005. 
9 
 
 Other work also tries to assess this international factor, although not 
related to the „US factor‟. Van de Haar (2011) finds that in Japan-Philippines 
Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA), the international factor can overcome 
barriers posed by the domestic factor. The international factor here is the need to 
arrange closer relations with Japan, which is a US‟ ally in East Asia, especially in 
relations to the growing threat of China. Domestically, the Philippines is plagued 
by protectionist policy in its political institutions (due to decades-long rent-
seeking behavior) and domestic interests (pressure from populist Non-
Governmental Organizations - NGOs and the catholic church).
7
 Other works, such 
as those by Lee (2006) on Singapore and Nagai (2003) on Thailand, also attempt 
to assess international factor, although the two countries FTA behavior are 
basically a response to global development, such as the slow negotiation progress 
of WTO in multilateral level and ASEAN in regional level. Both works are also 
equipped with domestic nuances, namely the relative absence of protectionist 
groups in Singapore and the relatively strong role of export-oriented groups in 
Thailand. 
 
I.2.3 Domestic Factor 
 A more robust literature on Southeast Asian trade policy lies primarily 
within this category. However, angles of analysis in this theme are quite various. 
                                                          
7
 However, there is a validity weakness in Van de Haar‟s work. He claims that the international 
factor is better than domestic factor to explain the outcome. However, he comes to this conclusion 
after determining that the domestic factor (namely the deep devision on whether or not to ratify the 
deal) cannot explain why the country still ratified it in the end. He does not show how the 
international factor leads to the ratification, especially in dealing with the stalemate in the 
domestic level.  
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A work by Bird, Hill, & Cuthbertson (2008) on Indonesia, for example, gives a 
very interesting insight on how the democratization process influences the 
country‟s inconsistent trade policy. The Ministry of Finance, on one hand, 
proposes tariff liberalization while the Ministry of Trade and the Ministry of 
Agriculture, backed by domestic business pressures and populist policies, 
implement non-tariff barriers (NTBs) on the other hand. Subnational governments 
also play a role by imposing local tax and other measures, which are largely NTBs. 
Another interesting theme, proposed by Chandra (2008) in the context of 
Indonesia, argues that Indonesia‟s relative eagerness toward ASEAN 
liberalization is due to the rise of „logical nationalism‟ (a redefinition or 
awareness in which national interest can be attained through regional setting - 
„Regional Integration Strategy‟. For example, Chandra (2008) mentions that 
Indonesia‟s sensitivity toward national disintegration is preserved by ASEAN‟s 
principle of non-interference.  
 A broader classification within this category is presented by those authors 
who view the state as a unitary actor in influencing trade policy. There are quite 
many academics focusing on this issue. Low (2008) contends that Singapore‟s 
aggresiveness toward bilateral FTA deals is because of the city-state‟s 
development plan to be the center for a knowledge-based economy (KBE). An 
FTA is important because: 1) it provides a necessary lock-in reform to boost 
private initiatives; 2) it provides market access to KBE‟s products; and 3) it 
facilitates human resources and technology access, including mobility of highly-
skilled workers. In contrast, Suzuki (2003) and Okamoto (2006) provide insight to 
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how this unitary state imposes a more protectionist policy in Malaysia. Suzuki 
(2003) argues that Malaysia is more confident to conduct FTA within the ASEAN 
framework as it provides flexibility for domestic adjustment, such as the delay of 
automotive liberalization until 2005. This is also the case for Malaysia‟s effort to 
expand ASEAN free trade to include China, Japan and Korea, which can be seen 
as an effort to maintain flexibility but to gain bigger market and stronger voices 
against other regional blocking in North America (NAFTA) and Western Europe 
(European Economic Community - EEC). Okamoto‟s (2006) work is similar to 
this logic as she labels Malaysia as a „reluctant bilateralist‟. Not only due to effort 
to protect sensitive sector, it is also because Malaysia cannot withstand WTO-plus 
principle which may hurt the country‟s Bumiputera policy. Bumiputera (which 
literally means „son of soil‟) is an affirmative action designed to improve the 
economic status of ethnic Malay against Chinese and Indian.   
 Another important insight is from Nesadurai (2003, 2012), which again 
sees the state as a unitary entity. Both works see Southeast Asia as a single unit 
and argue that the AFTA is made in a way that would benefit intra-ASEAN vis-a-
vis extra-ASEAN business groups. State and business engage in a patronage 
network, in which trade policy outcome is the result of accomodation that state 
elite has to make in order to engage key business elite. Such pressure from 
business groups result in so-called „developmental regionalism‟, which can be 
seen in at least two examples: 1) low-quality FTA, which includes Sensitive List 
and Exclusion List (those sectors that are not competitive enough but 
economically leveraging domestic business); and 2) ASEAN business group that 
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will get the first priority (than extra-ASEAN) for investing in other ASEAN 
countries for 10 years under the ASEAN Investment Area (AIA) scheme. 
 Such development within this domestic aspect needs to be qualified for the 
sake of the research. For example, the prevailing theme in which state is seen as a 
unitary actor is not always true. State is a complex actor and institution, which 
behaves far from a single manner. The case is particularly true for their response 
to TPP, which will be shown in the subsequent empirical chapter. At the same 
time, the primary role of business groups should be seen in relations to the activity 
of other actors. Societal groups should not be seen within this single group alone; 
other groups such as the various NGOs also play important roles. Again, their role 
and influence will be shown in the subsequent empirical chapter. 
Table I.2 provides a summary of literature review on Southeast Asian 
trade policy. It basically formulates three weaknessess of existing literature: 1) 
lack of comparative study; 2) lack of the linkage between FTA and the existence 
of Great Power (international factor); and 3) imperfect assumption that state is 
unitary and a societal group is only made of business sector (domestis factor). 
Table I.3 articulates such weaknessess into the solution that will be utilized within 
this research. It is argued here that the case of TPP provides an important account 
to address the gap. The research will be a comparative study, with a unique 
opportunity to see the linkage of trade policy and the existence of Great Powers 
(TPP is basically a US-led FTA). The research will also assume that the state is 
not unitary and societal groups vary  much more than only ones constituted by the 
business group alone.  
13 
 
Table I.2 – Summary of Literature Review 
Countries Studies Perspectives 
  Comparative International 
Aspect 
International and 
Domestic Aspect 
Domestic Aspect 
Comparative 
(Singapore, 
Malaysia, 
Thailand) 
Hoadley (2007)  Economics: market 
acess; fear of trade 
diversion 
 Politics: rise of 
export-oriented 
enterpreneur; closer 
relations to the US 
   
      
Singapore Pang (2007)  Closer relations to 
the US 
  
Low (2008)    State’s strategy for 
economic survival 
Lee (2006)    Int’l: WTO and 
ASEAN’s slow 
progress 
 Domestic: relative 
absence of 
protectionist group 
 
      
Thailand Nagai (2003)    Int’l: WTO’s and 
ASEAN’s slow 
progress 
 Domestic: role of 
export-oriented 
group 
 
      
Malaysia Suzuki (2003)    State’s strategy to 
protect infant 
industry 
Okamoto (2006)    State’s strategy to 
protect infant 
industry 
      
Vietnam - - - - - 
      
Philippines Van de Haar 
(2011) 
   Int’l: to forge closer 
relations to Japan & 
to balance China 
 State: protectionist 
Senate 
 Domestic: pressure 
of protectionist 
group 
 
      
Indonesia Bird, Hill & 
Cuthbertson 
(2008) 
   Fragmented power 
due to 
democratization 
 Chandra (2008)    The rise of ‘logical 
nationalism’ 
      
ASEAN as 
single unit 
Nesadurai (2003, 
2012) 
   Role of protectionist 
business group 
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Table I.3 – Literature Gap and Proposed Solution 
Categories Problems Proposed Solution 
Comparative 
Approach 
Too many discussions on single-
country analysis 
Conduct comparative study for the 
research 
International 
Factor 
Too few discussions on linkage 
between trade policy and existence of 
Great Power (the US) 
 Conduct research on TPP (a US-led 
FTA) 
 Develop theoretical framework: linkage 
between trade policy and existence of 
Great Power 
Domestic 
Factors 
State is seen as a unitary actor. 
Societal group is also composed only 
of the business sector 
Develop theoretical framework: state and 
societal group consist of various actors. 
 
I.3 Research Questions 
The main aim of this research is to analyze the role played by international 
and domestic factors in shaping trade policy. How do international factors 
influence the decision to participate or not to participate in TPP? How do 
domestic factors affect this very process? What is the pattern of interaction 
between these two factors in shaping a country‟s trade policy? Do they perform 
similar patterns across countries? What are the similarities and differences among 
countries? 
 For the case study, the research will use 3 countries: Vietnam, Malaysia, 
and Indonesia. The first two represent „participating countries‟ while the last one 
represents the „not participating country‟. Practically speaking, the research aims 
to answer these questions: “Why have Vietnam and Malaysia decided to join the 
TPP?” and “Why has Indonesia decided not to join the TPP?” 
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I.4 Significance 
 The main significance of the research is to generate more understanding 
on the nature of trade policy decision making in Southeast Asia. Of particular 
importance, the research is designed to identify determining factors influencing 
the decision of Southeast Asian countries on TPP. On the international side, the 
research seeks to improve our understanding on the linkage between „trade policy‟ 
and „Great Power existence‟. On the domestic side, it seeks to improve our 
understanding on the linkage between „trade policy‟ and „plural interests of state 
and societal groups‟.   
 The research is basically a comparative approach. Therefore, by using the 
words of Ragin (1994), it aims to explore diversity of Southeast Asian trade 
policy decision-making, namely the decision whether or not to participate in the 
TPP. By doing so, it seeks to analyze similarities and differences between the 3 
countries on their international trade policy behavior.  
 Practically, the research will be a useful account for any parties interested 
in the study of trade politics in Southeast Asia. Some stakeholders potentially 
taking advantages from this research are government officials, business groups 
and academics. 
 
I.5 Structure of Research 
 The research will be organized as follows: 
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Chapter I    -  Introduction 
This chapter will highlight the reasons for conducting this 
particular research. It consists of background, literature review, 
research questions, objectives and structure of research. 
Chapter II   -  Research Design 
The chapter will elaborate on the theoretical framework used for 
this research, namely the operationalization on international and 
domestic factors. The theoretical framework will mainly include 
definition, indicators and hypothesis. Meanwhile, discussion on 
methodology will include method, case selection, technique of 
validation and data collection.     
Chapter III  - TPP: Development and Controversies 
The chapter will focus on TPP as a US-led FTA initiative. Firstly, 
it will discuss the progress of TPP, such as its evolution from 
TPSEP and negotiation process so far. Secondly, it will address 
TPP‟s economic issues sensitive to developing countries, such as 
comprehensive liberalization and WTO-plus proposal. Thirdly, it 
will position TPP within the US‟ regional approach in Asia-Pacific, 
especially on its interests to balance China and to create US-led 
regionalism. 
Chapter IV, V, VI – Case Studies: Malaysia, Vietnam and Indonesia  
Each chapter here will discuss one case study. Discussion will 
include dependent and independent variables. Here, the dependent 
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variable is the country‟s decision regarding TPP, while the 
independent variables are the international and domestic factors 
affecting the outcome. Each chapter will discuss the nature of 
relations between the two variables by examining how independent 
variables work to influence the dependent variable and so on. Each 
chapter will end with a conclusion. 
Chapter VII – Conclusion 
The main aim of this chapter is to compare similarities and 
differences among the case studies. The chapter will also reflect the 
findings with theoretical framework proposed in earlier chapters, 
therefore creating a dialogue between evidence and theory. The 
chapter will also position the result of research to the broader 
theoretical literature of trade policy in Southeast Asia. Lastly, there 
will be a recommendation for further study. 
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CHAPTER II – RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
II. 1 Conceptual Framework 
Figure II.1 – Diagram of Conceptual Framework 
 
 
In regards to determinant factors affecting trade policy decision-making, 
many literature put heavy emphasis on economic factors. It is not the goal of this 
research to continue such a tradition. Rather, it adopts the political-economy 
approach in which the intertwining political and economic aspects provide a more 
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comprehensive view on the nature of trade policy. As seen from figure II.1, there 
are two factors affecting Southeast Asian trade policy decision making, namely 
international and domestic factors. The distinction is made based on the gap found 
in the literature review section. For international factors, it is „the need to forge 
closer relations to the US‟. It consists of two different variables, namely 
„economic gains‟ and „political-security needs‟. Meanwhile for domestic factors, 
it is „the support to economic reform‟, which consists of „support from state 
decision-makers‟ and „support from societal groups‟. The four variables affect the 
decision of Southeast Asian countries, whether or not to participate on TPP. 
Positioning TPP within the broader trade policy debate in Southeast Asia, 
several assumptions must be made to formulate the best conceptual framework. 
First, different from most existing FTAs that Southeast Asian countries currently 
have, TPP entails a „US factor‟. The US has been an important economic partner 
for Southeast Asian countries for a long time, therefore incorporating this 
particular element in essential. Yet, the US is also a Great Power in current global 
politics: it is the main security guarantor in the Asia-Pacific since the end of 
World War II and the winner of the Cold War against the Soviet Union. Therefore, 
US‟ presence (for example through TPP) must be seen in accordance with 
Southeast Asia‟s own political and security objectives, whether it is aligned or not. 
Especially in the current uncertainty regarding China‟s rise (either peaceful or 
not), the role of the US remains critical. This is why linking FTA policy with 
political-security consideration is justified. Second, TPP is an FTA promoted to 
be the „high-standard‟ or 21st century agreement. It means that the TPP aims to be 
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more aggressive in promoting liberalization and economic reform. This coincides 
heavily with Southeast Asian countries‟ own domestic agenda for economic 
reform. Therefore, such international agreement should be seen in accordance 
with the dynamic within the domestic arena. Such a reform agenda is never easy; 
it always generates pros and cons among various groups. Reform agenda always 
carries a great deal of wealth distribution among actors, as some may benefit and 
some others may lose, be it for economic, political or even ideological reasons. 
For this research, it means that seeing TPP as part of a reform agenda opens up 
the possibility of seeing a different trade policy-making: state and societal groups 
should be seen as consisting of many actors with different interests on reform 
agenda. Thus, domestic politics even transcends beyond the decision-making of 
participating/ not participating in the TPP itself. Rather, as Figure II.1 suggests, it 
influences the domestic political process since the decision is being taken. 
The following subchapters will discuss each variable in greater detail. It 
will start by discussing the economic gains and political-security needs (both are 
part of international factors), domestic support to economic reform (both from 
state decision-makers and societal groups), and hypothesis. The latest part of this 
chapter will discuss method, technique of validation, case selection, and data 
collection. 
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II.1.1 International Factors: The Need to Forge Closer Relations to the US 
A. Economic Gains 
Linkage between economic gain and trade policy is a very common 
framework. Basically, it postulates that the more a state gains economically, the 
greater the chance it will participate in an FTA. The framework is very common 
in the field of Economics. Yet even within International Relations (IR) theory, the 
issue of gain is also a central theme of state‟s behavior. The neoliberal-
institutionalist theory proposes the concept of absolute gain for determining state 
action on international cooperation. The paradigm basically absorbs some realist 
assumptions of International Relations, such as state as a unitary actor seeking 
maximum gains (Grieco, 1988, p. 486-487). It will, therefore, determine their 
action on a given international cooperation (TPP in this research), in which the 
state will seek absolute gains. The more absolute gains it can take, the more 
willing a state will be to participate in international cooperation. Within this 
research, a state will pursue an FTA in order to get three types of economic gains: 
trade gain, investment gain, and lock-in reform opportunity.  
 Trade gain is an obvious reason for fostering an FTA. By liberalizing 
tariffs and other barriers, there will be more opportunity for export. Economically, 
this is called a „trade creation‟ effect. In East Asia, in which many countries rely 
heavily on external markets, an FTA is an important tool to access overseas 
market, especially as the latter are getting more restrictive due to economic 
slowdown and domestic political pressure. Particularly in Southeast Asia, trade 
links heavily with development process. It constitutes a significant proportion of 
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the economic growth component. The more it exports, the higher the economic 
growth; the less it exports, the lower the economic growth. Consequently, it will 
also lead to employment level and welfare gains. Moreover, securing an FTA is 
also important against other countries competing to access the same market. One 
country does not trade only with a single country. So, a country must keep an eye 
on the performance of its competitors, especially those with the same export 
structure and export market. Securing an FTA is a winning tool as it will reduce 
tariff barriers only for members while maintaining tariffs to non-members. In a 
different situation, if a country loses market share given that its competitor has 
already secured an FTA with the targeted market, FTA can also be a tool to 
correct the disadvantage. Solis & Katada (2008) discusses this possibility on their 
work on cross-regional FTA. They argue that an FTA is arranged due to „fear of 
exclusion‟ or „trade diversion‟ from the existing FTAs as a way to improve 
competitiveness. 
 For a small country, like those in Southeast Asia, there is always a danger 
to secure an FTA with a bigger trading partner like the US. Due to power 
asymmetry, the latter can demand higher liberalization without the former can 
demand the same thing. Yet as argued by Ravenhill (2006), a small country is still 
always better off with than without an FTA. It is because a bigger country is 
always a more important partner for a small country than vice versa; therefore, the 
trade benefit they may enjoy will be higher. This causes a small country to be 
willing to liberalize more as the expected benefit will outweigh the cost.  
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 Another gain from an FTA is investment. As a country secures FTA, it is 
anticipated that, as a member, it will experience an inflow of foreign capital. If the 
agreement is between developed and developing countries, then it is the latter that 
will experience higher FDI flow than the former. As an FTA is secured, there is 
an opportunity to produce goods in a more cost-effective way, which means 
relocating factories to developing country with the target to serve a big consumer 
market in the developed country (Ravenhill, 2011, p. 183). This is what happened 
in Mexico after NAFTA, in which the country received a massive surge of FDI 
from around US$ 8 billion in 1990 to US$ 24 bilion in 2001 (Ravenhill, 2011, p. 
183). This is also why some FTAs, such as TPP, are embedded with investment 
agreement. An investment agreement is important as it creates an investment-
friendly environment for foreign capital, especially in Asia, where the 
governments traditionally require many restrictive measures for FDI operation 
(Aggarwal, 2006, p. 9). An investment agreement will prohibit local-content 
requirement, export performance requirement, rule for expropriation, and the like. 
As a result, member countries are more likely to experience more FDI. This 
investment gain is very important if one observes the development process in 
Southeast Asia. Throughout the second half of the 20
th
 century, Southeast Asia 
has been tying its development process with the inflow of foreign investment. 
Foreign companies, either joint-venture or fully-owned, make a substantial 
contribution to these countries‟ exports. They also serve as the main source of 
capital, technology and working skills. Therefore, even without a substantial trade 
gain, sometimes a country still pursues an FTA exactly for this investment gain 
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(Kimura, 2006, p. 51). If one takes into account the competitive environment in 
which East Asian countries compete heavily for FDI, especially from China, then 
the greater the need is to secure investment gain through an FTA (Kimura, 2006, p. 
51).  
      The last indicator relates heavily with the investment gain, e.g. opportunity to 
lock-in reform. An FTA is important as it shows a commitment to a pro-business,  
conducive investment climate, which will be critical for inviting foreign 
investment. Therefore, FTA is seen as an external push to conduct domestic 
economic reform, or to lock-in reform commitment. Within an FTA, especially 
the one with a high standard like the TPP, a country is bound to many reform 
agenda, such as greater liberalization, enhanced transparency, and fair competition. 
This is even more important in the globalized world, in which many countries 
compete with one another to attract FDI (Ravenhill, 2011, p. 180).  Continuing 
this logic, it makes a lot of sense to secure such commitment in an FTA as 
countries‟ participation is less than the one in WTO level. Therefore, it will 
greatly improve a country‟s visibility in the eyes of foreign investors (Ravenhill, 
2011, pp. 180-181). 
 
B. Political-Security Needs 
 Some scholars have discussed the possibility of linking trade with 
political-security objective. This is very relevant for developed countries, in which 
Aggarwal (2006, p. 11) formulated that “...a more industrialized country has a 
higher stake in bilateral deals with specific countries whose assistance is vital in 
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the event of adverse political security development...”. Some countries have 
shown a very clear tendency to arrange such a trade-political/ security nexus. The 
US arranged an FTA with Israel and Jordan as rewards for both countries‟ support 
on US‟ policy in the Middle East, while China arranged a China-ASEAN FTA as 
a way to cool down China‟s threat perception and Japan arranged bilateral and 
mini-lateral FTAs with Southeast Asian countries to strengthen its regional 
presence (Aggarwal & Lee, 2011, p. 17). In this research, it is argued that such a 
nexus is also very possible for small and medium powers. Countries in Southeast 
Asia, no different from their Great Power fellows, also possess political-security 
priorities which are very likely to make them link FTA to such objectives. There 
are three indicators to be utilized here, i.e. coherency with foreign policy 
objectives, security threat from China, and to reduce China‟s economic influence. 
 For the first indicator, it is important to see trade policy as part of a state‟s 
broader foreign policy tools. Analyzing the Philippines‟ view on the Japan-
Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA), Van de Haar (2011) notes 
that in the current academic literature there are only thin efforts to linkage these 
two policies, in which foreign policy is seen as a less important subfield in 
International Relations. Van de Haar (2011) tries to fill the gap by linking 
domestic sources of foreign policy to trade policy outcome, yet this research will 
formulate it differently. In this paper, it is argued that trade policy, especially on 
TPP, links heavily with a country‟s foreign policy goals and objectives. If a state 
judges that a participation in a particular FTA will serve its foreign policy, then 
the more likely it will participate. Yet, if it is not then there will be no need to 
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participate. „Foreign policy objectives‟ means that one must utilize a customized 
approach, since each country has their own foreign policy objective. Trade policy 
should be seen as a continuation of foreign policy. It can also serve as an 
important tool to achieve such objectives, if other political or security tools are 
considered inappropriate. Therefore, in this paper, it is assumed that a country‟s 
trade policy is consistent with its foreign policy.
8
     
 The second indicator relates heavily with the broader security situation in 
East Asia. As noted in many literature, the US always plays an important role as 
an external security guarantor in this particular region. Tracing back to the end of 
World War II, the US‟ presence is important as a significant deterrent to the 
expansion of communist insurgency. As the Cold War ended, the region faced 
another challenge as there is one potential Great Power accumulating its power 
source, namely China. The problem here is that China‟s rise also entails a high 
degree of uncertainty: is China‟s rise benevolent or malevolent? The very 
situation of China‟s rise relates heavily with the concept of „balance of threat‟ 
postulated by Stephen Walt (1987). Different from the ordinary balance-of-power 
theory, balance of threat basically looks at the intention of one state to use its 
capability against another state. Therefore, it has a more direct nuance and is 
different from balance-of-power theory that emphasizes only capability. Does 
China have the intention to use force against its neighbors? This is something very 
difficult to answer.  
                                                          
8
 By saying „trade policy is consistent with a foreign policy‟, it does not necessarily mean that the 
author denies the possibility of inconsistency between the two of policies. In fact, this is the case 
of the absence of FTA between Japan-China, China-US, and Korea-Japan, although they trade 
heavily with each other. However, the author wishes to show that there are cases where the two 
policies go hand-in-hand. The finding of the thesis (shown in the conclusion) proves it.  
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 In IR, there is an assumption to arrange precautionary actions to mitigate 
an unlikely scenario. A work by Mochizuki (2009) sheds light on the connection 
of economic tools with such action. He mentioned that under security uncertainty, 
a country‟s strategy is usually not clear-cut between either balancing nor 
bandwagoning but entails a mixed approach. They will engage the potential 
adversaries through economic accommodation, such as what ASEAN did through 
the ASEAN-China FTA. Therefore, FTA is important as an engagement mean. 
Moreover, it also means that FTA can be used as a way to strengthen relations 
with an external power, especially one with the capability to constrain China, such 
as the US. Solis & Katada (2008) also explores this issue by arguing that one of 
the motives for cross-regional FTA is a state‟s attempt to engage the US as an 
extra-regional security guarantor. This is the very issue raised by Pang (2007) on 
commenting the US-Singapore FTA. From Singapore‟s point of view, the 
decision to arrange the deal is due to a political-security threat from surrounding 
environment, especially its bigger neighbors Indonesia and Malaysia and the 
broader US-China rivalry. On the TPP issue, it is argued here that the whether or 
not to participate links heavily with this US-China debate in East Asia. A 
Southeast Asian country will assess the level of China‟s threat based on their own 
customized situations, which then leads to an attempt to engage an external 
security guarantor or not. If they assess that such China‟s threat is high, then the 
more likely they will participate on TPP. Similarly, if they assess such a threat as 
relatively absent or less urgent, then the lower the need to engage the US through 
TPP. 
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 The third indicator, to reduce China‟s economic influence, still relates to 
this US-China debate. Yet, it entails specifically on the very economic tools that 
China may use to exert influence over Southeast Asian neighbors. China has been 
engaging Southeast Asia quite dynamically especially through trade relations and, 
to a lesser degree, FDI. The research will investigate how Southeast Asian 
countries respond to this particular economic engagement, such as on whether 
they see it as an opportunity or a threat and the very policy they formulate as a 
way to respond to such a situation. A country may continuously nurture its 
economic relations with China if it finds such relations beneficial. Yet, if it is not 
then a country may seek ways to mitigate such „threat‟. Responses here may vary, 
from developing their own competitiveness against surging import from China or 
to invite external actors to offset such imbalance. TPP is an important part of this 
strategy, as it gives an enormous measure for mitigating too close or too 
threatening economic relations with China. This line of argument is actually 
consistent if one sees the issue from the US‟ perspective. For the Great Power, 
TPP has important an political-security agenda (discussed more heavily in 
Chapter 3). Through TPP, the US offers a generous market access for Asia-Pacific 
countries, which on one hand, is substantial for deepening relations with the 
former, and on the other hand, to reduce or at least to balance the latter‟s 
increasing economic relations with China. Moreover, the high standard nature of 
TPP actually reflects the US‟ clear preference on neoliberal economic idea and its 
desire for more countries to embrace these ideals. As countries adjust their 
economies as required by TPP, then the greater distance it creates from other 
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development models, such as East Asian developmental state or Chinese-style 
„market socialism‟ (Manthorpe, 2013). Therefore, this research will focus on the 
Southeast Asian view the security-generated economic agreement.  
 
C. Proposition and Hypotheses
9
  
Figure II.2 – The Needs to Forge Closer Relations to the US: Hypotheses 
 
Figure II.2 shows relations between „economic gains‟ and „political-
security needs‟. The figure shows the relations in X and Y axis, describing the 
continuum by each variable. In this research, there are four propositions worth 
mentioning. Propositions here describe the logical relations between independent 
variables („political-security needs‟ and „economic gains‟) and dependent 
variables (decision on TPP). 
                                                          
9
 Given the qualitative nature of this research, the hypothesis proposed here should not be seen as a 
theory testing effort. Rather, it serves as a starting point or an early prediction to answer research 
questions. This position, therefore, makes the theory and hypothesis are very likely to change 
during the research. 
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#1 The higher the economic gains a country will get from the US, the more likely 
it will join the TPP 
#2 The lower the economic gains a country will get from the US, the less likely it 
will join the TPP  
#3 The higher a country has political-security needs to the US, the more likely it 
will join the TPP 
#4 The lower a country has political-security needs to the US, the less likely it 
will join the TPP 
 
 Different from propositions, hypothesis concerns more on temporary 
answer to the research questions. As seen from Figure II.2, there are three 
hypotheses based on three case studies: 
#1 High economic gains and high political-security needs most likely cause 
Vietnam to join the TPP 
#2 High economic gains and medium political-security needs most likely cause 
Malaysia to join the TPP 
#3 Medium economic gains and low political security needs most likely cause 
Indonesia not to join the TPP 
 
II.1.2 Domestic Factors: Support to Economic Reform 
Within the domestic category, there will be two different variables 
proposed: „support from state decision-maker‟ and „support from societal group‟. 
It is important to distinguish them, as they operate at different levels and are 
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constituted by different actors too. The activity of elite usually relates directly to 
the decision-making process. In this category, elite is indicated by national leaders, 
ruling party, opposition parties and bureaucracy. In the meantime, societal group 
also relates to decision-making process, although it plays a relatively more 
indirect role as a pressure group rather than the one responsible with the decision 
making process. Within this category, there are business groups, various NGOs, 
and academics. In this research, it is important to see the interest of those plural 
actors on the domestic economic reform process. 
Economic reform process means a set of policies designed to improve the 
efficient allocation of resources within a country. It means that there should be an 
abolition of market distortion policy and more promotion of pro-business or pro-
investment policy. Important in this regards are basic provisions, such as 
availability of infrastructure, human resources, and streamlining of investment 
procedures. Basically, economic reform is derived from neoliberal thinking. The 
most aggressive economic reform policy means only minimal state intervention 
within the economy, in which the state should only function as a referee or 
watchdog to maintain order. Therefore, market reform policies also entail 
liberalization and abolition of protectionist policies such as tariffs, subsidy, 
discrimination against foreign companies, and the like. TPP as a policy is of 
course coherent with this thought with the aim to restructure or reform the 
economy. A reform-minded government may use FTA like TPP as an additional 
pressure to directly expose domestic businesses to international competition, 
along with their own domestic economic reform agenda. By doing so, the state 
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hopes to force them to restructure their business activity so that it will conform 
more to international standards and competitiveness (Ravenhill, 2011, p. 182). In 
East Asia, where the economies are increasingly integrated to each other by a 
regional production network, policy reform is critical to deepen industrial 
structure or to move up the development ladder. As argued by Kimura (2006), 
abolition of protection will create an incentive for foreign companies to 
restructure their production from „pattern specific to each country‟ to „a pattern 
with wider production networks across countries‟. 
In this research, several qualifications must be made in order to better 
assess the influence of this variable on FTA decision-making. First, the domestic 
economic reform process is always politically contested. As mentioned before, 
this policy always carries a high degree of welfare distribution effect as some 
businesses are allowed to stay while some others are forced to exit. Not only in 
the business sector, such contest can also easily spill over into the political arena 
by taking more actors to express their position, such as the ruling party, 
opposition parties, bureaucracy, NGOs and others. In this research, such debate 
leads to a country‟s position on TPP. The more the support for domestic economic 
reform, then the more likely a country will participate in TPP. Second, there 
should be a distinction made between an actor‟s interest and its capacity to deliver 
it. Some reform-minded actors, for example, leaders from a ruling party, may 
have keen support for economic reform measures. Yet, it does not necessarily 
mean that they have the capacity to implement them, even though the decision has 
been taken. Actors may take important reform measures, such as the passing of 
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several business-related laws, but implementing them is another story. This 
research that covers the decision-making process on TPP relates pretty much to 
the interest aspect rather than the capacity. It relates to the power contest among 
actors in expressing their interests. This is very typical among developing actors, 
in which influential actors support reform measure but lack implementing 
capacity. Domestic actors within Vietnam and Malaysia may join the TPP as it 
relates to their interests, yet they seem to have problems to implement it once the 
negotiation reaches a conclusion. The implementing issue is of course beyond the 
scope of this research, not to mention that at the time being (2013-2015) it is 
impossible to cover, as TPP has yet to reach a conclusion.
10
   
 The rest of the subchapter will discuss the role of various actors in the 
policy-making process, divided by state and societal group‟s support, as well as 
the proposition and hypothesis for the domestic factor. 
 
A. Support from State Decision-Makers 
 As mentioned in chapter I, existing literature on Southeast Asian trade 
policy seems to see the state as a unitary actor. However, this research adapts an 
opposite view: the state is constituted by several actors, each of which competes 
for their own interests. The research is in line with the work of Gourevitch 
(19798) on the „second image reversed model‟, where he challenges the concept 
                                                          
10
 The distinction between „an actor‟s interest‟ and „implementing capacity‟ helps to explain why 
many developing countries, although have limited capacity to implement the TPP‟s high standard 
requirement, still decide to join the negotiation. A decision to join the TPP (pre-negotiation) only 
needs interests from powerful domestic actors to support the economic reform. Even more, the 
implementing capacity (post-negotiation) arguably can be translated into the negotiation table to 
request for technical capacities from developed countries, longer transition period, and the likes. 
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of strong state. According to him, assuming the state as the sole and only ultimate 
decision maker is both „apolitical‟ and „reductionist‟. It is „apolitical‟ since it 
hides the domestic policy making process; even though there seems to be a single 
articulation of interest in a given state, there should be an adequate explanation of 
why it happens. It is also „reductionist‟ since it makes false assumption that each 
state behaves similarly without room of variations. Furthermore, Gourevitch 
(1978) proposed the concept of „coalitional analysis‟, where any groups within a 
country articulate and make a coalition to foster their interests. Similarly, Milner 
(1997) said that the unitary state‟s assumption is both misleading and 
overgeneralizing, as it makes a researcher overlook key domestic factors to 
influence a decision-making process. International cooperation, including an FTA, 
always has „domestic distributional consequences‟, which lead various domestic 
actors to influence the process to maximize their gains. Milner (1997) proposes 
the concept of „polyarchy‟, which consists of: 1) no actor has a single authority 
over decision-making; 2) each actor has interest and power; and 3) each actor 
involves in a political „struggle and compromise‟.11 
 In Southeast Asia, discussion on the state itself is quite robust under 
different themes. If one looks at literature on political regime, discussion on state 
as a non-unitary actor is similar to the term „elites‟, which simply means power 
concentration on the few (Bertrand, 2013; Case, 2009, 2010). Discussion on elite 
itself is very important within Southeast Asian politics, as argued by Felker 
                                                          
11
 However, it must be noted that both Gourevitch‟s „coalitional analysis‟ and Milner‟s „polyarchy‟ 
include not only political actor but also institution/ structure to explain  a country‟s foreign policy. 
However, this thesis focuses only on actor-based analysis. Such limitation is made that the thesis 
becomes more manageable with less number of variables.  
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(2009), as the elites themselves contribute to the adaptation, and even success, of 
Southeast Asian states within the global political economy. 
 According to these literature, elite usually consists of „national leaders‟ and 
„opposition parties‟ (Bertrand, 2013; Case, 2009, 2010). The distinction is very 
clear to the democratic political system in Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines, 
in which national leaders are competing with leaders of other political parties for 
political power and authority. For the more autocratic Malaysia and Singapore, 
national leaders are usually the ones responsible for establishing and maintaining 
the current autocratic regime, namely the leaders of United Malay National 
Organization (UMNO) party in Malaysia and the People Action Party (PAP) in 
Singapore, whereas opposition parties are those wishing to overthrow such 
regimes and establish democratic ones, as in the case of Anwar Ibrahim in 
Malaysia. In a communist country like Vietnam, national leaders are the executive 
committee of the Vietnam Communist Party (VCP), but without any clear role of 
opposition parties. However, even within Vietnam‟s case, greater participation in 
policy-making is also fostered, especially in the parliament (London, 2010; 
Gainsborough, 2012). Specifically for national leaders, Case (2009) argues that 
they are important for regime survival as they provide economic resources to 
other elite members in exchange for political support and therefore create the so-
called „elite cohesiveness‟.12 Given their high ranking and powerful position in the 
ruling party, usually they also serve as a country‟s President or Prime Minister. 
                                                          
12
 Usually, the „elite cohesiveness‟ applies to elite members favoring the national leaders‟ group, 
as the case in Malaysia (Nesadurai, 2012). However, in democratic countries like the Philippines, 
opposition parties also get leverage from the existing democratic regime and, therefore, wish to 
maintain the survival of the regime (Case, 2009). 
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Moreover, beside leader and opposition party, the ruling party itself is also very 
important as a distinct political entity. Their positions (or rather, members of the 
party) do not always conform to the leader. In many cases, they exert a certain 
degree of power and opposing stance that the leader must keep an eye on. Yet if 
they are in the same stance, then the ruling party will be an important political 
supporter for a leader‟s interest.    
 Such a concept so far only applies for political change in Southeast Asia. It 
is the purpose of the research to see the extent to which these elite members 
influence policy-making in the region, especially on FTA preferences. It is 
interesting to see that some single-country researches actually prove that elite 
plurality plays a significant role within trade policy decision-making. Focusing on 
the Philippines, Van de Haar (2011) shows that the legislature does play arole in 
assessing the Japan-Philippines EPA (by delivering protectionist stance), therefore 
providing the room for conflict (or consensus) between national leaders and 
opposition parties.    
 Another important actor within this category is the bureaucracy. Existing 
literature in this particular actor, such as Fritzen (2009), usually sees bureaucracy 
in Southeast Asia as a non-Weberian example, namely non-neutral actor and 
heavily co-opted by the leaders due to their strategic roles in delivering the state‟s 
policy. Bureaucracy seems to be trapped within conflict between elite, as can be 
seen in Thailand in which elite division means bureaucratic division as well 
(Bertrand, 2013, pp. 122-123). There are also exceptional cases, of course. In 
Singapore, bureaucracy has transformed into a professional, rule-based, and 
37 
 
meritocratic one, although one must still take into account the influence of 
national leaders (former Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yeuw) that determined such 
design to maintain the city-state‟s competitiveness and survival (Winters, 2012, 
pp. 61-63).
13
 However, bureaucracy indeed plays a role in determining policy 
outcome. Sometimes they act on their own interests and ideas to foster a particular 
policy, even if it means confronting themselves with other bureaucratic bodies or 
even other elite members. As shown by Bird, Hill & Cuthbertson (2008), this is 
particularly true for the case of Indonesia, in which the Ministry of Trade and 
Ministry of Agriculture adopted protectionist NTBs (in favor of business and 
populist) vis-a-vis the Ministry of Finance, which continued its liberal tradition by 
imposing a tariff reduction. In the case of the Philippines, Tongzon (2005) shows 
that trade decision-making should be conducted through several layers of 
discussion among bureaucratic bodies, therefore giving room for conflict, let 
alone the supposed coordination and consensus. 
 
B. Support from Societal Groups 
IR theory recognizes the role of non-state actors in influencing the 
policy-making process, especially trade policy. Neo-functionalist argues that 
domestic business entrepreneurs, eyeing on the potential gains in a regional 
market, will push the government to conclude an FTA deal (Solis & Katada, 2008, 
p. 18). This is important, as usually there are deep trade and investment linkages 
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 Winters (2012) bases his explanation on the geoeconomic consideration, in which Singapore 
cannot compete with the resource-rich Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and other surrounding states 
to attract global investment. Therefore, the regime predictability, which includes a sound 
bureaucracy, is crucial for the resource-lacked Singapore to win the competition. 
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between a country and its neighbors, as seen in the establishment of the European 
Economic Community (EEC). Coherent with this logic, referring to the 
bilateralism phenomena in Asia Pacific, Aggarwal (2006) proposes that 
competitive and export-oriented industries will likely be the supporter and push 
for the government to conclude bilateral FTAs. 
In Southeast Asia, the business sector constitutes the major element 
within societal groups. Regarding this group, their very significance is 
undoubtedly important. Nesadurai (2003, 2012) discusses the „patronage network‟, 
in which business sector links heavily with the state in order to maximize its 
economic gain. Within the AFTA, they are sufficiently strong to influence the 
FTA outcome, namely developmental regionalism through Sensitive List and 
Exclusion List, as well as affirmative action on investment. In the words of 
Winters (2012), the domestic business sector can be categorized as oligarchs, in 
which they possess material power to maximize their own interest. High profile 
role played by the business sector has been discussed in many literature, 
especially in the case of Indonesia (Robinson & Hadiz, 2004; Hadiz, 2012; 
Winters, 2012), the Philippines (Tongzon, 2005; Van de Haar, 2011; Winters, 
2012), Thailand (Bertrand, 2013), and Malaysia (Bertrand, 2013; Nesadurai 
2012).
14
 Therefore, within the context of TPP, it is expected that they will play an 
active role in determining outcome. 
 On the other hand, one must bear in mind that a business sector is not the 
only actor within societal groups. Others also play a significant role, although so 
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 In the case of Vietnam, London (2010) shows that remarkable economic growth has contributed 
to the rise of business group, especially managers of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). However, 
their influence to the government is not very clear. 
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far their very influence has been assessed only in terms of bringing political 
change in Southeast Asia. There has been extensive discussion on this particular 
issue. Writers such as Alagappa (2004), Hughes (2009), Case (2010), Aspinall & 
Weiss (2012), and Bertrand (2013) use the word „civil society movement‟ or 
„middle class‟ to describe this other group, which basically means „group of 
associational life‟. Interestingly, they found relatively similar results across 
Southeast Asia. In democratic-type regimes such as in Indonesia, Thailand and the 
Philippines, civil society is very vibrant; they are a necessary factor to support 
change in the political regime, although they are not a sufficient factor, as elites 
still play a more important role. In pseudo-democracies like Singapore and 
Malaysia (Beeson, 2009b), the elite is such a strong entity that it can exert 
influence to or co-opt with civil society, although they still maintain some degree 
of autonomy and opposition. In communist or totalitarian countries such as 
Vietnam and Myanmar however, civil society is completely repressed.   
 It is the purpose of this research to assess their influence on different 
arenas, namely trade policy-making. Here, they are better represented by NGOs, 
which cover a wide variety of arenas, such as labor, health, consumer satisfaction, 
trade, and so on. They are usually active in advancing the concern of civil society, 
ranging from low, middle, to high income groups. In existing literature, NGOs in 
Indonesia (Bird, Hill & Cuthbertson, 2008; Chandra, 2008) and Philippines (Van 
de Haar, 2011) are particularly notable in advancing such concern.  
Another important actor, but with less coverage discussion, is the academics. 
They are important, as they are the source of academic and technical knowledge 
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that will be necessary for any actor‟s interest attainment. The academics 
themselves are quite various, yet in this research it is important to distinguish at 
least two different camps. First is the economist with an Economic or 
Management background. Usually, they support the idea of neo-liberalism, which 
is pretty much coherent with the domestic economic reform policy. Second is the 
academic with Political Science or IR background. Usually, they are concerned 
with mostly foreign and security policy. They also are keen on seeking linkages 
between economic cooperation with foreign and security objectives, therefore 
their stances are usually more state-centered than the economist. These two camps 
give different nuances on TPP, as they see it differently based on their academic 
background. 
 
C. Proposition and Hypotheses  
It is best to formulate relations between „state‟s support‟ and „societal 
group‟s support‟ by using figure II.3. Each of these variables inhabits either axis 
X or Y and influences a country‟s decision on TPP. For that purpose, it is 
important to make a proposition. For domestic support to economic reform, there 
are four propositions: 
#1 The stronger the support from state‟s decision-makers, the more likely a 
country will join the TPP 
#2 The weaker the support from state‟s decision-makers, the less likely a country 
will join the TPP 
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#3 The stronger the support from societal groups, the more likely a country will 
join the TPP 
#4 The weaker the support from societal groups, the less likely a country will join 
the TPP 
 
Figure II.3 – Domestic Support to Economic Reform: Hypotheses 
 
 Figure II.3 postulates hypothesis for these domestic variables. It poses 3 
hypotheses based on three case studies: 
#1 Strong support from state decision-makers & societal groups most likely cause 
Vietnam to join the TPP 
#2 Medium support from state decision-makers & societal groups most likely 
cause Malaysia to join the TPP 
#3 Weak support from state decision-makers & societal groups most likely cause 
Indonesia not to join the TPP 
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II.2 Method 
The research adopts a comparative method. According to Ragin (1994), 
such a method lies between quantitative (many cases, few aspect of cases) and 
qualitative (few cases, many aspect of cases) approach. The comparative method 
enables researcher to examine a moderate number of aspects within a moderate 
amount of cases, therefore it serves best for research aiming to explore diversity 
(Ragin, 1994). In this research, „aspect of cases‟ is the international and domestic 
factors, while „cases‟ are the 3 countries (Vietnam, Malaysia and Indonesia). The 
research will follow an inductive process of reasoning to identify the degree and 
nature of interaction among variables.  
The research will adopt a case study as its process of inquiry.
15
  A case 
study enables the researcher to develop a holistic account to phenomena, in which 
the researcher is not constrained simply by „tight causal-effect‟ as in quantitative 
approach, but more on „complex interaction‟ among variables (Creswell, 2007, p. 
39). A case study requires accurate descriptions as well as deep analysis on 
phenomena being studied. A case study is mostly appropriate for research aiming 
to find answer on „why‟ and „how‟ questions, which are the goal of this research. 
The case study here will be of an explanatory type to seek explanation of an event. 
A case study also enables the researcher to develop a better understanding 
between theory and evidence. According to Yin (2003), the researcher must 
conduct a feedback loop in order to better understand phenomena. A feedback 
loop is basically a „going back and forth‟ typical in qualitative research, in which 
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 Creswell (2007) mentioned that there are five process of inquiries: case study, ethnography, 
phenomenology, narrative reasearch, and grounded theory. 
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the researcher will reflect findings (data) to the theory being used, therefore refine 
and modify it to better explain the phenomena. Moreover, for a timeframe, the 
research will investigate the three case studies within 2008-2015. 2008 is chosen 
as it was the first time the US expressed its intention to join TPP, a decision of 
which was soon followed by Vietnam and Malaysia. 2015 reflects the current year 
in which discussion of TPP is still evolving. 
 
II.3 Technique of Validation  
As for validation technique, the research will follow “within-case control” 
and “process tracing” outlined by Munck (2004). Such concepts are adaptations of 
a quantitative approach (or in the words of Ragin (1994), “hard science nature of 
social research”) which distinguishes between experiment group and control 
group to measure whether independent variable really influences dependent 
variable. In qualitative-type approach as adapted in this research, usually it is very 
difficult to develop such grouping as phenomenon occurs in natural setting and 
cannot be experimented. “Within-case control” is a technique developed in order 
to cope with this issue. Basically, a phenomenon is segregated into variables 
related to hypothesis (called „systematic component‟) and those that do not 
(„random component‟). Then, a close examination through process-tracing will be 
conducted. Process-tracing is basically finding evidence on an independent 
variable to influence a dependent variable as well as on how it works. „Evidence‟ 
here usually appears on the statement of actors or official documents.   
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Another technique of validation for this research is a „positive-negative 
case‟ proposed by Ragin (2004). For comparative research, it is very common to 
compare cases possessing similar outcomes (or positive case). The researcher will 
find similarities across cases to explain causal factors, on the basis of “presence/ 
absence of a cause by presence/ absence of an effect”, known as “two-by-two 
cross-tabulation”. However, a problem appears, as we cannot determine the 
degree of causality of an independent variable in influencing the outcome of a 
dependent variable. In practicality, what if an independent variable appears in a 
case the outcome of which is totally opposite (negative case)? Therefore, it is 
necessary to compare a positive case with negative case. Such effort will enable a 
researcher to assess the degree of influence of independent variables to dependent 
variable, therefore contributing to a more valid causality. In this research, positive 
cases are represented by „participating‟ groups (Malaysia and Vietnam) while the 
negative case is the „not participating‟ country (Indonesia). As mentioned above, 
therefore, a comparison between these different groups is of utmost importance. 
 
II.4 Case Selection 
There are three countries selected to be case studies for the research: 
Vietnam, Malaysia and Indonesia. Vietnam and Malaysia are chosen as they 
represent „participating countries‟ of TPP; in fact, they are among the first 
countries to join after TPP held its first official negotiation in March 2010. On the 
other hand, Indonesia is chosen as the „not participating‟ country. During 2008-
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2015, various actors in Indonesia have been consistently showing reluctance to 
join.  
 Case selection for this research follows John Stuart Mills‟ „Method of 
Agreement‟ and „Method of Difference‟. Method of Agreement basically states 
that countries are chosen based on similar outcomes, whereas Method of 
Difference is based on opposite outcome (Mills, 1974, quoted in Ragin, 2004). In 
this research, Method of Agreement is utilized at one point on finding 
commonalities on the decision to participate on TPP (between Vietnam and 
Malaysia). Moreover, onother level of analysis will be devoted to comparing 
„participating‟ and „not participating‟ groups, therefore utilizing Mills‟ Method of 
Difference as both groups show opposite outcomes. Such analysis is necessary as 
it will address validity issue, namely the cross-tabulation problem which appears 
on analyzing countries with similar outcomes alone (Ragin, 2004, pp. 130-131).
16
 
Such a combination, i.e. „participating‟ and „not participating‟ countries, is also 
taken as the research is aimed to explore the diversity of trade policy in Southeast 
Asia. Therefore, concentrating only on either „participating‟ or „not participating‟ 
will only bring partial results. Comprehensiveness of the nature of trade policy 
decision making in Southeast Asia is the ultimate goal of this research.  
 There are surely more countries belonging to either „participating‟ or „not 
participating‟ groups in Southeast Asia. For example, Singapore and Brunei 
Darussalam are the original member of P-4 countries since 2005, in which TPP 
was still named the TPSEP. Other countries, such as Thailand, Laos, Cambodia 
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 For more detail on the cross-tabulation problem, please see the „Technique of Validation‟ 
subchapter below. 
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and Myanmar, are also among the „not participating‟ countries. The decision to 
put only Vietnam, Malaysia and Indonesia are based on the following 
considerations:  
First, countries taken as case studies for the research must have an 
economically important status within the region. Among this category, the most 
common reference in any literature is the ASEAN-6 (Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Philippines, Singapore, Brunei and Thailand) and CLMV countries (Cambodia, 
Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam). The former constitutes the more economically 
developed countries, with a combined GDP of around 90 percent in Southeast 
Asia‟s economy (ASEAN Secretariat, 2010, p. 38), while the latter is seen as less 
developed countries with a limited influence on the region, let alone on the global 
economy. Seen from this perspective, choosing ASEAN-6 seems to be a rational 
decision. However, in this research, Vietnam should be included in respect to its 
relatively fast economic development process. The country grew tremendously 
high, from only US$ 14.1 billion in 1985 to US$ 123.6 billion in 2011.
17
 The 
growth performance is close to the other miracle story in Southeast Asia, namely 
China, by around 7-8 percent since the late 1980s. Academics such as Masina 
(2002) credits Vietnam as a „late late-comer‟ in the world‟s economic 
development, while Collins (2009) refers it as a „young tiger‟. Therefore, the most 
important countries for the research are ASEAN-6 and Vietnam. 
Second, countries chosen should be sensitive to the „US factor‟ embedded 
within TPP. Politically, TPP is important as the US‟ tool for reengaging the Asia-
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 Data.worldbank.org  
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Pacific.
18
 In this regard, Singapore and Brunei are not qualified for the research 
exactly because they are the original member of TPSEP. At the time of 
establishment (in 2005), the US was not interested in becoming member; in fact, 
the US only expressed its interest to join in September 2008, which then triggered 
other countries‟ interest to join the deal. The very motive of Singapore and Brunei 
in joining TPSEP definitely excluded this „US factor‟. Therefore, the only 
qualified „participating‟ countries are Vietnam and Malaysia.  
As for Indonesia, the reason for selection is because the country is the 
biggest economy in the region with the status as the informal leader of ASEAN. 
Indonesia is also a good negative case („not participating‟ decision) as, compared 
to other candidates such as Thailand and the Philippines, it scores low or weak at 
any variables being observed in this research („medium economic gain, low 
political-security needs, low state support and low societal group support‟). 19 
Indonesia does not show a large degree of variations, therefore it will serve as a 
good comparison to the positive case. Other countries such as the Philippines will 
show variation of variables, such as high-political security needs combined with 
low support to domestic economic reform.
20
 This is important to assess the degree 
of explanatory factor of each variable. In the proposition beforehand, it is stated 
that the higher/ stronger the degree of independent variables, then the more likely 
it will lead to participation on TPP. Yet, the Indonesian case shows that the 
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 The issue will be elaborated in greater detail in chapter III 
19
 Look at the previous subchapter on hypothesis.  
20
 Even for the economic gain variable, Indonesia‟s function as a negative case is still better than 
both Thailand and the Philippines. For this variable, Indonesia is hypothesized as having medium 
level gain. Meanwhile, both Thailand and the Philipipines are trade-dependent nations with high 
reliance on the US‟ market. Therefore, both countries should be categorized as „high economic 
gain‟. This is less ideal for a counterfactual proving.   
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counter-factual situation is also true where the lower/ weaker the independent 
variables, then the less likely it will lead to participation in TPP. Another reason 
to choose Indonesia is due to practical issue, as the author is a native Indonesian 
speaker, which will lead to an easier data gathering process. This is important as 
TPP is a very recent phenomenon in which English-based data is not always 
readily available.  
 
II.5 Data Collection 
Multiple data sources will be used in this research, consisting of secondary 
and primary data. Secondary data will be gathered from existing literature and 
available publication, both from government and non-government agency. Some 
secondary data for the research are: 1) relevant books and journals; 2) research, 
statistics, and other publication; 3) reliable articles from various newspapers, 
magazines and websites. Meanwhile, primary data will also be used in the 
research. Interviews will be conducted to relevant actors, such as officials, 
business, NGO activists, and academics. Formal documents and other necessary 
texts will also be gathered.   
For that purpose, two activities will be conducted. The first will precede 
the second activity. First is desk study activity by using the library and internet to 
gather data from books, journals, articles and formal documents. Second, a field 
trip to case studies‟ countries aimed primarily for interviews. Ideally, the whole 3 
case studies should be visited to ensure balanced views. Yet due to time and 
financial limitation, the field research is only to be conducted in Malaysia & 
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Indonesia (in Spring 2015). In Malaysia, the author interviewed staff members 
and/ or academics from Malaysian AIDS Council, Institute for Strategic and 
International Studies (ISIS), Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia (UKM, National 
University of Malaysia), and Monash University Malaysia. In Indonesia, the 
author targeted academics from the University of Indonesia, Bina Nusantara 
University, ASEAN Advisory Business Council (ABAC), NGO activists from 
Third World Network (TWN), and former Presidential Staff for Economic Affairs. 
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CHAPTER III - TPP: EVOLUTION AND CONTROVERSIES 
 
 This chapter aims to give an introduction to what TPP is. First, it will give 
an explanation of the evolution of TPP. The origin of the deal can be traced back 
to 2005 when it was still regarded as a peripheral agreement. Second, it will focus 
more on economic controversies. The subsection will elaborate on what it means 
to be the 21
st
 century agreement, why it is necessary and why it is controversial. 
Third, the chapter will highlight the political controversies surrounding the TPP. 
Of particular importance is the political-security meaning it carries: the view that 
TPP is part of US‟ pivot in Asia-Pacific. The chapter will end with a conclusion. 
 
III.1 Evolution: From TPSEP to TPP 
 The name of TPP came only in March 2010. Previously, there was the 
Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership (TPSEP), a preferential trading 
arrangement (PTA) between Singapore, New Zealand, Chile and Brunei 
Darussalam (known as the P-4 countries). Tracing back to its early development, 
TPSEP was born after the deadlock of APEC-initiated Early Voluntary Sectoral 
Liberalization (EVSL) negotiation in 1998. As mentioned in Chapter I, EVSL 
itself is the first attempt to create a Trans-Pacific PTA. The deadlock arouse from 
difference between two groups, namely the Western Group on one hand 
(consisting of „Western‟ members such as the US, Canada, Australia, New 
Zealand, and Singapore) and Asian group on the other hand (Japan, China and 
some other Asian countries) (Kelegama, 2000; Okamoto, 2004; Beeson, 2009a). 
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Western members demanded for Western-style FTA, which was basically 
comprehensive liberalization sectors, tight schedule and legally binding, whereas 
Asian members insisted on a looser arrangement to mind members‟ different 
development stage (Kelegama, 2000; Okamoto, 2004; Beeson, 2009a). Given the 
deadlock, the Western members tried to arrange PTA among the like-minded 
states. However, Australia and the US declined their negotiation status. The 
remaining smaller countries (Singapore, New Zealand and Chile), aware of the 
potential unattractiveness of their small markets, still continued the negotiation 
process. They believed that it was important to demonstrate other Asia-Pacific 
countries the benefit of full-scale trade liberalization. Then, Brunei Darussalam 
joined the negotiation in 2005. The TPSEP was concluded in the following year. 
 As part of TPSEP negotiation, two years after it came into force in 2006, 
there should be another round of negotiation to address liberalization in financial 
service and investment in 2008. It is where the US expressed its interest to 
negotiate (Capling & Ravenhil, 2012, p. 283) and when TPSEP started gaining 
worldwide attention. It was not so long until Presiden George W. Bush announced 
US‟ intention to negotiate fully in September 2008. The US seemed to find the 
high-quality nature of the TPSEP attractive. Among other FTAs, the TPSEP is 
widely acknowledged for its wide liberalization scopes, including the 
controversial agriculture sector (Lewis, 2011, p. 31). Financial service and 
investment were also still rare negotiation objects at that time.
21
 US‟ decision 
                                                          
21
 Although it is true that the TPSEP has a higher standard than other FTAs, some authors argue 
that it is not that high-standard. Capling & Ravenhill (2012) mentioned that there are some „high-
quality‟ requirements that have not been fulfilled yet by the TPSEP, such as the normative 
commitment (not legally-binding) to the environmental standard, the exclusion of dispute 
52 
 
soon triggered other countries to join as well. Australia, Peru, and Vietnam were 
among the earliest to join. As seen in Table I.1, they grouped with the P-4 and US 
to arrange the 1
st
 round of negotiation in Melbourne, Australia, March 2010, 
although Vietnam decided to be only an observer. Soon enough in October 2010, 
Malaysia joined Vietnam to be full negotiating parties during the 3
rd
 round of TPP 
negotiation in Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei Darussalam. In October 2012, 
Canada and Mexico joined the group while, in July 2013, Japan joined too. It 
made TPP members to 12 countries. Other than that, some countries are also 
reported to express intention to join, such as Colombia, Costa Rica, the 
Philippines, Thailand, South Korea and Taiwan. 
 
Table III.1 – New Members of TPP 
Time New Members  Note 
2006 Chile, Singapore, New 
Zealand, Brunei 
Darussalam (P-4) 
FTA titled Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic 
Partnership (TPSEP) 
September 2008 United States (US) US expressed interest to join. TPSEP started gaining 
world attention.  
November 2008 Australia, Vietnam, Peru Expression of interest 
March 2010   1st Round of negotiation under the title Trans-Pacific 
Partnership  
 Negotiation between P4, the US, Australia and Peru  
 Vietnam participated as observer 
October 2010 Malaysia Malaysia and Vietnam formally joined as negotiating 
parties during 3
rd
 round of negotiation 
October 2012 Canada and Mexico As negotiation parties 
July 2013 Japan As negotiation party 
TOTAL MEMBERS 12 countries 
 
The format of TPP negotiation is quite rare in comparison to other FTAs. 
The latter usually follows closed commitment by being restrictive to other 
                                                                                                                                                               
settlement mechanism from „competition policy‟ clause, and the lower IPR provision than the 
WTO commitment. 
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countries to join the deal (Elms & Lim, 2012b, pp.1-2; Lewis, 2011, p. 32). TPP is 
different as it opens the possibility for more countries to join. This rule was 
derived from the TPSEP, which acknowledges new members through the 
accession clause. Article 20.6 of TPSEP mentioned that:  
“...(1) this agreement is open to accession on terms to be agreed among the Parties, 
by any APEC Economy or other State. The terms of such accession shall take into 
account the circumstances of that APEC Economy or other State, in particular with 
respect to timetables for liberalisation...” (Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic 
Partnership Agreement, 2005) 
 
 TPP clearly follows the path of TPSEP (Lewis, 2011, p. 34). Not only for 
accession clause, TPP also follows high-standard or high-quality agreement in its 
negotiation. Furthermore, the two FTAs share a similar approach to geographical 
boundaries, by combining countries from North America, Latin America, 
Southeast Asia, Northeast Asia and South Pacific. It is, therefore, a truly Trans-
Pacific agreement, which has the potential to carry the APEC‟s idea of Free Trade 
Area of the Asia Pacific (FTAAP). Nevertheless, it is not always easy to adopt 
such objectives. As shown below, there are clear gaps between intention (or 
propaganda) and reality.  
 
III.2 Economic Controversies: TPP between Promise and Reality  
III.2.1 20
th
 vs 21
st
 Century Agreement 
 TPP has been conducting negotiation since 2010. Until August 2013, 
member countries have concluded 19
th
 negotiation round, the latest was in Bandar 
Seri Begawan, Brunei Darussalam. The negotiation was focused on creating the 
so-called high standard or 21
st
 century agreement. Having said so, supporter of 
54 
 
TPP wishes to undermine existing FTAs by labeling them as a mere 20
th
 century 
agreement. Lim, Elms & Low (2012) mentions several arguments why 20
th
 
century agreement is an example of low-quality arrangement. First, it focuses only 
on final rather than intermediate goods and tariff liberalization. Second, they also 
include many exclusion lists on sensitive sectors, most notably agriculture. Third, 
20
th 
century FTA also incorporates strict Rules of Origins (ROO), which is a new 
protectionist measure as it imposes a high ratio of local content requirement. 
Fourth, 20
th
 century FTA also only put limited commitment to service and 
investment liberalization. Many of them only adopt WTO commitment, which is 
criticized as weak commitment.  
21
st
 century agreement, in contrast, tries to go beyond that by pursuing 
more aggressive liberalization. It puts a specific target on intermediate rather than 
finished goods as cross-border parts and components trade becomes increasingly 
significant nowadays (Capling & Ravenhill, 2011, p. 560). Traditionally, to 
produce goods, all lines of production are conducted within a country. However 
given the prevailing communication and technology, it is now possible to split 
production process to several countries based on their specialization and cost-
effective competitive advantage. Value chain, vertical specialization and global 
production network are terminologies used to describe this phenomenon. As the 
result, on-the-border liberalization is now not enough. Beyond-the-border 
liberalization or domestic market reform is now all more important to ensure 
smooth mobility of such products (Capling & Ravenhill, 2011, p. 560). This is 
also the phenomenon captured by the WTO-plus arrangement, which is then 
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adopted within TPP. Trade facilitation is very important in this regard by 
streamlining or harmonizing custom procedures between countries. State-of-the-
art infrastructure is also important to support faster mobility and efficient value 
chain process. At the same time, stronger competition and investment policy 
should also be fostered. Competition policy gives national treatment status to 
foreign countries, therefore putting them in equal competition with local 
companies. Investment rules should also be incorporated within this trade 
agreement as it has intertwining nature within this value chain process (Lim, Elms, 
& Low, 2012, pp. 8-9). International rule should be maintained to ensure no 
expropriation or other discriminative action are taken, to establish Investor-State 
Dispute Settlement (ISDS) and to ensure „establishment without limits on the 
operation of financial institutions and suppliers‟ (Schott & Muir, 2012, p. 55). 
Stronger IPR regulation is also necessary to protect patent and other copyright 
materials, whereas a loose ROO is important to simplify complexities and 
rigidities generated by the strict 20
th
 century agreement. 
As observed by Schott & Muir (2012), such high standard agreement is 
influenced by the US‟ FTA template. Compare to other country, US‟ FTA is 
relatively more broad-based with only limited exclusion list. There are exceptions, 
such as sugar products in US-Australia FTA, rice in Korea-US (KORUS) FTA 
and small dairy products in US-Canada trade. This category also includes the 
service sector, in which the US has a keen interest in liberalizing financial 
services, insurance, telecommunication, and air express delivery in the overseas 
market. For investment chapter, the US refers to the NAFTA template, in which 
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the ISDS is set up to ensure the Mexican does not expropriate US‟ companies. 
Moreover, US‟ FTA usually also includes investment treaty to escape 
complexities in the Congress. Different from trade agreement that only requires a 
simple majority to pass, investment treaty should possess two third majority in the 
Congress. Therefore, it is easier to embed investment with a trade agreement.   
 
III.2.2 Opposition from Member Countries 
 TPP‟s high-quality arrangement, of course, must confront with oppositions. 
Many member countries voice concern on some clauses. Japanese interest groups 
disagree on agriculture liberalization, stating that TPP will endanger the country‟s 
food security by a rising food import from 60 percent to 90 percent and it makes 
Japanese rice, wheat and beef uncompetitive in domestic market (Fensom, 2013). 
Another controversy is at the pharmaceutical issue. Through stronger IPR 
implementation, the US wishes to impose a lot more expensive pharmaceutical 
sales for medicine in other countries. This is the issue in which Malaysia 
withdrew its bilateral FTA negotiation in the 2000s and triggers opposition from 
other countries as well, such as Australia, New Zealand, Chile and Peru (Capling 
& Ravenhill, 2012, p. 291).  
Meanwhile, competition policy is problematic in TPP‟s developing 
members. Under the national treatment principle, small, uncompetitive companies 
in Mexico, Vietnam, Peru, and Malaysia should confront big highly competitive 
companies from the US. National treatment principle also means that it is 
prohibited to support state-owned enterprises (SOEs); a rule that can greatly 
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hamper state-led development process in Malaysia, Vietnam, and Singapore. 
Moreover, strict implementation on IPR, environment and labor are difficult as 
developing countries can never cope with. Piracy is way too prevalent while the 
environment and labor standards are beyond the capacity of any governments 
from developing countries. Moreover for the issue of International Arbitration 
Committee, TPP aggressively protects the interest of Multinational Corporations 
(MNCs) beyond the traditional international law. TPP tries to position MNC equal 
to states, thereby giving space for the former to bring the latter to the court. 
Controversy moves as the US tries to propose financial service liberalization. In 
East Asia, especially those suffering negative impact from Asian financial crisis 
1997-1998, excessive capital mobility is seen as one contributing factor to the 
crisis, therefore financial service liberalization will lead to greater financial 
instability in the region. It is not without reason that Malaysia imposed capital 
control measure during the crisis. 
 
III.3 Political Controversies 
III.3.1 TPP: US’ Tools for Engaging the Asia-Pacific 
 Another controversial issue surrounding TPP is about US‟ motives. One 
argument said that the very purpose of the US to foster TPP is to capture a new 
global market for US‟ future economies. It correlates heavily with the severe 
economic downturn that the US faced during the global crisis in 2007-2008. 
During this episode, almost 2.2 million housing owners in the country were 
unable to pay their debt (Kompas, 19 Sept. 2008). In 2008, as many as 10.1 
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million people lost their jobs or the highest in the latest 25 years. It is with this 
background that the US feels attracted by East Asia, a dynamic region with a huge 
domestic market, productive citizens and high economic growth. By engaging 
East Asia, the US tries to boost its economic performance again by exporting 
more to the region. Moreover, the world‟s economy is characterized by the global 
imbalance in which the US‟ import too much and East Asian countries export too 
much (Akyuz, 2010). The US feels it is important to correct such imbalance, as it 
will also remedy its huge trade deficit by exporting more to East Asia. Therefore, 
proposing TPP is an important exit strategy to revitalize the US‟ economy further. 
Through export, the US wishes to produce more, therefore, to recover economic 
growth and to provide more jobs.  
Such argument is true at some point. However, one must recognize that so far 
TPP only engages countries with small markets, such as Brunei, New Zealand or 
Malaysia. For other countries such as Mexico, Canada, and Australia, the US 
already has FTA with. Therefore, at least in the short term the export market 
argument is not very valid as the US finds no significant gain. However, the 
argument is more valid in the middle or long run, given the possible entry of new 
countries under TPP‟s accession clause. The entry of Japan in July 2013 is a good 
proof, which is clearly an important state in East Asia, given its huge domestic 
market and powerful economic status. The US may expect the entry of other 
market-prospective countries, such as Indonesia, India or even China. The more 
countries to join the higher economic gains that the US will achieve, therefore 
bolstering the very purpose of East Asia as US‟ new spur of economic growth. In 
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this regard, US has interest in the creation of FTAAP, as mentioned by Myron 
Brilliant, Senior Vice President of US Chamber of Commerce (quoted in Lewis, 
2011, p. 35-36): 
“…while new export opportunities in the seven partners of the TPP negotiations…may 
be relatively modest for US companies…[i]f the TPP agreement evolves gradually into 
the Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific, then the United States has the potential to 
reach into economically significant markets that previously have been closed off to us 
through bilateral negotiations…” 
 
There is another argument claiming that one must position the US‟ TPP 
maneuver with the overall US‟ political-security objective in Asia Pacific. Koo 
(2013) argues that after the Cold War, the US seems to detach from East Asia 
because its market-led Washington consensus idea is in direct conflict with the 
traditional Asian-led capitalism. The US uses International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
to promote greater liberalization in the region; even more the US is no longer very 
generous to give other countries‟ access to its huge domestic market. Such 
situation makes East Asian countries somehow „move away‟ from the US and 
triggers East Asian regional arrangement. This is particularly true for the 
ASEAN+3 arrangement, in which China is the main promoter. This arrangement 
gains success in developing Chiang Mai Initiative, which provides liquidity 
backup for member countries during the economic crisis. It is a challenge to US-
backed IMF program that accentuates structural adjustment program. In terms of 
trade, East Asian countries also try to access other markets as alternatives to the 
traditional US market.  
     Within such situation, it is no wonder that China gains a sufficient space to 
exercise its power rise. As mentioned above, China is a keen supporter of 
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ASEAN+3 arrangement, which largely excludes the US. China also generously 
provides its market to Southeast Asian countries through ASEAN-China FTA, 
concluded in 2001.
22
 China even proposed another bold measure to create FTA 
among ASEAN+3 countries, which again excluded the US. The US, in the midst 
of China‟s regional presence and accusation of the former being too involved in 
the Middle East, responded by establishing the “plus-one” framework with 
ASEAN countries (Koo, 2013, p. 104). In November 2005, there was ASEAN-US 
enhanced partnership, in which one of the main agenda is to promote ASEAN-US 
trade and investment facilitation, including to propose FTA with individual 
ASEAN countries. The US concluded FTA with Singapore in 2003 and conducted 
bilateral negotiations with Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines, although it 
eventually failed (Koo, 2013, p. 104). In US‟ view, it is important to leave its 
wait-and-see behavior on ASEAN regionalism project and start engaging it to 
ensure that it will not harm US‟ regional influence (Mochizuki, 2009, quoted in 
Koo, 2013). The US even signed the ASEAN‟s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation 
(TAC), a decision that the US was very reluctant beforehand.  
Another central pillar for the objective is to support the idea of FTAAP 
through APEC (Koo, 2013, p. 104). TPP is important as it has the potential to 
make the idea come true. TPP is also important as a continuation of US‟ 
engagement in Asia Pacific as well as to keep China‟s regional influence in check 
(Capling & Ravenhill, 2011, p. 559).  This is particularly relevant if one looks into 
                                                          
22
 China even proposed the Early Harvest Program with which Southeast Asian countries can 
export agriculture products at 0 percent tariff rate to China during 2004-2010without reciprocal 
action from China‟s side. 
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the political-security connection between the US and the current TPP members, as 
elaborated below: 
“...there is a strong degree of support for US foreign policy goals among the current 
TPP partners, many of whom seek their security in defence arrangement with the US. 
Australia has a treaty alliance with the US and it hosts joint military intelligence 
facilities. Sinapore has actively supported the US military presence in East Asia, and 
it provides the US forces with access to its air and naval bases. Malaysia and Brunei 
Darussalam have defence cooperation arrangements with the US. Peru and Chile 
have been close allies of the US in Latin America in recent years. Although New 
Zealand and the US suspended thheir alliance in 1985 (when New Zealand refused to 
allow nuclear-powered submarine access to its ports), NZ-US military cooperation 
resumed in 2007. Finally, Vietnam has recently commenced low-level forms of 
military cooperation with the US, in large part because of escalating tensions with 
China over the South China Sea...” (Capling & Ravenhill, 2012, p. 293) 
 
Trade-security linkage is not without precedent in US‟ policy. After the end 
of World War II, the US had keen interest to promote the capitalist world vis-a-vis 
Soviet Union-backed communist world. This made the US support the 
establishment of the World Bank, IMF and International Trade Organization/ ITO 
(which then was replaced by the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade/ GATT) 
as part of creating free and open world system. In 1951, the US also established 
San Fransisco Peace Treaty, in which it provided bilateral security guarantee 
while the allies (including Asian allies like Japan) joined trade multilateralism and 
enjoyed access to US‟ domestic market (Aggarwal, 2013, p. 182). The pattern 
continues with US‟ PTA strategies since the 1980s. US-Israel and US-Jordan 
FTAs in 1985 and 2001 are important as they reaffirmed American support to 
these allies as well as to strengthen relations with them (Aggarwal, 2013, p. 183). 
This is also the very reason in which the US gives FTA partner status to Bahrain, 
Morocco and Oman (Capling & Ravenhill, 2012, p. 292). In the Asia-Pacific, 
important countries in this regard are Australia, Chile and Singapore, with which 
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the US already arranged bilateral FTAs during the 2000s as part of its attempt to 
strengthen existing security arrangements (Capling & Ravenhill, 2012, p. 292). 
   Geoeconomically, it is increasingly more urgent for the US to engage 
more deeply in the Asia-Pacific. This region is a site for growing economic 
influence or, using the word of Fareed Zakaria (2008), the Rise of the Rest, such 
as China, Indonesia, and other East Asian countries. East Asia is one of the most 
economically dynamic regions nowadays as it consists of the Asian Miracle 
countries, which succeed to transform their nations from poor into strong 
economic powerhouses. East Asian countries contributed 32 percent to the 
world‟s GDP since the 2000s. It makes them as one of the contributors to the 
multipolar world while at the same time erodes the US‟ hegemonic status. It is no 
wonder that under President Obama, the US tries to give more emphasis on Asia-
Pacific. In November 2009 during his visit to East Asia, President Obama even 
portrayed himself as „America‟s first Pacific president‟ (Capling & Ravenhill, 
2012, p. 288).   
 
III.3.2 TPP as New Regional Model in Asia-Pacific 
Another US‟ motive on TPP is to promote it as a new model of regional 
integration in the Asia-Pacific. As mentioned beforehand, after the Cold War East 
Asia increasingly develops its regional arrangement. Many of them excludes the 
US, due particularly to the influence of China. It is very clear in the case of 
ASEAN+3, in which China even proposed to create EAFTA in 2003, although it 
failed due to minimal support from other countries. Japan proposed another 
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arrangement called the CEPEA, consisting of ASEAN+3 countries, India, 
Australia and New Zealand (called the ASEAN+6). The US was once again not 
here. Despite commonalities in terms of US‟ exclusion, both arrangements have 
another similarity. They are a relatively low-quality arrangement by emphasizing 
mostly on tariffs and maintaining high exclusion list and limited support for 
WTO-plus principle (Lewis, 2012, pp. 238-239).  
     Given such development, the US wishes to use TPP as a new model of 
regional integration. TPP is, at least in the rhetoric, a complete contrary to the 
East Asian integration model. In terms of membership, it includes not only the US 
but also other American countries (Lewis, 2012, pp. 238-239). Secondly, as 
mentioned above, TPP is promoted to be high-quality 21
st
 century FTA with a 
deep commitment to large-scale liberalization and WTO-plus principle. Through 
TPP, the US emphasizes different rules of the game in the Asia-Pacific to pursue a 
legally based arrangement, stronger protection to labor and environmental 
standard and creation of a level playing field (Obama‟s speech, quoted in Capling  
& Ravenhill, 2012, p. 292). 
    The competing model between East Asia and the US seemed to repeat the 
previous division within the APEC-initiated EVSL negotiation. At that time, 
Asian groups proposed a more relaxed approach by proposing concerted 
liberalization or liberalization based on each country‟s development capacity. In 
contrast, Western countries led by the US proposed comprehensive liberalization 
equipped by tight schedule and legally binding commitment. In the current era, it 
is somehow repeated in which ASEAN plus arrangement is said to be 20
th
 century 
64 
 
or low-quality agreement, whereas the TPP set the 21
st
 century or high-quality 
standard. It is interesting to note that the US uses its mighty power, namely its 
huge domestic market, to draw countries closer. Many Asian countries rely very 
much on this market, therefore creating a big pull strategy for them to gather 
around the US, even though it means accepting US‟ rule of the game. It is not 
without coincidence that the US chose TPSEP as its starting point, as the 
agreement possesses the accession clause to enable new membership. By doing so, 
the US somehow sends a message to other Asia-Pacific countries that access to 
US‟ market is only granted if a country accepts US‟ sphere of influence. 
Therefore, if the TPP gains success, the US will be the ultimate agenda-setter in 
Asia-Pacific and potentially dwarf other regional arrangements (Lewis, 2011, p. 
39). 
  
III.4 Conclusion 
 The very idea of TPP was coming from the initiative of Brunei, Chile, 
New Zealand and Singapore to create TPSEP in 2006. It soon gained worldwide 
attention as the US expressed its intention to join in September 2008. What makes 
it attractive is the very fact that TPP still retains the so-called high-quality FTA 
that TPSEP pursues. This is not easy, of course, because such rhetoric faces 
resistance from other countries, such as developing members within TPP that 
disagree on the strict adherence to WTO-plus arrangement. More importantly, the 
opposition also comes from the US‟ domestic politics itself. Despite US‟ rhetoric 
on 21
st
 century FTA, in fact, it is not ready to fully liberalize its domestic market 
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as certain domestic groups oppose market opening in sugar, beef and textile 
market. The US‟ government will also find difficulties to pass congressional 
debate as now it no longer enjoys the leverage of Trade Promotion Authority 
(TPA).  
     Politically, one can systematize US‟ motive in TPP as followed. First, the 
US tries to anticipate engine of growth from the Asia-Pacific for the US‟ economy 
in the middle and long-term period. Currently, TPP is not big enough for market 
expansion. However, the accession clause within TPP makes it very possible to 
accept new potential members with huge domestic markets. Secondly, TPP is 
important as US‟ tools to engage the Asia-Pacific, especially as the last several 
years countries in the region actively make their own regional arrangements that 
practically exclude the US, such as the ASEAN+3 or ASEAN+6. China also takes 
advantage of such situation by pursuing its regional agenda through the 
ASEAN+3. Therefore, it is necessary for the US to come up with a new regional 
model that is different from the East Asian proposal. TPP is important here as its 
high-quality rhetoric can serve as a new regional model against the East Asian 
low-quality model.   
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CHAPTER IV - MALAYSIA  
 
 In the academic literature, Malaysia was known as the reluctant bilateralist 
(Okamoto, 2006) as dense patronage network between state and domestic 
business group hampered the country from becoming an aggressive FTA 
champion. However, Malaysia nowadays engages FTA more passionately than 
before by signing bilateral FTAs with Japan, Chile, Pakistan, India and Australia. 
Since 2010, Malaysia also joined the TPP negotiation. For Malaysia, the motives 
for joining TPP intersects heavily with its very position within the global 
economy as it seeks economic survival. Moreover, the TPP is considered to be the 
„next stage‟ of Malaysian development agenda. More interestingly, discussing 
TPP in Malaysia relates heavily to the overall structure of Malaysian domestic 
economic and political landscape, touching more sensitive issues such as the 
Bumiputera policy and the survival of existing political regime.  
    The chapter on Malaysia reveals that the country‟s decision to join TPP 
comprises of international and domestic aspect. On international aspect, the 
economic benefit is very dominant, especially in regards to Malaysia‟s status as a 
trading nation. Through TPP, the country strengthens the existing trade and 
investment linkage with the US, which is Malaysia‟s traditional economic partner. 
It is also important to note that TPP serves as an important tool to lock-in 
economic reform within Malaysia. It resonates well with domestic aspect, in 
which Malaysia‟s participation in TPP is due to the existence of pro-economic 
reform groups, consisting of national leaders and bureaucracy, which are willing 
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to deal with the long-standing protectionist group within domestic political 
landscape. 
 
IV.1 The Development of TPP Case in Malaysia 
     In regards to trade relations with the US, Malaysia was negotiating 
bilateral FTA as early as 2005. It followed the US‟ Trade and Investment 
Framework (TIFA) in Southeast Asia as way to get the superpower closer to this 
particular region. However, the negotiation did not go very smoothly. In January 
2009, the negotiation stopped and never resumed. The Malaysian government 
commented that it was due to US‟ support for Israel‟s invasion to the Palestine.23 
Yet, the real cause was the high standard template that US wished to impose, in 
which Malaysia found it hard to comply. Among the most difficult issue was the 
government procurement, where in one hand the US wished it to be liberalized 
and on the other hand Malaysia saw it vital for ethnic redistributive policy (Brown, 
2010; Elms & Lim, 2012a).  
 As Malaysia found FTA with the US vital, the country wished to resume 
trade talks. Opportunities came in 2010 where the US-sponsored TPP started 
negotiation in 2010. Malaysian Minister of International Trade and Industry (ITI) 
explicitly stated that due to the stalemate of bilateral talks, Malaysia‟s „natural 
choice‟ would be joining the TPP (Brown, 2010). Malaysia also found it more 
                                                          
23
 (2009, Jan. 13). Rundingan FTA dengan AS Ditangguh [FTA negotiation with the US is 
pending]. Retrieved from 
http://ww1.utusan.com.my/utusan/info.asp?y=2009&dt=0113&pub=Utusan_Malaysia&sec=Muka
_Hadapan&pg=mh_03.htm  
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convenient to negotiate in TPP framework than in bilateral FTA. The reason is as 
followed: 
“…Malaysia thought maybe this is [TPP] a good idea to continue where we left 
[the US-Malaysia bilateral FTA]…it makes sense to us now that we have more 
friends, we have developing countries friends in the negotiation process…because 
if we have any industry that we want to protect, then let‟s give Vietnam or Peru a 
call…so we have friends to negotiate with…and we thought that we have more 
bargaining chip as [we are now with] countries with similar development status 
compare to before. So it makes absolute sense for us to join the TPP…”24 
 
 Malaysia was then officially accepted as negotiating parties during the 3rd 
Round of TPP negotiation in Brunei Darussalam, 4-10 October 2010. It makes 
Malaysia be the fourth countries from Southeast Asia to join the talks, besides 
Singapore, Brunei Darussalam, and Vietnam. At this point, the decision was taken 
by Minister of ITI Datuk Seri Mustapa Mohamed and backed up by the PM Najib 
Razak himself. Nonetheless, as the issue evolves, these two actors are criticized 
domestically since the negotiation is too confidential without any access for other 
actors. Criticism comes from many actors, such as NGOs, opposition parties, and 
ex-PM Mahathir Mohamad. Recognizing this problem, MITI starts to engage 
other actors more intensively, especially through consultation and press release, 
yet it is still reluctant to disclose all negotiation texts and development. On their 
reply to MITI‟s press release in May 2013, NGO coalitions commented that 
MITI‟s engagement should start at least three years earlier (Idris, 2013).  
     The domestic debate continues as the government established the 
bipartisan TPP caucus in the parliament. The aim of the caucus is to foster 
consultation with the public and to ensure that Malaysia‟s participation will be in 
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 Interview with two economists from the Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS) in 
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 24 February 2015 
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line with the country‟s best interest (The Malaysian Insider, 8 Jul. 2013). The 
caucus is also a forum where the government delivers the update of the 
negotiation. In reality, the government can never uncover the whole process and 
only selectively point out several issues. Originally, the caucus comprised of 7 
members: four from the ruling coalition Barisan Nasional (BN) and three from the 
opposition Pakatan Rakyat (PR) (The Malaysian Insider, 8 Jul. 2013). 
Subsequently, it evolves into 11 members: six from BN and five from PR (The 
Borneo Post, 1 Oct. 2013). The chairman is Datuk Ahmad Hamzah from UMNO. 
The government and the caucus meet regularly, such as in July 2013, August 2013, 
September 2013, October 2013, November 2014 and April 2015.  
However, there is still much dissatisfaction. Opposition parties make many 
press statements, whereas NGOs arrange demonstrations, coalition, and other 
forms of pressure to the government. It heightened even more in April 2014 where 
US‟ President Barrack Obama visited Malaysia. Many actors, either they are in 
the pro- or anti-TPP groups, used this rare occasion to voice their concerns. Until 
now, there is no consensus achieved among these domestic actors. Government 
still continues negotiation in the TPP and the anti-TPP group still conducts 
various forms of protest.   
 
IV.2 International Factor 
IV.2.1. Economic Benefits: Seeking Trade, Investment and Economic Reform  
 One of the reasons why Malaysia joined the TPP was due to the structural 
economic issue. For a small, trade-dependent country like Malaysia, international 
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economic exposure in terms of market access and investment are of greatest 
importance. As seen in Table IV.1, trade to GDP ratio in Malaysia consistently 
reaches a high level, from around 111 percent in 1980 to 220 percent in 2000. As 
a small population country (only around 30 million people), Malaysia‟s trade 
importance is a lot greater than populous countries like Indonesia or China. The 
last two countries mostly rely on the domestic market, in which trade only 
contributes around 40 to 70 percent of their GDP. Malaysia‟s trade dependence is 
pretty much like Singapore, another member of TPP, the ratio of which 
consistently more than 300 percent. 
 
Table IV.1 – Trade to GDP Ratio (Percent) 
 1980 1990 2000 2010 
Indonesia 54 49 71 47 
China n.d. 27 44 55 
Malaysia 111 147 220 170 
Singapore 411 344 366 372 
Source: data.worldbank.org  retrieved at 2 April 2015, 2:21 PM 
  
It is of this structural situation in which Malaysia seeks international 
market more aggressively than a country like Indonesia does. Within TPP, 
Malaysia‟s greatest interest is the US, which dominates the grouping by 
accumulating 58 percent of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and 40 percent of 
its population in 2010.
25
 The US also happens to be one of Malaysia‟s biggest 
(and traditional) trading partner (in fact, the US is number two after Singapore), 
with trade amounted to as much as US$ 40 billion in 2011 and surplus of 
US$ 11.6 billion (Williams, 2013, p. 5). For Malaysia, the US is an important 
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 Calculated from UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics 2012, pp.412-418 and 454-471 
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market for its manufacturing sectors such as electrical product and machinery. On 
2011, these two segments contributed to US$ 12.5 billion and US$ 4 billion or 
around 48 percent and 16 percent of total Malaysian export to the country 
(Williams, 2013, p. 16).
26
  
  
Table IV.2 – Top Five Foreign Investment in Malaysia (US$ Million) 
Source: US Department of State, 2012 
 
Moreover, Malaysia is also a country very dependent on FDI. Foreign 
companies constitute to as much as 80 percent of the country‟s export. Especially 
to the US, the country contributes as one of the biggest FDI providers in Malaysia. 
As seen in table IV.2, US‟ shares of total FDI in the country is around 14.3 
percent, 9 percent, and 19.1 percent in 2006, 2007 and 2008. In 2010, the US 
contributed to as much as US$ 3.8 billion from the total FDI US$ 6.8 billion (US 
Department of State, 2012). Among the major US companies to operate in 
Malaysia are Freescale, Texas Instruments, and Intel (semiconductor), Motorola, 
Agilent, Komag and Western Digital (electronics) and ExxonMobil, 
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 Although the US‟ market is very important to Malaysia, it does not necessarily mean that other 
TPP members provide no economic opportunities. In January 2015, Malaysia is going to graduate 
from Canada‟s General System of Preferences (GSP), which gives the former preferential access 
to the latter‟s market to support its economic development. Upon termination of GSP, Malaysia 
must deal with higher tariffs to access Canada‟s domestic market; a situation that Malaysia wishes 
to avoid upon participation in TPP. See Hunter (2014). 
 2006 2007 2008 
Japan 1,202 1,896 1,637 
Germany 63 1,092 1,287 
USA 675 878 2,544 
Singapore 514 858 565 
Netherlands 895 491 526 
US’ shares 14.3 % 9.0 % 19.1 % 
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ConocoPhillips, Caltex, Murphy Oil, Dow Chemical and Eastman Chemicals 
(petroleum and petrochemicals) (US Department of State, 2012). 
With such trade and investment standing, it is not surprising that Malaysia 
seeks to secure deeper trade and investment linkage with the US. The TPP is part 
of the way as liberalization agenda will trigger a higher number of trade and 
investment between the two countries. On the consultation with Malaysian 
Chambers of Commerce and Industry at 28 May 2013, Minister of International 
Trade and Industry (ITI) Mustapa Mohamed explicitly said that Malaysia seeks 
penetration to other countries through lower tariffs, taxes, and other barriers 
(Bernama, 2013). In fact, a feasibility study conducted by the United Nations 
Development Program (UNDP) at the request of Malaysian government showed 
that by 2020 the country will gain as much as 1.46 percent of its GDP in 2020 
(MITI Malaysia, 2013, p. 10).
27
 Petri, Plummer and Zhai (2011) gives a more 
ambitious prediction that Malaysia will be the second country to benefit the most 
from TPP after Vietnam. In 2025, it is estimated that TPP will create welfare 
benefit of as much as US$ 9.4 billion or 2.24 percent of Malaysian GDP. The 
export benefit will also reach US$ 16.4 billion or around 5.0 percent of GDP 2025. 
Malaysia clearly gains more, as the US will only accumulate 0.07 percent and 2.0 
percent for welfare benefit and export benefit. Having such clear economic gains, 
Ministry of Trade and Industry (MITI) Malaysia mentioned explicitly that the 
country seeks trade and investment opportunity from this particular FTA, as stated 
below: 
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 However, the full text of the feasibility study has never been made to public; a situation, which 
made member of parliament (MP) from opposition party PKR (People Justice Party), Wong Chan, 
speculated that the study resulted in bad, rather than good, economic prospects. 
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“…By not joining the TPPA, Malaysia would be at a disadvantage in terms of 
seeking bigger and better market access for Malaysian products and services. The 
impact of that disadvantage will be even more significant should countries such as 
China, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand and other competitors decide to join the 
TPPA later…In an increasingly competitive global environment, our absence from 
the TPPA will also make Malaysia less attractive as an investment destination, 
compared with other TPPA members. Investors‟ perception of Malaysia will also be 
affected. As investors avoid Malaysia, this could result in less opportunities for job 
creation. Similarly, Malaysian companies that are investing in the TPP countries, 
will not enjoy the privileges and investment protection as provided under the 
TPPA…” (MITI Malaysia, 2013, pp. 12-13, emphasis added) 
 
Table IV.3 – Share of FDI Going to East Asian Countries, (Percent) 
  1980 1990 2000 2005 2008 2009 
Northeast Asia (ex. Japan) 26,5 40,7 83,7 72,9 78,7 77,1 
China 1,6 16,1 29,2 45,4 46,0 46,0 
South Korea 0,5 3,5 6,5 4,4 3,6 3,6 
Southeast Asia 73,5 59,3 16,3 27,1 21,3 22,9 
Singapore 34,5 25,8 11,1 11,3 5,0 11,8 
Vietnam 0,1 0,8 0,9 1,2 4,1 3,7 
Thailand 5,3 11,9 2,4 5,1 3,6 2,3 
Malaysia 26,0 12,1 2,7 2,5 3,0 0,7 
Philippines 3,2 2,5 1,6 1,2 0,7 1,0 
Indonesia 5,0 5,1 -3,2 5,2 0,0 0,0 
Northeast & Southeast Asia (ex. 
Japan) 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Compiled from UNCTAD, 2012 
 
 The investment seeking motive is a very important in Malaysian case if 
one takes a look at regional perspective. In East Asia, as seen from Table IV.3, 
there has been a severe competition for FDI. Malaysia did not perform very well 
since its share of FDI continually went down from 26 percent in 1980 to only 2.7 
percent in 2000 and even only to 0.7 percent in 2009. There are rising stars in the 
region such as China, Vietnam, and South Korea in attracting FDI, which 
somehow reduce Malaysia‟s performance. China is the most serious competitor as 
the country received only 1.6 percent in 1980 but jumped to 29.2 percent and 46 
percent in 1990 and 2009. Vietnam and South Korea also performed quite 
74 
 
tremendously from only getting 0.1 percent and 0.5 percent in 1980 to 3.7 percent 
and 3.6 percent in 2009. The regional situation now is competitive enough even 
for traditional FDI-attractive countries like Singapore to inevitably lose its FDI 
sharing, from 34.5 percent in 1980 to 11.8 percent in 2009. For Malaysia, this is 
problematic since foreign companies account for almost 80 percent of its export 
(Lee, 2014a). Lee (2014a) even mentioned that China develops so fast that it is 
now no longer a lower-value chain country but moves to a medium-value chain, a 
position that Malaysia currently retains. Therefore, Malaysia sees TPP as a way to 
be economically visible in Asia Pacific (Nambiar, 2012). By having more 
liberalization and better access to the US, Malaysia hopes to be more competitive 
in the eyes of the global investor.  
     Another important motive for Malaysia to join the TPP is to boost 
domestic economic reform process. It is true that Malaysia‟s economic 
development is a success story from low-income to middle-income. But as the 
country marches toward high-income country (or as stated in the development 
plan document, the New Economic Model, to be a developed country in 2020), 
problem arises as the country seems to face a middle-income trap. The middle-
income trap is a situation in which a country finds difficulties to move up the 
development ladder since there is not sufficient capital, technology and efficient 
allocation of production in the economy. Therefore, the general prescription is to 
have a higher degree of liberalizations and structural reforms of the economy. 
According to economists from Institute of Strategic and International Studies 
(ISIS) interviewed for this research, Malaysia is way too slow to reform itself. 
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There had been attempts to liberalize Malaysian economy further, such as those in 
the 1970s when Malaysia started the export-oriented strategy, yet as the year goes 
more aggressive reform is necessary. 
     The most troublesome sectors are the strategic industries, pioneered by 
Malaysia‟s longest serving Prime Minister, Mahathir Mohamad, such as 
automotive, heavy and chemical industries. Following the logic of Japanese 
developmental state, protection at the initial stage is important to develop them, 
yet the protection should be gradually removed to make them get used to 
international competition and, therefore, improve their performance. However, 
such domestic-driven liberalization is way too slow since the business becomes 
too dependent on the government for protection without any improving 
performance.
28
 According to Rasiah (2011), the most protected sectors, namely 
automotive and chemical, are in fact the least exporting ones, therefore showing 
that they underperformed throughout the years. Transport equipment sector only 
exported around 23.7 percent of overall output in 2008, while chemical-based 
such as non-metal mineral products and basic metal only exported 11.7 percent 
and 17.8 percent. Malaysian automotive company, Proton, only survives since 
there is government regulation for Malaysian officials to use only Proton car for 
office purpose (Tham, 2014). More importantly, the Malaysian government is also 
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 One of the reasons for the slow domestic-driven liberalization is the government‟s 
interventionist policy, namely the Bumiputera policy, is too intertwined with Malaysia‟s social and 
political system. The longest ruling party, the UMNO, retains a dominant status since it links 
Malaysia‟s development policy with ethnic Malay‟s affirmative action agenda. The poor but 
majority ethnic Malay has the first priority and opportunity to almost everything to restore the 
economic imbalance against the ethnic Chinese and Indian. Stopping such interventionism means 
cutting the UMNO‟s political tool, therefore, UMNO politicians are among those opposing the 
economic reform. More on this issue will be elaborated on the domestic subchapter below.  
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very slow in preparing for cutting-edge human resources to prepare the country to 
be a developed and knowledge-based economy. Malaysia is lagging behind 
neighboring countries in terms of providing researchers and engineers. In 2006, 
while Japan, South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan can provide around four to five 
thousand researchers and engineers per million persons, Malaysia can only 
provide 367 (Rasiah, 2011, p. 113). The same goes to research and development 
(R & D) funding, as seen in Table IV.5, in which Malaysia can only provide 0.3 to 
0.6 percent during 1990-2006, while other East Asian countries can reach 2-3 
percent (Rasiah, 2011, p. 113). 
     Regarding the TPP, therefore, what Malaysia aims to do is to re-orient its 
economic reform strategy. As domestically-driven approach fails, then 
participation to TPP is important as a way to lock-in reform.
29
 Malaysia has a 
stake in the high-quality standard of the deal as it requires Malaysia to undergo 
significant structural economic reform. Committing to TPP means that Malaysia 
is bound to the international agreement to liberalize the long-protected heavy 
industries, service sectors, government procurements and the likes. Doing that 
will ensure a more efficient allocation of resources, streamlining sectors in which 
Malaysia has no advantages on and focusing on sectors where Malaysia has the 
leverage. It will also invite more investment opportunities from abroad, therefore 
ensuring fresh amounts of capital and technology that Malaysia urgently needs. 
Under TPP, there will also be an opportunity for movement of the natural person, 
in which skilled workers will have greater mobility to work overseas. Malaysia 
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 Two economists from ISIS interviewed for this research also pointed out this lock-in reform idea.  
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has a lot of interests in this particular aspect to support its knowledge-economy 
goals. 
     Moreover, Malaysia should immediately undergo reform since 
international norms in the 21
st
 century is getting more and more liberal that 
Malaysia finds it harder to comply. However, a different situation occurs after the 
Asian crisis 1997-1998. Internationally, new norms apply in which Malaysia finds 
it harder to comply. Tham (2014) mentioned that under WTO‟s Trade Related 
Investment Measures (TRIMs), Malaysia must prohibit its local content 
requirement policy. Meanwhile, even on a relax FTA such as the Japan-Malaysia 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (CEPA), the country must liberalize tariff 
for small engine capacity vehicle to 2015 (in which Malaysian Proton company 
concentrates its production). Moreover according to Case (2006), investors are 
hesitant to enter Malaysia since in the Asian crisis 1997-1998 the government 
conducted capital control to protect domestic businessman (especially from 
UMNO), a policy that in turn hurted foreign investors.  
It is not too much to say that Malaysia is now at the crossroads. Malaysia 
must conduct economic reform if it wants to remain economically competitive. 
Malaysia‟s entry to TPP must be seen as an effort to bring the country to the „next 
stage‟. TPP is a lot more ambitious than any other FTA Malaysia currently has 
with its strong demand for domestic economic reform. By joining TPP, Malaysia 
tries to „lock-in‟ domestic reform to ensure its smooth process by complying with 
international legal standards. 
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IV.2.2 The Political-Security Needs: Malaysia between the US and China 
 Another motive for Malaysia to join the TPP relates to the political-
security aspect. Joining TPP means that the country has more opportunity to 
engage the US. The US is important as it is still the world‟s superpower, so for 
small country like Malaysia having a close connection to the US is always very 
important. Just as many countries in East Asia, engaging the US is an important 
agenda in their foreign policy since the rise of China makes political and security 
condition the region unpredictable (Ciorciari, 2010). There is no country in the 
region that can stop China from being too aggressive, therefore greater US‟ 
presence in the region is always welcomed since the latter is the only one capable 
of constraining China. Malaysia‟s participation in the TPP is in line with other 
maneuver that Malaysia takes toward the US.
30
 Lee (2014a) argues that Malaysia-
US political and security relations are an „unsung success story‟ as there are much 
cooperation in progress. Among them are continuous military training (Malaysia 
is one of the few sites for American troops to conduct jungle training, whereas 
Malaysian military officers join training program in the US), opening access to 
the US for Malaysian port and airfields (which since 2009 the US Navy has 
visited more than 30 times), and renewing Acquisition and Cross-Service Training 
Agreement in 2005 (which means both countries can exchange logistics for 10 
years ahead). Ciorciari (2010) argued that Malaysia now commits a limited 
alignment with the US, which means that the country pursues stronger political-
security interaction but without a defense treaty nor space for US‟ military base.  
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 Interview with two political scientists from Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia/ UKM (National 
University of Malaysia) in Selangor, Malaysia, 23 February 2015 
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Ciorciari (2010) further explains that there is, of course, a limit on how close 
Malaysia can be. First, the country‟s Muslim majority constituent tends to assume 
US‟ foreign policy as anti-Muslim. Second, the country always has adherence to 
the idea of regional resilience, as it is the champion of ASEAN‟s Zone of Peace, 
Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN).   
     Yet, one must not assume that Malaysia pursues TPP (or closer relations to 
the US) since it feels threatened by China. Although the threat exists, it is more to 
be of middle to long-term rather than short-term one (Dhillon, 2009, p. 153, 155). 
In fact, internally Malaysia is not a keen supporter of China's threat theory. It can 
be seen from the statement of the then PM Mahathir Mohamad, who saw it as „a 
bad and dangerous idea‟ (Lee, 2014a, p. 12). One must understand Malaysia‟s 
foreign policy that seems to be pragmatic towards the Great Powers; it is better to 
engage them both rather than choose either one of them.
31
 Such pragmatism 
derives from Malaysia‟s nature as a small trade-dependent economy, which makes 
them look for international market and stable regional environment. For Malaysia, 
China is an important trading partner; even Malaysia has the biggest trade volume 
with China than any other Southeast Asian countries.
32
 Malaysia already aimed 
for China‟s huge market even since the 1970s, when the rapprochement between 
the US and China gives Malaysia an opportunity to start a diplomatic relation 
(Dhillon, 2009). Malaysia is also the first Southeast Asian country to start 
diplomatic relations with China. 
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 Ibid. 
32
 In 2012, trade between two countries reached US$ 95 billion. 
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     At least in the short to medium term, Malaysia has no worry to the 
perceived China‟s threat. The country is a maritime Southeast Asian, therefore, 
reduces the possibility of having a direct military attack from the Great Power 
(Ciorciari, 2010). Economically, Malaysia‟s open economy makes it relatively 
immune from China‟s power since the later is only one from several trading 
partners (Lee, 2014a). Structurally, China cannot easily translate its economic 
prowess into actual political tools since it depends too much on foreign firms to 
manufacture export products. If China reckless enough to do so, it mistakenly 
sends the wrong signal of being unilateralist that possibly triggers relocation of 
foreign factories to a more friendly country (Lee, 2014a). 
  
IV.3 Domestic Factor 
 To understand the domestic dynamic of TPP in Malaysia, one must 
understand the very context from where it evolves. Debates within Malaysia, 
either from the pro-TPP groups or the anti-TPP groups, link with the very roots of 
Malaysia‟s social, economic and political condition. Malaysia is a typical post-
colonial society, in which inter-ethnic conflict becomes the determining feature. 
Segregated under British colonialism, the majority but poor ethnic Malay 
community lived separately from the richer ethnic Chinese and Indian during 
Malaysia‟s independence. The previously politically marginal ethnic Malay came 
into dominance after the ethnic riot in 1969. A Malay grassroot organization 
called United Malay National Organization (UMNO) becomes the ruling party 
even until now, making a big coalition under the banner of Barisan Nasional (BN 
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or National Front). The UMNO gains legitimacy since it brings forward the 
Bumiputera policy (means son of the soil), implemented through the New 
Economic Policy (NEP), in which it proposes affirmative action to ethnic Malay 
in order to correct economic imbalances with the Chinese and Indian. It is 
henceforth many discriminative policies were introduced, such as scholarships for 
the Malays, delegation of government contracts, imports commitment, leasing and 
other projects to Malay businessman, the Malay equity ownership rules and many 
others.
33
 Everything goes well in the second half of 20th century, in which the 
state can find a delicate balance between international and domestic demand. 
According to Case (2006), state apparatus selectively liberalized some economic 
sectors, such as the manufactures for FDI and export activities, and used the 
money to developed other protected sectors where the ethnic Malay can grow, 
such as the service sector, automotive, heavy, and chemical industries. Under this 
system, economically Malaysia transforms from low to middle-income country 
and politically to be an authoritarian state (where the UMNO continued winning 
all elections). 
     Yet, as Case (2006) further argued the equlibrium was shaken after the 
Asian Crisis. There has been a changing term from „ethnic Malay priority‟ to 
„Malay conglomerate priority‟ since the affirmative actions goes in large degree to 
this businessmen.
34
 Even more, they are so influential since they are also the 
member of the UMNO. Therefore, they can ensure government contracts and 
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 Included here is the government procurement sector, which is to be liberalized under the TPP. 
34
 The richer the ethnic Malays are after the introduction of Bumiputera policy, the more likely 
they can exert control to the state. In the 1970s, most of UMNO members were teacher, but in the 
1980s they were dominated by businessmen (Dhillon, 2009, p. 77). 
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other activities go to their pocket. When crisis stroke, Malaysia‟s well-known 
capital control policy was dedicated to protecting this business from the stormy 
weather of the crisis, including to help them from collapsing. Domestically, it 
caused anger to the general public, not only to ethnic Chinese and Indian but also 
to the Malays. Consequently, the UMNO lose two third majority (which is critical 
for amending constitution) in the election in 1999 for the first time.
35
 
Internationally, foreign investors cannot accept such moral hazard and corrupt 
bureaucracies, and therefore began seeing other neighboring countries as better 
alternatives.   
    Post-Asian crisis Malaysia is at the crossroads. Politically, the UMNO no 
longer enjoys comfortable standing in front of Malaysian and needs to keep close 
eye on the opposition parties, such as the PKR (People Justice Party), PAS (Pan-
Islamic Party), DAP (Democratic Action Party), etc. Again in 2008, these 
opposition parties made the BN coalition lose two–third majority.36 Economically, 
Malaysia can no longer sustain interventionist policy without backlashing 
international investor. Economic slowdown after the crisis, the middle-income 
trap and growing competition from neighboring countries, all call for the need to 
structurally reform Malaysian economy, but with the complication of hurting the 
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 Ever since, the UMNO is always perceived as full of corruption and scandal, distant from the 
general public, and full of intra-UMNO politician conflicts. See Samad (2009). 
36
 Since the 2000s, there has been a growing discourse named the „new politics‟ among the young 
Malay. Since they no longer share past history of Malay ethnicity and developmentalism, 
nowadays they demand governance issues, such as corruption eradication, public participation, and 
the likes. This position shares much resemblance to the interest of opposition parties but not so 
much to the UMNO. This young Malay aspiration also meets the interest of ethnic Chinese and 
Indian, who wish for getting rid of discriminative policy. Look at O‟Shannassy (2013) and Samad 
(2009) for more elaboration on this. 
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intra-UMNO business-politician.
37
 Malaysian society now must choose between 
those difficult options.  
     It was in this context where Malaysia entered the TPP negotiation. TPP 
strikes pretty much to the debate, by showing that the government wishes to 
pursue economic reform, but with the risk of alienating intra-UMNO business 
politician (and even the general public of ethnic Malays). The government is also 
no longer in the politically convenient position where it must concern on 
alternatives outside UMNO. The following section explores the issue more. It 
discusses the stances and maneuvers of domestic groups belonging to the pro- and 
anti- TPP groups. The pro-TPP groups consist of some business sectors, the 
Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), and leader (the Prime 
Minister/ PM Najib Razak). Meanwhile, the anti-TPP groups are made of some 
bureaucratic agencies, NGOs, opposition parties, and the intra-UMNO business-
politician. The chapter will then followed by an assessment of their political 
powers. 
 
IV.3.1 The Pro-TPP Groups 
 As Malaysia is a trading nation, it is only natural to see that business 
sectors support the government decision to negotiate in TPP. However, business 
stance is unanimous since those supporting are only those working on export-
oriented industry.  This is the stance made by several business associations, such 
as the Federation of Malaysian Manufacturers and Malaysian Textile 
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 Tham (2014) labeled it as choosing between the „economic‟ or „race‟ policy. 
84 
 
Manufacturers Association (Hunter, 2014). Other business groups have quite 
heavily linkages with other countries, especially the US. Even since the 
negotiation of Malaysia-US Bilateral FTA, several companies are known to lobby 
the Malaysian governments. Many of them belong to the US-Malaysia FTA 
Business Coalition, which is basically a group of high profile US companies, such 
as the Cargill, Citigroup, Intel Corp, General Electric, ExxonMobil, and the likes 
(Smeltzer, 2009, p. 15). There is also other foreign affiliated business associations 
that declare their support for the TPP, such as from American-Malaysian Chamber 
of Commerce, Malaysia-Canada Business Council and the Malaysia-New Zealand 
Chamber of Commerce. They released a Joint Statement during 18
th
 Round of 
TPP Negotiation in Kota Kinabalu, Malaysia at July 2013 (The Establishment 
Post, 17 Jul. 2013). 
A relatively more important icon and more well-publicized, for domestic 
economic reform, is the MITI. This powerful ministry is the one most responsible 
for handling the negotiation with overseas parties on the trade-related issue. On 
TPP, beside serving as the chief negotiator, MITI directly negotiates no less than 
9 technical working groups, e.g. 1) market access in goods; 2) rules of origin; 3) 
trade remedies; 4) investment; 5) services; 6) non-conforming measures; 7) 
business mobility; 8) cooperation and capacity building; and 9) horizontal issues 
(MITI Malaysia, 2013, pp. 7-9). Domestically, MITI is the government‟s main 
speaker for TPP issue, discussing and deliberating government‟s stance to various 
domestic stakeholders. This ministry sees TPP as a „lock-in‟ process to ensure 
continued domestic reform, citing its objective „to develop transparent and 
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predictable rules...[and] inclusive regulatory environment‟ are in resonance with 
Malaysia‟s own „economic transformation and domestic reform program‟ (MITI 
Malaysia, n.d., pp. 4-5). Moreover, it stresses that "...Malaysian companies are 
also increasingly becoming global investors and they require a level of 
transparency and predictability that can only be guaranteed effectively through 
binding agreements like FTAs...” (MITI Malaysia, n.d., p. 3). 
     In TPP issue, MITI is like the forefront of the government in socializing 
and deliberating information on Malaysia‟s participation on TPP. It is no wonder 
that MITI, even more than the PM Najib himself, receives the most attack from 
other political actors.
38
 It is MITI that needs to deal with NGOs business or media 
through various consultation, meeting and press releases. When the government is 
accused of keeping all information behind the scene during 2010-2013, it was 
MITI to take on all the attack and then hitherto to open channel for information 
dissemination. Included here are several briefings with the parliamentary TPP 
caucus that was led by Minister of ITI himself, Datuk Seri Mustapa Mohamed, 
such as on 30 September 2013, 17 November 2014 and 1 April 2015. MITI even 
conducted TPP Open Days on 1 August 2013 and met with Coalition to Act 
against TPPA on 6 August 2013 (MITI, 2013). If one searches through their 
website MITI actively provides press release and article on their website 
regarding TPP. 
     Arguably, the most powerful supporter of TPP (or economic reform, 
interchangeably), is the PM Najib himself. He is the national leader or the holder 
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 Interview with two economists from ISIS. Op. Cit. 
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of the topmost position within Malaysian politics, serving both the PM and 
chairman of UMNO. Inherent in this PM thinking is that he/ she is the one most 
responsible to drive Malaysia through its economic hardship, including to take 
tough decision such as domestic reform, as a way to bring the country to the „next 
level‟. It is PM Najib who launched the New Economic Model (NEM) in 2010 to 
replace the old-fashioned NEP. Different from the discriminatory policy entailed 
within the latter, namely to correct ethnic imbalance by imposing Bumiputera 
policy, the former embeds itself with a stronger „level the playing field‟ principle, 
inclusiveness, transparency, and merit-based approach (O‟Shannassy, 2013, p. 
440). NEM basically consists of three main ideas: 1) to make Malaysia a 
developed economy in 2020; 2) to create a more service-based economy; and 
most importantly 3) to create a private-led economic development, with the 
government serves only as facilitator (Lee, 2014a). Moreover, the NEM is 
designed to move up Malaysia on higher value chain as it loses competitiveness in 
the lower-wage manufacturing sector (US‟ Department of State, 2012). 39  By 
taking such bold move toward domestic reform, then NEM should be seen as a 
parallel policy with the TPP to bring Malaysia to the next level.  
     Najib‟s economic reform agenda should be seen in parallel to the political 
reform he wishes to pursue. Recognizing the danger if the UMNO keeps 
discriminating the ethnic Chinese and Indian, he introduced the 1Malaysia 
rhetoric as a way to gather more vote from the two ethnics. 1Malaysia basically 
serves as a platform for a more balanced approach among the three biggest ethnics, 
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 The NEM is also ambitious enough to be the regional hub for manufacturing sector, which is a 
direct challenge to Singapore (Lee, 2014a, p. 47). 
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comprising of: 1) continued affirmative action to the Malays; and 2) incorporation 
of „healthy‟ competitive element with the non-Malays (Wariya, 2009, pp. 184-
185). O‟Shannassy (2013) describes it as a way to gain new legitimacy among the 
constituents, namely to give more weight to the Ketuanan Rakyat (people 
supremacy) than to Ketuanan Melayu (Malay supremacy). Economically speaking, 
such agenda is important as it encourages more competition in the Malaysian 
economy, including to addresses the rent-seeker problem. Najib stated that “...the 
best way forward, for their interests and for the interests of this nation, is to adopt 
open competition, be it amongst Bumiputera or free competition for all...” (quoted 
in Wariya, 2009, p. 185). Such approach is also important to mitigate the brain 
drain issue that Malaysia faces nowadays, where there are more educated and 
skilled ethnic Chinese and Indian looking for overseas jobs due to unfavorable 
circumstances at the domestic level. 
 
IV.3.2 The Anti-TPP Groups 
 At the other side of the coin, there are even more various actors within the 
anti-TPP groups. First, there are several bureaucratic bodies who feel concern on 
FTA with the US. The Ministry of Health and Ministry of Agriculture, for 
example, did not feel comfortable with the deal, as it potentially triggers rising 
medicine cost and liberalizing the long-protected agriculture sector (Smeltzer, 
2009, p. 19). Other agencies are several government agencies that were 
established for the NEP in the 1970s to develop rural areas, therefore carrying 
protectionist ideas, such as the Federal Land Development Authority (FELDA) 
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and the Federal Land Consolidation and Rehabilitation Agency (FELCRA).
40
 
However, their role within the debate is quite moderate if not non-existent. 
Perhaps disagreements occurred within these government bodies, but it has never 
come to the media or general public yet, unlike the NGOs.
41
 Moreover, they do 
not have significant influence since they are more to be an administrator rather 
than a distinct political actor. In Malaysia, everything is already planned within 
the development plan, and they only need to follow.
42
 Another agency is the 
Ministry of Finance, which is said to be protectionist as it has the authority over 
the procurement policy (Dhillon, 2009; Tham, 2014). However, now PM Najib 
himself chairs the ministry, therefore reducing the potential protectionist stance it 
can carry. In fact, several agencies indeed join the negotiation process along with 
the MITI, such as the central bank (the Bank Negara Malaysia) on financial 
service and Ministry of Finance of government procurement.
43
  
 Second, a relatively more active role is played by opposition parties. 
Usually, they are mostly active in giving press statements and in the parliamentary 
caucus meeting. Due to the case‟s high profile status, the latter is unprecedented 
in Malaysian history as the TPP is the only FTA to be discussed in the parliament 
and to be tabled for „parliamentary mandate‟ (The Star, 2013).44 Usually, they 
question secrecy issue in which the government only circulates information 
among themselves, especially before the caucus was made in July 2013. Member 
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of Parliament (MP) from PKR Nurul Izzah Anwar on 6 June 2013 made a specific 
press statement about this. She concerned on the fact that Malaysia‟s law gives 
authority to the executive to conduct international treaty without any participation 
from the public (Anwar, 2013). Therefore, she called for a „parliamentary study 
group‟ to scrutinize every detail of the negotiation clause (Anwar, 2013). The 
stance of opposition parties also touch sensitive issues being voiced mostly by the 
NGOs (to be discussed later) such as the Investor Dispute Settlement (IDS), 
Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) and sovereignty. Among them is DAP MP 
Charles Santiago in July 2013 who referred to US-Jordan FTA that raised 
medicine cost to 20-30 percent (The Malaysian Insider, 10 Jul. 2013). He also 
feels concern about sovereignty issue since under TPP, certain domestic law can 
be bypassed by an international tribunal (The Malaysian Insider, 10 Jul. 2013). 
Several other opposition parties MP use the parliamentary caucus arena to voice 
their concern. This secrecy issue was again complained by MP from Parti Sosialis 
Malaysia (PSM) Michael Jeyakumar, at a TPP protest in Kuala Lumpur, 19 March 
2014. He wished the government to open the original negotiation text to the 
parliament member, since right now they can only study TPP based on previous 
US‟ FTA experience and ask questions to the government whether the deal 
includes topic A or B (The Rakyat Post, 19 March 2014). Other opposition parties 
who are among the most active is Wong Chen from the PKR. On 17 November 
2014, he directly criticized Minister of ISI Mostapa Mohamed for not releasing 
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the interim reports (in June 2013 and August 2014) and pending the dissemination 
of final report (Wong, 2014).
45
  
Third, among the anti-TPP group, the NGOs are among the most dynamic 
ones. They commented on many sensitive issues within TPP negotiation. Beside 
confidentiality issue discussed above, they also criticized many other areas, such 
as health and small and medium enterprises (SMEs). As voiced by Malaysia 
AIDS Council, they mostly criticize the very potentials of TPP raise medicine cost 
due to longer patent duration and data exclusivity (Rahman, 2013). In an 
interview with a policy manager from this NGOs, this applies, for example, to the 
Hepatitis C medicine that costs US$ 1,000 per pill. It also has patent duration for 
20 years (under the existing WTO rule) and to be prolonged for another 20 years 
under the TPP‟s IPR regime.46 Economically speaking, higher medicine cost will 
bring negative impact to Malaysian federal budget since health service is highly 
subsidized.
47
 On SME issue, NGOs concern on national treatment principle where 
SMEs should confront with US‟ big companies (Idris, 2013).  
Moreover, various NGOs with different concern even join a grand NGOs 
coalition, namely the BANTAH TPPA (literally means AGAINST TPPA). At 21 
May 2013, they released an open letter as an answer to MITI‟s press release; with 
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this they stated their stances on various issues such as confidentiality, health, 
SMEs and many others. (Idris, 2013). Specifically on the investor-state dispute 
settlement, they challenged the government to develop Malaysian economy 
organically without any dependence from MNCs and sovereignty-threatening 
legal obligation. This coalition NGOs conduct regular demonstrations in Kuala 
Lumpur, including those on 22 May 2014 in the wake of Barrack Obama‟s visit. 
They also use media to raise awareness among general public, mostly the internet 
website, even since the bilateral Malaysia-US FTA talks. (Smeltzer, 2009, pp. 15-
17). 
    Fourth, another serious contender from the anti-TPP group is the intra-
UMNO business-politician. They are the one to enjoy the most leverage from 
Malaysia‟s Bumiputera policy, therefore, feel threatened by the possibility of 
dismantling it. Their causation has started even from the US-Malaysia bilateral 
FTA talks, such as from the Malay Businessmen and Industrialist Association of 
Malaysia (in Malay abbreviation, Perdasama), the president of which 
Moehammad Izt Emir is an important leader in UMNO (Smeltzer, 2009).
48
 In 
August 2013, there was a headline from Utusan Malaysia, a Malay language 
newspaper owned by the UMNO, which labeled Malaysia‟s TPP negotiators as 
„traitors‟ (Kyodo News International, 2013).  
    Arguably the most vocal contender from this intra-UMNO group is no 
less than ex-PM Mahathir Mohamad himself. He was Malaysia‟s longest serving 
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PM, the founding father of the NEP and Bumiputera policy and the strong 
advocate for government intervention. He made a lot of statement regarding the 
TPP. In August 2013, he openly called the Malaysian government to withdraw 
from the TPP talks as it reduces government‟s ability to implement socio-
economic policies, especially the NEP (Kyodo News International, 2013, Oxford 
Business Group, 2014). He also commented that TPP will ensure smooth 
penetration from US‟ companies to enjoy market and government contracts in 
Malaysia‟s economy (Global Research, 2013), a comment that has strong 
resonance with his statement for US-Malaysia bilateral FTA, namely the deal as a 
US‟ way to „politicaly and economically re-colonize developing and newly 
industrializing countries‟ (Smeltzer, 2009, p. 19). In July 2014, he openly 
criticized PM Najib himself by saying: “...the quality of a strong leader is his 
willingness to stand up against foreign pressure [the TPP] and protect the interests 
of the country. If you can‟t do that, then you are not considered a strong leader...”. 
 
IV.3.3 Assessing the Influence of Pro- and Anti-TPP Groups: Toward 
Consensus? 
 The contesting dynamic among the pro- and anti-TPP group have been 
ongoing. Each group has political power, and accordingly it influences how they 
can pursue their interest. The pro-TPP group, consisting mainly of the MITI and 
PM Najib, is understandably powerful. MITI has a good standing among the 
bureaucracies and is the forefront of Malaysian trade diplomacy, which is very 
important due to the country‟s trading nation status. MITI was established to 
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resemble the powerful Japanese MITI when Mahathir was inspired a lot from the 
Japanese experience. Japanese MITI has real authority on foreign investment and 
trade, even more than the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Dhillon, 2009, p. 147). 
Meanwhile, PM Najib can be said as „person number one‟ in Malaysia nowadays, 
as he not only serves as the current Prime Minister but also the chairman of the 
country‟s most powerful and longest serving ruling party, the UMNO. Therefore, 
these pro-TPP group supporters are high profile in nature and have a very good 
political source to pursue their interest. Given their position as the same executive 
branch, they also work collaboratively, such as MITI to deliberate information 
and conduct consultation while the PM to provide political back up and to face the 
intra-UMNO resistance. 
    On the other side, the more various actors within anti-TPP group has a lot more 
varied political influence. For the opposition parties, general public tends to have 
only little information therefore the media coverage is not that wide. TPP case is 
also not comparable to other politically „sexier‟ case such as the Anwar Ibrahim 
trial, therefore the level of importance is not of the toppest priority.
49
 TPP indeed 
has a certain degree of sensitivity that makes it attractive to attack the government, 
yet at the current stage it is of mediocre importance. It is, therefore, 
understandable if their action is confined to delivering press statement and 
comments. On the parliamentary caucus, although it is an unprecedented event 
that TPP is being discussed in there, the role of opposition parties (and NGOs) 
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should not be overestimated. It is true that demands from them contributed to such 
outcome, yet we must also consider the needs of the government to open 
consultation with other stakeholders. The longer TPP is seen to be secretive, the 
more the government at a disadvantage. Therefore, the outcome should be seen as 
the result of the government‟s public communication purpose rather than the 
rhetoric „to gather input from the MP‟ (Bernama, 2015). In fact, the government 
still determines the process of the caucus a lot. They still refuse to give the full 
negotiation text and instead only selectively deliberate information, as 
acknowledged by the MP themselves. Moreover, the claimed „parliamentary 
mandate before signing the TPP‟ should not be overrated too. The government 
only promises for allowing debate in the parliament after negotiation concludes,
50
 
but not necessarily „ratification‟. Even more, the government only chose the word 
„to mull‟ or „to consider‟ rather than „to get consent from‟ or „to get ratification 
from‟ the parliament (The Star, 2013). In the end, the power to sign the agreement 
will stay on the executive branch again, just like any previous FTA that Malaysia 
signed. However, the true importance of these opposition parties is on their 
growing performance in the general election process, where they could force the 
BN coalition to lose two third majority in 1999 and 2008. Moreover, they made 
the UMNO lose Malay belt state in Kedah, Perak, Perlis, Kelantan, and Johor 
gradually. In connection to TPP, it means that the current UMNO government 
must constantly give a close eye on them. It also means the UMNO cannot 
antagonize the traditional constituent ethnic Malays, which, unfortunately, is the 
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main controversy in the TPP debate.
51
 The current UMNO under PM Najib is not 
as powerful as in the Mahathir era who can comfortably take any measures he 
likes without fearing any backlash in the general election. 
     As for the NGO, despite their activism in advocating for the anti-TPP 
group, their very power is still limited. Malaysia is still an authoritarian country in 
which the state controls the community organization, just like labeled by 
Alagappa (2004) as „controlled and communalized civil society‟.52 It is seen in the 
media tools where they can only access the alternative internet website such as the 
Malaysian Insider, FTAMalaysia.org, Malaysiakini, whereas the government 
controls the mainstream medias.
53
 They also still face limited time, financial aid 
and capital resources, including other long lasting urgent agenda of 
democratization (Smeltzer, 2009, pp. 15-17). In an interview with an NGO worker, 
the BANTAH TPPA only used to meet regularly while nowadays it is difficult to 
meet the schedule of every member.
54
 Despite this limitation, their role is still 
very important as one of the few channels for ordinary Malaysian to know about 
TPP as well as to continuously demand consultation and, therefore, improvement. 
Their role is also important as the source of technical knowledge to the 
government. As mentioned in an interview with an NGO worker, one of them is 
on Halal Food issue that was previously regarded as a technical barrier to trade. 
With BANTAH‟s advocacy, the Malaysian government cleared it with the US‟ 
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government.
55
 This role is coherent with what Weiss (2008) found in the 
democratization agenda, in which the NGOs may not trigger political change, but 
they have the power toward greater „compromise and openness‟. 
     Interestingly, there is not much interaction among these anti-TPP actors. 
An NGO worker interviewed for this study commented that being apolitical is 
very important for BANTAH as being too close to the opposition will bring 
detrimental effect to the movement. They still want to engage both the BN and 
opposition to maximize the result.
56
 For opposition parties, the opportunity to 
engage cooperation with the BN (or rather, intra-UMNO business politician) is 
also almost non-existent as shown in the differing statement of the parliamentary 
caucus. 
     A lot more powerful actor within this group is the intra-UMNO business-
politician. This group is the greatest challenge that the pro-TPP group should 
confront, in fact since, especially for PM Najib he must confront a structural 
power that is maybe beyond his capacities. As mentioned before, since the 1980s 
the UMNO member mostly comes from Malay business sector. It is problematic 
since UMNO presidential election allegedly becomes full of money politics. 
Whoever wants to be or stay as the president he/ she must provide a generous 
policy concession in return, such as protection, government procurement contracts, 
and the likes. As argued by Dhillon (2009), this creates faction within UMNO in 
which the policy will benefit the president‟s supporter and alienate his/ her 
contenders. Moreover, there are many examples in which UMNO President/ PM 
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must fulfill their needs to stay in power. In the 1980s, Malaysia had an economic 
downturn and the government conducted SOEs privatization as a response, but in 
reality the intra-UMNO business took over this lucrative opportunity for their 
benefit (Dhillon, 2009). With such situation, if a PM pursues a reformist policy 
such as the TPP, there is always a chance his party member will backlash against 
him. This has already appeared by a powerful icon like ex-PM Mahathir 
Mohamad. As the longest serving PM, he is the most respected figure and 
therefore still retains a very powerful grip within UMNO. In 2014, Mahathir was 
appointed as Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Proton, Malaysia‟s long protected 
automotive company and also Mahathir‟s golden policy. It makes PM Najib‟s 
position at a disadvantage. Automotive sector subjects to liberalize under TPP 
along with other for-ethnic-Malay sectors such as the SOEs and government 
procurements. More importantly, PM Najib does not have a very strong grip on 
his party. Besides keeping an eye to the growing opposition parties, he must also 
worry on at least two intra-UMNO factions to stay in power.
57
 Mahathir 
Mohamad is in one of the factions, where he still wishes to continue his strong 
interventionist policy as well as to put his son Mukhriz Mahathir to be the future 
UMNO president and Malaysia‟s Prime Minister. There is also another faction 
from Deputy PM Muhyiddin Yassin, who is known to be conservative with his 
clear preference to ethnic Malay over Najib‟s 1Malaysia policy (O‟Shannassy, 
2013, P. 442). 
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     With this opposition and intra-UMNO faction, there is a limit on how far 
PM Najib can pursue his reformist policy. His policy can never be fully labeled as 
„reformist‟ as he wishes to continue ethnic Malay affirmative policy (since they 
are the traditional constituent) but still tries to attract new voters from the non-
Malays. The previously assumed 1Malaysia policy he brought is left ill-defined, 
multi-interpreted and never be elaborated in actual government policy to capture 
these two seemingly impossible objectives (O‟Shannassy, 2013, p. 436). More 
practically, Chin (2010) found that at 2010 PM Najib liberalized 27 sub-service 
sectors as an economic reform action, yet there is no actual Bumiputera 
participation in those sectors. PM Najib also increased the foreign ownership limit 
on unit trust segments and stock broking companies from 49 percent to 70 percent, 
yet he retained the 30 percent foreign ownership in local commercial banks. 
Economists from ISIS acknowledged such hardship for reform.
58
 In the country, 
speaking about reform means shaking the very fundamentals that make up 
Malaysia today. Those proposing it sometimes are labeled as traitors that do not 
understand the history. They continued by saying that there should be a new 
consensus where reform should be understood as a way to modernize Malaysia 
and to bring the country‟s economy to the next level. 
     This limitation has made the MITI and PM Najib should make some 
concessions. There have been numerous verbal statements in which they will 
ensure that reform will not harm the ethnic Malay interests.
59
 During US‟ 
President Obama visit to Malaysia in April 2014, PM Najib used this rare 
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opportunity to gain support from the Malays by saying that „Malaysia has not 
ready to sign TPP due to domestic sensitivities‟ (Reuters, 2014). In May 2014, 
PM Najib also commented that TPP‟s „content is more important than the 
deadline‟.  
     MITI also addresses the issue more specifically on their various press 
releases. Some chapters are not so clear in showing this concession, such as the 
service sector and SOEs. On service sector, it is interesting to see that the 
government already concluded its negotiation without any elaboration on how the 
ethnic Malay‟s interest being promoted (MITI Malaysia, n.d., p. 2). The same 
goes to SOEs chapter, in which the ministry only commented that the country is 
„looking for flexibilities‟ as the SOEs are important for „the provision of public 
goods & services, development of strategic industries and implementation of 
socio-development program‟ (MITI Malaysia, n.d., p.6). As secrecy shrouded the 
TPP negotiation, more update on these issues are to be awaited in the future. 
Some other sectors such as the SMEs and government procurement, it is very 
clear that government really looks for the middle line between the need for reform 
and for protection. On SMEs the government looks for „longer transition period‟ 
while for the government procurement, there will be a „threshold‟ in which 
international investors are allowed to join domestic bidding. Below is the 
statements for both SMEs and government procurement: 
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“…the TPP has taken a conscious decision to address all SME issues in all areas 
under negotiations. These concerns such as increased competition are addressed 
through longer transition periods for liberalization. It is also addressed in the form of 
carve-outs of GP [government procurement] activities and through threshold…in 
addition, the TPP has developed a Chapter that touches on SME-specific issues such 
as lack of information and through the Chapter hopes to look into ways how the TPP 
can facilitate the development of SMEs and promote SMEs into the international 
market…” (MITI, n.d., p. 8) 
 
“…The Government will ensure that the extent of market opening in government 
procurement is guided by our stakeholders interests and concerns. The thresholds in 
our market access offers (i.e., the value of bids that will be open for bidding by 
companies from the TPPA Members) will be decided in consultations with our 
stakeholders…” (MITI Malaysia, 2013, p. 17) 
 
 
IV.4 Conclusion 
 The decision of Malaysia to join the TPP coincides with the very future of 
the country itself: either to or not to reform its economy. While it is true that 
Malaysia needs stronger trade and investment linkage with the traditional partner, 
namely the US, the actual importance of TPP is that it serves as an international 
push to lock-in domestic economic reform. As the world‟s economy is getting 
more and more market-oriented, Malaysia needs to adjust accordingly, especially 
since its long-standing positive economic profile is eroding due to stronger 
competition from countries like China. It is an effort, using Nambiar‟s (2012) 
terminology, to make Malaysia remains „visible‟ in Asia-Pacific.  
However, the quest for economic survival also coincides with the domestic 
political survival of the ruling party, the UMNO. The party is no longer as strong 
as before when it brings the country to its current economic prosperity. As mass-
level constituents can no longer accept long-standing corruption practices and 
scandals, opposition parties are getting stronger than ever. Moreover, the proposal 
for economic reform strikes very directly to the heart of UMNO‟s power, namely 
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patronage linkage with domestic business. It is very reasonable to see that the 
current state actor in Malaysia is no longer unitary as assumed in the existing 
literature. Proponents for TPP are mostly the national leader (such as PM Najib) 
and the bureaucrat MITI while the anti-TPP are mostly the opposition parties, 
NGOs, and intra-UMNO business-politician.   
     As the issue still evolves, there are more to be seen from Malaysia‟s 
domestic response on the TPP. Domestic actors have yet to reach consensus, so 
there are still plenty of room for each group to influence the others. The debate 
most probably is going to peak when TPP finally concludes, maybe somewhere in 
July 2015 as the latest update shows. As the momentum for TPP grows, including 
the promised open negotiation at the parliament, then there will be an opportunity 
for the previously assumed less influential NGOs and opposition parties to be on 
stage. If they manage the media and public opinion well, there will be an 
opportunity for them to improve their bargaining position against the government. 
The opposition parties are expected to use the chance to appear populist. The 
NGOs will use it to raise awareness among general public, therefore, garnessing 
more support for their movement. MITI and PM can also use the stage for their 
gains. Either way, whichever groups are winning the „battle‟, their strategy will be 
of great importance. 
     Interestingly, there is always an opportunity in which Malaysia will drop 
its participation in TPP. As commented by political scientists from UKM, PM 
Najib will most likely drop the deal if he cannot satisfy the intra-UMNO business-
politician. There is a precedent for this, in which Malaysia drop the previous 
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bilateral US-Malaysia FTA talks where government procurement issue did not 
meet expectation from both sides. PM Najib is still very much constrained by this 
intra-UMNO structural power if he still wants to remain in power. If it is the 
scenario, it does not necessarily mean that Malaysia will stop looking for locking-
in opportunities from FTA. As mentioned by economists from ISIS, Malaysia will 
mostly likely turn to next big FTA, namely the RCEP which also has the high-
quality rhetoric.   
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CHAPTER V - VIETNAM 
 
 Compare to other members in the TPP, Vietnam is the least developed one. 
With GDP per capita of only around US$1,900, Vietnam is very far behind richer 
countries such as Singapore, the US, Japan and Canada, the GDP per capita of 
which more than US$ 35,000. However, Vietnam‟s accession is important for two 
particular reasons (Elms & Lim, 2012, p. 30). First, the country has a huge market 
opportunity with a population of around 85 million people and remarkable 
economic growth in the last two decades. It makes Vietnam the third most 
populous country (after the US and Japan) but with the highest economic growth 
among the members. Second, Vietnam is important as it alters TPP‟s „rich boy 
club‟ image. Vietnam is a good example to other countries as it is only lower-
middle income country but with a commitment to the 21
st
 century agreement. 
     Compare to the Malaysian case, there are not many debates inside 
Vietnam on the benefit of joining TPP. In fact, seeing the response of state actors 
and textile industry, Vietnam‟s local actors are very passionate on opening up the 
overseas market. However, different from the Malaysian case, Vietnam offers a 
more comprehensive story on trade policy behavior in Southeast Asia. There are 
four motives of Vietnam to join the TPP. First, Vietnam is a typical case for 
reaping economic benefits through FTA. Many studies forecast that the country 
will reap the most gain as compared to other members. Second, more importantly 
Vietnam has high political-security needs as it sees TPP as a way to forge closer 
relations to the US. Compare to other countries, Vietnam is much more sensitive 
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to China‟s rising phenomenon. Third and fourth, domestically decision to join the 
TPP is due to the influence of the ascendancy of pro-reform groups. They are the 
reformist faction from inside the VCP and the export-oriented business 
entrepreneurs from the non-state actors. 
     Choosing Vietnam as a case study is very important as there is only 
limited discussion in the academic literature. Some literature focuses on the 
economic aspect, yet the political aspect is largely missing. Vietnam‟s case is 
somehow underdeveloped from other earlier developing countries in Southeast 
Asia, such as Singapore, Thailand, and Indonesia. Also, a lot more attention has 
been given to China, a country that has the similar communist path, but develops 
earlier and has more influence in the global political economy. Vietnam is also 
still a very close country where political discussion is prohibited in the media and 
academics field. However, discussing Vietnam is very important as it has the 
potential, given its population and high performing economy, to be the next big 
thing in the Asia-Pacific.  
     The chapter consists of four parts. First, there will be a discussion on 
Vietnam‟s decision to join the TPP. Second, the international factor will be 
covered with a focus on economic gains and political-security needs. Third, the 
domestic factor will follow with emphasis on the reformist group and the silent 
resistance. Fourth, there will be a conclusion. 
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V.1 Vietnam and TPP Negotiation 
Besides the P4 Southeast Asian members (Brunei Darussalam and 
Singapore), Vietnam is the first country in this region to express formal interest to 
join TPP. Soon after US‟ expression of interest in September 2008, along with 
Australia and Peru, Vietnam officially announced its interest to join the 
negotiation during APEC Summit in Lima, Peru, in November 2008. When TPP 
launched its first round of negotiation on 15-19 March 2010 in Melbourne, 
Australia, Vietnam attended the meeting with „observer‟ status. The round itself 
was negotiated among seven countries, namely the P4, the US, Australia and Peru, 
making them well-known as the P7 or the original members of TPP. Vietnam 
became negotiating parties during the 3
rd
 Round of TPP Negotiation in Brunei 
Darussalam, 4-10 October 2010. Due to this early accession, Vietnam appeared 
enthusiast on the prospect of TPP. Vietnamese President Nguyen Minh Triet 
expressed his eagerness and passion by stating that his country‟s accession would 
be important to „integration, growth and prosperity in Asia-Pacific‟ (Vietnam 
News Agency, 14 Nov. 2010). 
     Seeing from the last two decades, Vietnam appears very passionate on 
having deeper trade relation with the US. The country conducts many efforts to do 
so, including signing the Bilateral Trade Agreement (BTA) in 2001, joining the 
WTO in 2007, and negotiating the Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) and the 
General System of Preferences (GSP) since 2008. TPP is another effort in these 
series in which Vietnam aims for US‟ large and lucrative market. Interestingly, 
this recent Vietnam‟s trade behavior is very different from its traditional approach, 
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which is very cautious. Before TPP, the country only signed ASEAN-based FTAs, 
which is widely seen as low-quality in nature. Also, it only has one bilateral FTA 
with Japan, which is the same with Indonesia and the Philippines. Vietnam‟s 
behavior is very different from other more enthusiast FTA followers such as 
Singapore or Thailand. Therefore when Vietnam joined the TPP talks, it seems 
that there is a changing perception of how the country sees FTA.  
     Vietnam follows all the negotiation talks until the latest recorded round in 
Brunei Darussalam, August 2013. After that when negotiation continues at lower 
levels, Vietnam also still joins. Vietnamese leaders are among other leaders who 
express firm commitment to continue TPP negotiation. 
 
V.2 International Factor 
V.2.1 Highly-Leveraging Deals: Vietnam Pursues Trade and Investment 
Gains 
 
Table V.1 – Trade/ GDP Ratio of Vietnam (Percent) 
 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Trade/ 
GDP 
18.1 79.7 65.6 89.5 120.1 127.8 143.7 144.7 119.8 135.5 150.3 146.5 154.1 
Source: data.worldbank.org at 31 December 2014, 9:40 PM 
 
 Very similar to other East Asian countries, Vietnam follows an export-led 
economic growth model. It means that the country relies on the international 
market very much; it manufactures goods domestically and exports it 
internationally. A common indicator for this is the high trade/ GDP ratio. In 
Vietnam case, as can be seen from Table V.1, it increases very rapidly during the 
107 
 
last three decades. When it started opening up in 1985, the ratio was only 18.1 
percent. However, as it liberalizes the ratio gradually becomes higher. In 1990, it 
reached 79.7 percent, in 2005 120.1 percent and 2013 154.1 percent. Vietnam 
trades heavily with developed countries such as the EU, Japan, and the US, as 
well as its developing fellows in the neighborhood, such as China and ASEAN.  
For example, in 2012 export to the EU made 18 percent of total export, followed 
by the US (17 percent), ASEAN (15 percent), and Japan and China (11 percent) 
(Lee, 2014b, p. 17). 
 
Table V.2 – Vietnam’s Export and Surplus to the US  
 2001 2013 
Vietnam’s Export US$ 1.053 billion US$ 24.649 billion 
Vietnam’s Surplus US$ 592.8 million US$ 19.636 billion 
Source: Lee (2014b), p. 17 
 
 Trade with the US has a significance to the overall Vietnam‟s export. 
During the 2000s, Vietnam got the most benefit from trading with this country. As 
seen from Table V.2, export to the US grows very tremendously. In 2001, 
Vietnam‟s export only amounted to US$ 1 billion, but in 2013 it reached 
US$ 24.6 billion. This is such a remarkable performance that Vietnam‟s export 
grows 24 times only in 12 years. Even more impressively, Vietnam benefits very 
much from this relation as it scores increasing surplus: in 2001 it was only around 
US$ 600 million while in 2013 it almost reached US$ 20 billion. Vietnam‟s 
surplus consistently makes more than 50 percent of overall trade with the US. 
Seeing only from this number, it is understandable why Vietnam pursues an FTA 
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with the US through TPP. Vietnam almost secures all FTA with its important 
partners. With ASEAN, the country has the AFTA/ AEC while, with China, it has 
the ASEAN-China FTA. Moreover with Japan, it even has two FTAs, namely the 
Vietnam-Japan CEPA and the ASEAN-Japan CEPA. Therefore, FTA with the US 
is a natural choice that makes the country join the TPP.
60
   
 For Vietnam, trade with the US is generated mostly from labor-intensive 
industries. Textile and footwear are among the most important products as they 
constitute as high as 50 percent of the overall export. Vietnam‟s textile export 
(knitted and woven apparel) contributed to 38 percent of total export in 2011 
while footwear to 12 percent (Williams, 2013, p. 16). Textile export is so 
important that it diverts Vietnam‟s trade with Japan and EU. Before 2001, 
Vietnam exported textile and clothing (T&C) equally to Japan and the EU; yet in 
2005 its export to the US was more than total volume of T&C export in 2001 
(Thoburn, 2010, p. 253). Vietnam‟s reliance on T&C export explains why the 
country pursues FTA with the US. As argued by Thoburn (2010), the textile 
industry is a very tariff-sensitive sector that the producer always looks for 
countries with lower tariff access to international market. The lower the trade 
barrier, the greater the chance a country has for exporting T&C and attracting FDI. 
     Aware of its leverage, Vietnam has been consistently pursuing this tariff-
reduction scheme. Prior to TPP, Vietnam engaged the US through the BTA in 
2001 and the WTO in 2007. The significance of those agreements was to secure 
lower tariff rate from the US. Before the BTA and WTO, Vietnam‟s export must 
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 With the EU, currently Vietnam is negotiating the Vietnam-EU Bilateral FTA. It is expected to 
reach conclusion in mid-2015. 
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face very high tariff rate compare to other countries. Along with overall 
improving relations after the Cold War, in 1998 the US gave Vietnam conditional 
Normal Trade Relations (NTR) status. NTR is important as it gives designated 
countries a Most-Favoured Nations (MFN) status or, in other words, WTO-level 
tariff rate. It means that Vietnam‟s export, especially textile, will be treated 
similarly with goods from other textile-producing countries. However, since it is 
only conditional, there is always an unlikely chance that the US withdraws it. This 
is the reason Vietnam signed BTA with the US in 2001 as a way to secure a 
Permanent NTR status. BTA itself is not an FTA; it includes many liberalization 
measures that Vietnam must pursue, but not reciprocal to the US (Manyin, Cooper 
& Gelb, 2007,p. 12). Finally, Vietnam was granted Permanent NTR at the end of 
2006, which consequently led to Vietnam‟s accession to the WTO in early 2007. 
Having Permanent NTR and joining WTO are important for predictability reasons. 
Vietnam will no longer need to be under the „annual review and possible 
termination‟ from the US Congress, while at the same time it can take cover under 
the WTO‟s „protection of multilateral system of rules‟ (Manyin, Cooper and Gelb, 
p. 3 & 9).  Vietnam‟s exports to the US rose even higher after the WTO accession. 
It increased to 30 percent and amounted to US$ 12.3 billion only within one year 
(Manyin, 2009a, p. 65). 
It is in this logic that Vietnam pursues accession to the TPP. The deal will 
enable Vietnam to penetrate deeper into the US with tariff preferences of almost 0 
percent. Vietnam Textile and Apparel Association (Vitas) announced that TPP 
would bring additional growth for Vietnamese textile and apparel‟s export from 7 
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percent to 12-13 percent in 2025 or worth to US$ 30 billion (Asia News Monitor, 
4 Apr. 2013). It is an achievement that will make Vietnam‟s share of the US 
market grow from 49 percent to 55 percent (Asia News Monitor, 4 Apr. 2013). 
 
Tabel V.3 – TPP-Induced Economic Benefits in 2025  
Country Welfare 
Benefit  
(US$ billion) 
% of 
GDP in 
2025 
Export 
Benefit 
(US$ billion) 
% of 
GDP in 
2025 
The US 13,9 0,07 55,7 2,0 
Australia 2,4 0,17 9,1 2,8 
Canada 2,3 0,12 6,7 1,1 
Chile 2,3 0,78 4,6 3,0 
Mexico 11,7 0,58 15,9 3,1 
NZ 1,7 0,83 3,2 5,7 
Peru 6,6 2,12 10,2 11,0 
Brunei 0,1 0,48 0,2 1,8 
Japan 30,7 0,58 61,2 4,9 
Singapore 1,4 0,35 1,5 0,6 
Malaysia 9,4 2,24 16,4 5,0 
Vietnam 33,5 14,27 68,0 25,8 
Source: compiled from Petri, Plummer and Zhai (2011), pp. 26 & 29 
The researcher in the East-West Center projected an even more remarkable 
result, by estimating that Vietnam would enjoy the most benefit among TPP 
members. As seen from Table V.3, Vietnam will get US$ 68 billion of export 
benefit in 2025 or 25.8 percent of its GDP in 2025. It far exceeds the gain of other 
Southeast Asian countries such as Brunei, Singapore, and Malaysia which will 
only get US$ 0.2 billion, US$ 1.5 billion, and US$ 16.4 billion. The same goes for 
welfare benefit in which Vietnam will get US$ 33.5 billion or around 14.3 percent 
of its GDP in 2025. At the same time, the US will only get US$ 13.9 billion or 
0.07 percent of its GDP and Japan will get only US$ 30.7 billion or 0.58 percent.  
With such high leverages, it is no wonder if Vietnam‟s government official stated 
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explicitly that their interest to TPP is the US market. As said by Tran Quoc Khanh, 
Deputy Minister of Industry and Trade and Head of Vietnam‟s TPP Negotiation 
Team: 
“...we have joined the TPP to seek a similar agreement with the US, through which 
Vietnam can further expand its export markets and thereby attract more foreign 
investors...the structure of US exports was complementary to Vietnam‟s import-
export regime rather than competing directly...”(Bangkok Post, 17 Dec. 2012; 
emphasis added) 
 
Table V.4 – Share of Industrial Production (Percent) 
 1995 2000 2005 2010 2012 
State-owned 50.3 34.2 25.1 18.2 16.4 
Domestic non-state 24.6 24.5 31.2 39.3 37.3 
FDI Sector 25.1 41.3 43.7 42.5 46.3 
Source: Lee (2014b), p. 32 
Another advantage that Vietnam can expect from TPP is FDI. Vietnam 
relies greatly on FDI for its economic development, such as for export-import 
activity, technology build up and employment creation. FDI increased 
significantly in Vietnam from US$ 428.5 million in 1991 to US$ 11 billion in 
2011 (General Statistic Office of Vietnam/ GSO, 2012a). Cumulatively, Japan 
ranked 1
st
 as FDI source during 1988-2012 by investing US$ 28.7 billion (GSO, 
2012b). Taiwan and Singapore ranked 2
nd
 and 3
rd
 during the same period by 
investing US$ 27.1 billion and US$ 24.8 billion (GSO, 2012b). The US ranked 
7th by investing US$ 10.5 billion (GSO, 2012b). FDI contributes very importantly 
for industrial production, as seen from Table V.4, and even exceeds contribution 
from SOEs and domestic enterprises. It has increased from only 25.1 percent in 
1995 to 46.3 percent in 2012 while SOEs decreased from 50.3 percent to 16.4 
percent. Foreign firms also contribute to export performance where it made 53-63 
percent of total Vietnam‟s export between 2009-2012 (Lee, 2014b, p. 36). For 
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employment creation, foreign-invested firms provided job to 20 percent of labor 
in the manufacturing sector in 1999 and 38 percent in 2005 (Athukorala & Tien, 
2010, p. 221). 
In anticipation to TPP, FDI is expected to enter Vietnam. The situation is 
comparable to what happened after Vietnam‟s accession to WTO in 2007, where 
FDI inflow grew tremendously. One even calls the country to expect second 
massive FDI flow due to TPP (Asia News Monitor, 4 Apr. 2013). Especially due 
to the prospect of tariff reduction cut, there are many foreign firms to invest more 
investment projects in Vietnam. Texhong Group and TAL company from 
Hongkong will invest US$ 300 million and US$ 200 million, while Unisoll Vina 
Company of Hansol Textile from South Korea will invest US$ 50 million with 
factory‟s capacity of 90 million pieces per year (VCCI News, 27 Mar. 2014). 
Some other firms expressing interest for more investments are Toray International 
from Japan, Sunrise from China and Lenzing from Australia (VCCI News, 27 Mar. 
2014). Moreover in November 2014, during a meeting between Lefaso and 
Footwear Distributors and Retailers of America (FDRA), there would be flows of 
American firms moving investment from China to Vietnam (Thanh Nien New, 11 
Nov. 2014).  
     Another economic advantage that Vietnam will enjoy is on economic 
restructuring. However, it must be admitted that the enthusiasm toward this 
advantage is far behind the trade and investment benefits. Government officials 
seem less enthusiastic than foreign and local economists to articulate this 
particular issue. According to Robert Lawrence from Harvard Kennedy School, 
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TPP will be the ‟foundation for economic reform‟, especially on SOEs, as it 
introduces „natural competition‟ between foreign and local companies and 
transparency on company‟s operation (Thanh Nien News, 26 Mar. 2014). 
Moreover, Tuong Lai, a sociologist and former adviser to Vietnamese PM, said 
that Vietnam should move from being the producer of natural resources and low-
technology industrial product to a higher development ladder. He also mentioned 
that TPP gives a road map to do so, yet he does not elaborate on the content of the 
roadmap itself (Tuong Lai, 2015). 
 
V.2.2 Political-Security Needs: Vietnam between China and the US 
 After the Cold War, there has been a changing foreign policy perception in 
Vietnam. The country can no longer afford to rely too much on the Soviet Union, 
especially since the latter‟s power was weakening. VCP must also maintain its 
relevance as the remaining several communist parties in the world. The 
momentum was culminated in the 6
th
 VCP Congress in 1986 when Vietnam 
decided to open its economy but maintained the one-party system.
61
 Moreover in 
terms of foreign relations, the country conducts the so-called „multidirectional 
foreign policy‟ and moves away from the aligned-to-East-Bloc policy. For 
Vietnam, it is important to keep a stable and friendly environment to continue 
economic development. From now on, Vietnam fosters cooperation with as many 
countries as possible without any ideological limitation. In the words of Ciorciari 
(2010), Vietnam transforms into a relatively neutral or a „non-aligned‟ country. 
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 Vietnam might adopt these dual systems from China as the latter has been implementing it since 
1978 with tremendous success (Khong, 2010). 
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By doing so, Vietnam also looks for independence and autonomy that it wishes 
for so long time. Different from dependency policy in the Cold War era, 
integrating with the world and foster cooperation will result in balance relations 
with any external powers. It gives Vietnam a necessary space for maneuvering 
actions for the sake of its national interest.  
Vietnam engages many countries in this policy. Among the first priority is 
the Southeast Asian countries that happen to be Vietnam‟s close neighbors and 
have a good international profile (mainly through the ASEAN). Therefore, 
Vietnam found it important to be part of ASEAN in order to secure a conducive 
neighboring environment, to create Vietnam‟s friendlier international image by 
using ASEAN's reputation, and to use AFTA as a necessary stepping stone to 
integrate with the world economy (Thayer, 2007, p. 37). Vietnam also engages in 
numerous economic and political cooperations with countries in Northeast Asia, 
such as China, Japan and South Korea. Vietnam is even willing to forge limited 
security cooperation with medium powers such as Russia and India. Vietnam 
signed separate security cooperation agreement in 1999 and 2000 with the two 
countries to foster defense training and technical cooperation (Ciorciari, 2010, p. 
112). For Vietnam, security cooperation is acceptable as long as it meets the three 
no‟s policy: 1) no military base; 2) no military alliance; and 3) no taking sides 
with any countries (Storey, 2011, p. 122). Vietnam also engages closer relations 
with the two Great Powers, namely China and the US. With the latter, as 
mentioned before, the cooperation benefits Vietnam very much that it seeks 
numerous agreements, such as the BTA, WTO and more recently the TPP. 
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Vietnam also negotiates the BIT which is expected to secure continued US‟ FDI 
to Vietnam and signs the Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) 
which is a platform for economic cooperation and regular meeting among senior 
officials (Office of the US Trade Representative, n.d.). Therefore, Vietnam‟s 
desire toward the TPP should be seen in relations with its „mutildirectional‟ 
objective. The more Vietnam takes advantage from the global economy, the more 
the country survives in the capitalist world and accordingly ensures the VCP‟s 
existence. 
     Discussion about the Great Powers leads to the second argument of 
Vietnam‟s political-security needs. There is a „China factor‟ here that makes TPP 
a lot more important than just ordinary economic agreement. Different from other 
countries such as Malaysia and Indonesia, Vietnam shares land border with China, 
making it much more sensitive toward an external threat. Also different from 
Malaysia and Indonesia, the country had a history of being China‟s colony and 
tributary, therefore making current China‟s threat theory much more viable in 
Vietnam‟s case. Vietnam is also one of the country having conflicting interest 
with China in the South China Sea. As known, China is getting more assertive 
since the end of the 2000s. In this situation, Vietnam has two priorities on its 
China‟s policy. First, the country wishes to maintain a stable and peaceful relation. 
This is why relations among the countries are pretty close despite the threat 
perception, as seen from the signing of Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in 
2003 and China becoming one of Vietnam‟s largest trading partner. Moreover, the 
communist parties in both countries, namely the VCP and CCP, are among the 
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minorities in the increasingly globalized (and democratized) world (Khong, 2010). 
Second, it is very important for a smaller country like Vietnam, especially since it 
adopts multidirectional foreign policy, not to provoke China. The country must be 
very careful in maintaining relations with other countries, especially the US, 
which is seen as China‟s rival. 
     However, it is not that Vietnam only bows to China‟s supremacy. The 
country also takes precautionary measures such as improving its own military. 
After 2007, Vietnam bought several military equipments from Russia, such as 
frigates missile boats and SU-30 jet fighters, and ordered six submarines valued to 
US$ 2 billion (Storey, 2011, p. 120). Even more importantly, Vietnam also 
engages a much closer relations with the US, even though this country is 
Vietnam‟s former enemy in the Second Indochina War. The US is the only 
country that can stand face-to-face with China‟s military might, which Vietnam 
finds that it is necessary to conduct closer relations. There are many notable 
improvements in this relations, such as exchange of visit among US presidents 
and Vietnamese PM, the incorporation of Vietnam in the US-backed International 
Military Education and Training Program (IMET) in 2005, the permission of US 
naval supply ships to be repaired in Cam Ranh Bay in mid-2010, disaster relief 
cooperation, and many others (Storey, 2011, pp. 121-122). The US also allowed 
Vietnam to access its non-lethal defense in April 2007 and currently there is a 
consideration to lifting arm sales ban (Manyin, 2009b, p. 160; Benedictus, 2014). 
Vietnam is also one of the largest US‟ aid recipient in Asia-Pacific, especially on 
the AIDS-related sector. In July 2014, Vietnamese President Truong Tan Sang 
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and US‟ President Barrack Obama signed the Comprehensive Partnership, agreed 
to conduct US-Vietnam Summits and incorporated Vietnam into the Proliferation 
Security Initiative (PSI) (Tiezzi, 2014).    
     More importantly, Vietnam makes sure not to provoke China in this 
relation. Intensifying relation with the US is conducted through less threatening 
ways or in low-level security cooperation. Vietnam does not pursue US‟ security 
alliance or military base for this particular reason
62
 Various economic 
cooperations that Vietnam pursues are coherent with this logic. Engaging the US 
via BTA, WTO, BIT, TIFA and currently TPP are categorized as less-threatening 
ways.
63
 Vu & Nguyen also recognized the importance of TPP in this regard. They 
argued that: 
“...in fact, the debate among Vietnamese pundits goes even further, with some 
arguing that the TPP is the most appropriate framework for the time being to propel 
Vietnam-US relations both bilaterally and multilaterally. That may be reasonable. 
There are still several impediments to closer ties between Vietnam and the US. For 
one, Vietnam‟s political affiliation with China is still a consideration. The long-time 
„Three No‟s” – Vietnam‟s non-alliance policy – are also an issue. This is where the 
TPP comes in as a „softer‟, multilateral approach, which focuses more on trade to 
help minimize unexpected consequences...” (Vu & Nguyen, 2014) 
 
 If we put the economic element in this China-Vietnam-US relation, it 
becomes more obvious for Vietnam to pursue stronger relations with the US. As 
mentioned above, for Vietnam, China is among the biggest trading partner where 
it makes 11 percent of Vietnam‟s total trade in 2012. Trade with China even 
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 It must be admitted that Vietnam and the US can no more be than just a „good friend‟, since 
there are limits to their cooperation. Vietnam is suspicious on its partner‟s intention, especially the 
US‟ democratization agenda, and still wants to maintain independence and autonomy from 
external powers. See at Storey (2011). From the US side, an issue such as the human right is still a 
big challenge (Auslin, 2012). 
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 Interestingly, China is reported to warn Vietnam about becoming too close to the US as a result 
of the TPP (Tuong Lai, 2015). However, it is not clear how it is carried out, to what extent of 
influence, and the response from the Vietnamese government. 
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reached US$ 20.2 billion in 2008 and US$ 50.2 billion in 2013. The problem here 
is, as it sees China as a threat, Vietnam is not satisfied with the quality of the 
bilateral trade since it is mostly for China‟s favor. China mostly exports 
intermediate goods, textile and machinery to Vietnam, while  Vietnam only 
exports natural resources such as oil, coal and rubber (Vu & Nguyen, 2014). Even 
more importantly, the trade balance is in China‟s favor in which Vietnam suffers 
deficit for the last 15 years. In 2001, for the first time Vietnam had US$ 0.2 
billion deficit and it grew to an „alarming level‟ in 2008 to US$ 11 billion (Storey, 
2011, p. 112 & 115). For Vietnam, this is not a comfortable situation. 
Domestically, there has been many dissatisfactions directed to China‟s economic 
activity.
64
 At the end of 2009, there was a demonstration from environmental 
activists, Catholics and political protesters on China‟s bauxite mining activity in 
Central Highlands. Mostly, they concerned on China‟s growing economic 
influence in Vietnam (O‟Flaherty, 2011). In May 2014 when China moved oil rig 
in the disputed water of Paracel Island, there were 15 factories set on fire in Bin 
Duong Province, north of Ho Chi Minh, accused of being Chinese or look-like-
Chinese brands (BBC, 14 May 2014).  
     Therefore, Vietnam sees moving away from China‟s economic might as an 
important thing. TPP is a very important tool as not only it can compensate trade 
deficit with China, but also it can bolster closer relations between Vietnam and the 
US (Vu & Nguyen, 2014). Another important consideration is China‟s power 
works best if it faces an economically failing state with a corrupt institution (Lee, 
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 It must be noted that in an authoritarian country like Vietnam, where the regime controls the 
civil society and stability is of utmost priority, demonstration becomes a very rare activity. 
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2014b, p. 48). Vietnam‟s effort to integrate with the world economy, including 
through TPP, is, therefore, an important step to avoiding such situation. Vietnam 
has been doing well in its integration and multidirectional foreign policy, because 
it means that the country diversifies its relations with other powers, therefore 
limiting the situation in which China becomes the only source of aid (as was the 
case of Myanmar before 2011 or Vietnam to Soviet Union during the Cold War).  
     Interestingly, TPP also gives an important tool to reduce economic 
dependency from China. TPP entails yarn-forward rule, i.e. tariff reduction will 
only be given if a country uses materials from its own domestic or fellow member 
countries. This is problematic for Vietnam since most of its textile materials 
actually come from China. However, there is a strategic consideration for this 
since the US helps Vietnam rechannelling its material source. If Vietnam can 
homegrown its own textile sources, it will tremendously improve the country‟s 
standing vis-a-vis China. This is the current progress in which Vietnam benefits 
largely from the incoming FDI, so that the country no longer needs to import from 
China (Brown, 2014; Tuong Lai, 2015).  
     However, there is still a problem in this line of argument. Chinese firms 
are among those coming to Vietnam in anticipation to TPP, along with the 
Singaporean, Korean, Taiwanese, Japanese and American. If Vietnam does not 
manage it well, somehow China‟s firm can take stronger benefit from this rule; 
something that will be again at Vietnam‟s loss. There is another complication in 
this issue since Vietnamese own firms do not fully prepare too in anticipation for 
this rule. As articulated by Nguyen Anh Kiet, a textile expert from Vinatex, local 
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players have not synchronized well to each other and suffer funding difficulties to 
conduct backward linkages, whereas at the same time foreign players (including 
China‟s firms) have much better funding resources (Thanh Nien News, 13 May 
2014). For example, Jiangsu Yulun Textile Group from mainland China got 
licensed worth of US$ 68 million in Nam Dinh Province while Gain Lucky 
Limited, a subsidiary of China‟s Shenzhou International, planned to invest 
US$ 140 million in Ho Chi Minh City (Thanh Nien News 13 May 2014). If the 
government lets it that way, the local player will be sidelined from the gains of 
TPP. Strategically speaking, if more Chinese company invests in Vietnam and the 
locals cannot compete with them, it will create another sensitivity among the two 
countries.    
 
V.3 Domestic Factor 
 Discussing TPP issue within a domestic setting, it is important to see the 
context from where the issue evolves. For Vietnam case, it is beneficial to see the 
political setting: Vietnam is an authoritarian country with a one-party system. It 
means that the most important actor, with the degree of hegemonic status in 
relations to other actor, is the VCP. Other actors operate on the basis of „mercy‟ of 
this particular actor, which means that they can function if the VCP allows them 
to. The situation means that the general mood in Vietnam will reflect the general 
mood of this party. It also means that other dissenting voices, such as from civil 
society or the media, are limited since the state controls them at great extent. It 
explains why TPP discussion within Vietnam is relatively calmer without any 
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noisy resistance than another country such as Malaysia. TPP in Vietnam is seen as 
a very elitist issue without any interaction from, or even flow of information to, 
the general public.  
     However, Vietnamese state cannot be seen as a coherent unit in which all 
policy from the central can be transferred easily to other actors. In fact as Masina 
(2006) argued, Vietnam should be seen as a decentralized case in which party in 
the central cannot always exert control to the subnational level. Prior to the 
famous Doi Moi policy, the initiative to liberalization comes from the subnational 
level, which was then recognized by officials in the Central. In terms of TPP, this 
is where we can expect to observe a „silent resistance‟, which can greatly hamper 
the central‟s economic reform commitment. 
 
V.3.1 The Rise of Pro-TPP Groups in Vietnamese Politics 
 When Vietnam opened itself for the first time under the Doi Moi policy in 
1986, there were observable changes within the VCP, namely the death of Le 
Duan and the rise of pro-reform faction. Le Duan was a powerful figure who had 
the capability to sideline many other powerful leaders such as Ho Chi Minh and 
Vo Nguyen Giap (BBC, 14 July 2006). He also retained a very ideologist vision 
of Vietnam with pro-Soviet Union stance and favored the Maoist-Stalinist 
economic model (BBC, 14 July 2016). His death led to the ascendancy of a pro-
reform faction inside the party, such as the Secretary General Nguyen Van Linh. 
He had the vision for economically liberalized Vietnam for the sake of countering 
the diminishing economic assistance from the Soviet Union (Masina, 2006). Doi 
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Moi policy was introduced as a set of liberalization policy to give more autonomy 
to the SOEs, to eliminate state‟s monopoly on international trade, to welcome the 
FDI, to give private entities more space, create joint venture and own private 
assets (Masina, 2006, pp. 59-70). After that, this faction seems to continue in 
power as many other liberalization and reforms are recorded in Vietnam‟s policy. 
After the Asian Crisis 1997-1998 when Vietnam suffered slower economic 
growth, many reform policies are introduced to speed up economic development. 
Among the most important one is the FDI Law on 9 June 2000 which allows 
foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs) to fully own their operation (Athukorala & 
Tien, 2010, p. 210). This is an important development since previously Vietnam 
was a lot more hesitant about introducing such aggressive policy, as it the 
communist idea of resisting globalization still lingers. This is why since the Doi 
Moi they must every FIEs operate on joint venture basis with the SOEs, the latter 
is an important symbol of the social market system that Vietnam adopts. However, 
this FDI law allows FIEs not to arrange joint venture again and fully operates on 
their own. In 2001, wholly-owned foreign firms made 80 percent of total 
approved FIEs and 65 percent of registered investment from FIEs (Athukorala & 
Tien, 2010, p. 214). The reform continues through many other reformist policies, 
such as a new Investment Law in 2005 which treats foreign and domestic 
companies equally, abolishing export performance and local content requirement 
policies and providing easier business start-up procedures (Athukorala & Tien, 
2010, p. 210).    
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     Politically, the event in which reformist faction gained momentum is the 
9
th
 VCP Congress in 2001, which gave rise to Secretary General Nong Duch 
Manh. Manh has no direct experience of Vietnamese independence war and is a 
university graduate engineer, therefore represents a more modern and professional 
figure in the party (BBC, 22 Apr. 2001). He is very different from his predecessor 
Le Kha Phieu who is a war veteran and represents an ideological faction. Upon 
his appointment, Manh made a vision for an industrialized Vietnam in 2020 and to 
fight corruption (BBC, 22 Apr. 2001). Important also here is the momentum of 
Vietnam to sign the BTA with the US in 2001. The US saw this event as the 
country‟s commitment toward reform (Manyin, Cooper, and Gelb, 2007, pp. 4-5). 
     On the 10
th
 VCP Congress in 2006, such reform personnel were also on 
the rise. Secretary-General Nong Duc Manh was elected again until 2011. He 
outlined Vietnam‟s economic development agenda, including more integration 
with the world economy, securing 7.5-8 percent economic growth, pursuing 8 
million job and lowering unemployment to 5 percent (Manyin, 2009a, p. 86). New 
Prime Minister (PM) and  President were also elected, namely Nguyen Tan Dung 
and Nguyen Minh Triet, who both are seen as reformist figures from the South 
(Manyin, 2009a, p. 87). These three figures contributed to Vietnam‟s decision to 
join TPP in 2008. Nguyen Tan Dung is even more important as he was re-elected 
as PM in 11
th
 VCP Congress in 2011 and, therefore, retains the position until 2016.  
The global financial crisis also contributes to Vietnam‟s decision to TPP. 
Vietnam suffered slower growth as it depends very much on the international 
market. The country‟s growth has not recovered yet, in which growth 
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performance during 2008-2013 is only around 5 percent, compare to the previous 
era in which Vietnam could reach 7-8 percent (data.worldbank.org, n.d.). For 
VCP, 7 percent rate is a psychological limit for economic growth to maintain 
employment level and, therefore, public order. As has been mentioned before, 
after the Cold War, the VCP has the very interest to link economic performance 
with their survival so that they can continue to exist within the increasingly 
capitalized world. Moreover, continued reform is important if the government 
wants to provide job. There is one million people entering work field per year and 
half of the population is under age of 25 (Manyin, 2009a, p. 85). The slower 
growth created an alarm for the administration in which they must seek new 
growth strategy. TPP is part of this plan as it provides tremendous room for 
continuing high economic growth. Actually, TPP‟s negotiation also runs in 
parallel with other FTA commitment that Vietnam pursues, such as the Vietnam-
EU FTA, Vietnam-EFTA FTA, Vietnam-Korea FTA, Vietnam-Russia-Belarus-
Kazakhstan Custom Union FTA and the RCEP. Interestingly, all this FTAs was 
initiated when these trio icons were in power. PM Nguyen Tan Dung is especially 
important as he still serves until 2016 and therefore has the interest to continue 
TPP negotiation. When the talk keeps delaying its deadline, PM Dung, along with 
many other TPP leaders, keep repeating commitment to accelerate negotiation and 
to reach a deal. This is made in various ocassion, such as in November 2014 when 
he met US‟ President Barrack Obama and in March 2015 when he met Australian 
PM Tony Abbott and New Zealand PM John Key (Embassy of Vietnam in USA, 
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2014; Prime Minister of Australia, 2015; Radio New Zealand News, 19 Mar. 
2015).   
Another proponent for pursuing TPP is the export-oriented business. Their 
preference to TPP is very clear as they are the one to reap the most advantage 
from accessing the US‟ lucrative market. Among them is the textile industry, 
which is an important sector in Vietnam that employs 2.5 million workers in 
4,000 factories (Vietnam News, 21 Dec. 2013). According to Vice President of 
Vietnam Textile and Apparel Association (VITAS) Le Tien Trung in November 
2013, TPP will increase the country‟s textile export to 13-20 percent between 
2013-2017 and even hit US$ 25-30 billion in 2025 (Vietnam Plus, 26 Nov. 2013). 
Another player such as the Vietnam National Textiles and Garment Group 
(Vinatex) launched an aggressive investment plan in anticipation of TPP. The plan 
includes 57 projects, including 2 projects on cotton farms, 8 projects int exile, 15 
projects in fabrics and 24 projects in garment, with the goal to reach US$ 5 billion 
turnover in 2016 (VCCI News, 27 Mar. 2014). Another enthusiast is from the 
footwear industry. Chairman of Vietnam Leather and Footwear Association 
(Lefaso) Duc Thuan in January 2012 stated that the US accounted for 30 percent 
of Vietnam‟s export market in this sector, but the country gets only 5-6 percent 
share while China gets 87 percent (The Saigon Times, 5 Jan. 2012). TPP will 
slash current tariff by 50 percent and, therefore, will improve Vietnam‟s export 
quite considerably.  
Business associations, such as the Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry (VCCI) and the American Chambers of Commerce in Vietnam 
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(AmCham), are also very active in dealing with TPP issues. Their role is mostly to 
spread out information, socialization and business preparation toward conclusion 
of the deal. VCCI, for example, conducts many seminar and workshops to prepare 
Vietnamese domestic business for entering the US market. In August 2013, they 
conducted a seminar called „TPP Negotiation Process – Requirements from 
Apparel, Leather, Shoes and Agriculture‟ (The Saigon Times, 25 Aug. 2013). On 
10-20 April 2015 they made a survey study program entitled „US Market – 
Challenges and Opportunites for Vietnamese Business Ahead of TPP‟ (VCI News, 
22 Mar. 2015a). Meanwhile, the Amcham is also very active. The purpose is not 
only to prepare domestic business but also to meet various stakeholders such as 
the Ministry of Trade and Industry and foreign economists. They arranged CEO 
Forums, Export Forums, Seminar, Workshop, and Dialogue Meeting during 2013-
2014 (AmCham Vietnam, n.d.). 
Some other industries are more concerned on what will happen after TPP 
commences, although the tone is very moderate, adjusted to Vietnamese standard. 
As voiced by General Director of Vinh Hoan Corp, Truong Thi Le Khanh, a 
major seafood exporter, the government needed to consider labor allocation 
between the leading industries in Vietnam, namely seafood, textile, and footwear 
(Thanh Nien News, 1 Apr. 2015). The government can encourage textile and 
footwear industries to reallocate outside of Mekong river where the seafood 
industry is located (Thanh Nien News, 1 Apr. 2015).  Another moderate tone is 
from SMEs Association, a sector that will be pretty much hurt by TPP. In which 
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in February 2015 its President Cao Sy Kiem said that the industry must prepare a 
lot if it doesn‟t want to lose domestic market (Voice of Vietnam, 6 Feb. 2015). 
Other pro-TPP actor is the Ministry of Trade and Industry. Actually, they 
are of the main important actor since they negotiate internationally on behalf of 
Vietnam. Even their deputy, Tran Quoc Khanh is Vietnamese Chief of Negotiator 
himself. They have been active in giving socialization to domestic business, such 
as the one in November 2013 where they engaged VCCI Ho Chi Minh City 
branch for a conference called „TPP Agreement and Vietnam‟s Participation 
Process‟ (VCCI News, 31 Dec. 2013). The conference was quite high profile 
since the speaker of which was the Tran Quoc Khanh himself along with the 
Minister of Trade and Industry Vu Huy Hoang. This ministry is also the one to 
conduct regular consultation or update with the VCP. After TPP negotiation 
meeting in Hawaii in March 2015, it is known that they met the Economic 
Commission of VCP‟s Central Committee for this particular purpose (Voice of 
Vietnam, 19 Mar. 2015). Interestingly, other ministry seems to support the 
Ministry of Trade and Industry in TPP negotiation, at least what appears on the 
surface. One of them is the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, most 
probably because this Vietnam is a champion for agro-based export, therefore 
making FTA as an important tool to market the product abroad. Director of Agro-
Forestry Processing and Salt Industry under this ministry said that Vietnamese 
agriculture products have been exported to 180 countries and earned a record 
US$ 30.8 billion in 2014 (VCCI News, 22 Mar. 2015b). Included here is those 
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scoring more than US$ 1 billion such as woodwork, coffee, rubber, fruit and 
vegetable, shrimp, cassava, and cashew (VCCI News, 22 Mar. 2015). 
 
V.3.2 The Silent Resistance  
 The government of Vietnam has been actively conducting reform for 
meeting up the TPP‟s requirement. Actually, this had been done even when they 
tried to sign BTA and WTO commitment. On Labor issue, for example, there has 
been many measures that Vietnam already did: 1) rejoined the International Labor 
Organization (ILO) in 1992; 2) it has been working with ILO to draft new labor 
law; 3) it ratified five ILO most important convention on compulsory labor, 
income inequality, the worst form of child labor, minimum age, and 
discrimination; and 4) it considers ratifying two more conventions, namely on 
freedom of association and right to collective bargaining (Martin & Jones, 2009, p. 
100). They also sped up the SOEs reform process, especially after the global 
financial crisis where Vietnam‟s economy slowed down. As expressed by Vu 
Xuan Thuyen, economist and senior officials from Ministry of Planning and 
Investment, SOEs must now follow PM‟s regulation to divest from „non-core 
industries‟ (Thanh Nien News, 6 Jan. 2014).  
     No matter how committed the government is, in reality Vietnam always 
finds it difficult in terms of implementation. There have been many examples of 
many reform activities conducted with international donors in which Vietnam 
only does well on the paper, yet very lack for implementing it. For example, the 
United Nations Development Program (UNDP) helped the Vietnamese 
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government arranging the supposedly reformist development agenda, such as the 
10-year Strategy for Socio-Economic Development 2001-2010 and the 5-Year 
Plan for Socio-Economic Development 2001-2005. Although they agreed to put 
on „goals and target‟, in fact, there is only a little elaboration on how to achieve 
that (Masina, 2006, pp. 95-96). Gainsborough (2010a) argues that there is the so-
called „take-the-money-and-run‟ practice in Vietnam regarding donor aid. There 
are various donors in Vietnam seeking to implement neoliberal reform such as 
good governance and all. However, Vietnamese officials approach them by 
welcoming such assistance, agreeing to participate, but very lacking in 
implementation. Gainsborough (2010a) portrays that this is the case for the anti-
corruption measure proposed by Swedish Development Agency. Vietnamese 
National Assembly passed the milestone law in 2005, however there has been 
only minor effort to investigate corruption cases to date. 
     There should be a more thorough work on this „silent resistance‟ to 
measure to what extent it influences the reform commitment. However, a work by 
Painter (2006) gives a clue on from which actor it occurs. The problem lies in the 
practical decentralized nature of authority in Vietnam, in which subnational 
government (and actor) have a lot more space for their own policy. In the SOE 
reform, Vietnam conducted several policies on this particular issue, such as the 
one during 1986-1992 and 1997-2002 (under IMF‟s and World Bank‟s 
supervision). However, such reform is said to be only half-heartedly implemented 
because of the maneuver in the subnational level. They create the so-called 
„manager-owners of semi-privatised entities‟,  in which they see it more as an 
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opportunity to get more economic gains (Painter, 2006, p. 75). When an SOE is 
equitized, it is the manager that will buy the shares rather than the general public 
whereas subnational state remains as the major shareholders (Painter, 2006, 
p.75).
65
 
 Although such silent resistance occurs, interestingly in some other areas it 
never appears to public. When other countries such as Malaysia and Australia 
give so much objection to the health issue, in Vietnam there is no actor voicing 
such concern (Brown, quoted in Chowdhury, 2014). There are only two articles 
from Thanh Nien News on this issue, but this is only English version and seen 
from the angle of foreign experts without any quotation from local expert‟s 
statement. In fact, health is a very big problem in Vietnam as, according to Oxfam 
International, the country is among twelve countries with the highest number of 
HIV patient. However, medicines are still very expensive (An Dien, 2014). Even 
more, Vietnam receives 90 percent of HIV/ AIDS‟ funding from donor, in which 
the US (as the biggest donor) plan to reduce it in 2015 as the country is now 
recognized as a middle-income economy (An Dien, 2014). The „lack of voicing‟ 
problem in Vietnam is mostly probably caused by the controlled community 
organization under the Communist regime, making upholding such issue will be 
potentially considered as an insult against the government. 
     Recognizing this silent resistance, although it is safe to assume that it is 
only implicitly uttered, the Vietnamese government seeks to have flexibility in the 
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 Regarding this silent resistance, Gainsborough (2010a) argues that patronage is so engrained 
among the Vietnamese societies that it is considered to be the „how-to-work‟ system. Even more, 
the patronage can be traced back to before the Doi Moi era, in which the communist Vietnam is 
falsely assumed as an egalitarian society.  
131 
 
negotiation process. They propose that their country is the least developed one 
among member and, therefore, call for recognition of „level of development of 
each country‟. Many government leaders voiced this, including PM Nguyen Tan 
Dung himself, when he visited New Zealand PM John Key in March 2015 (Radio 
New Zealand News, 2015). This is also what is concerned by President Truong 
Tan Sang several years earlier during TPP summit in Honolulu, Hawaii, 12 
November 2011 (BBC Monitoring Asia-Pacific, 2011).  
     Vietnam is reportedly asked for the a transition period for many of the 
TPP‟s chapter. This is articulated by Chief Negotiator Tran Quoc Khanh himself 
when he visited the US in September 2014 (Voice of Vietnam, 19 Sept. 2014). On 
textile sector, the US will give Vietnam three years before applying the yarn 
forward rule so that it can build its own „domestic material supplies‟ (The Saigon 
Times, 25 Aug. 2013). This also includes five years transition period for SOEs 
chapter, in which Vietnam is in the same boat with other SOE-bulk countries like 
Malaysia, Peru, and Brunei (Manthorpe, 2013). Vietnam is also reportedly looked 
for many exceptions in this particular chapter. So far, the SOEs negotiation still 
continues in which countries already agreed to the definition and general 
provision, but still works on the exceptions allowed (Fergusson, McMinimy and 
Williams, 2015, pp. 43-44). Among the exception here where Vietnam is 
supposedly fought for is whether the chapter will be included in the dispute 
settlement mechanism (Fergusson, McMinimy and Williams, 2015, pp. 43-44). In 
labor sector, Vietnam is also reportedly opposed to bringing this issue into the 
legally-binding dispute settlement mechanism (Fergusson, McMinimy and 
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Williams, 2015, p. 39). Vietnam is also expected to ask for capacity building. 
They are quite open in expressing their needs., such as in human resources on 
FTA negotiation and economic integration, competitiveness of domestic 
companies and, the necessary legal system (Ministry of Trade and Industry, n.d.b, 
p. 3). 
 
V.4 Conclusion 
 Vietnam is a case with comprehensive reasons for joining TPP. Vietnam is 
a country benefiting so much from US‟ tariff elimination as it will boost textile, 
footwear, and other exports as well as invite a large number of FDI. Vietnam also 
has a very viable reason to approach the US in terms of politics and security as 
this country is very sensitive to China due to geographical proximity and 
historical subordination. For Vietnam, TPP is important as it is a less threatening 
way to approach the US. Vietnam does not want to provoke China and 
participation on TPP is coherent with the country‟s three No‟s policy. In the 
domestic level, the decision to join TPP coincides heavily with the rise of pro-
economic reform group within the VCP. This group can be traced back to the 6
th
 
VCP Congress in 1986, 9
th
 VCP Congress in 2001 and 10
th
 VCP Congress in 
2006. In TPP issue, they also collaborate with export-oriented business 
entrepreneurs. 
     It is not so much to say that pursuing TPP in Vietnam is surrounded by 
euphoria feeling. The country seems so passionate to take the promised lucrative 
economic benefits from accessing overseas market. The euphoria is largely 
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contributed by the relatively little resistance from the domestic arena, as the 
usually outspoken civil society elsewhere is suppressed by the one-party regime in 
Vietnam. The challenge is, as articulated by Shihoko Goto from Woodrow Wilson 
Center, whether the perceived economic benefits will actually overweight the 
adjustment that Vietnam has to commit, therefore giving incentive for Vietnam to 
open up itself (Chowdury, 2014). It is also worth noting that despite the reform 
efforts by the government, such as in SOEs and labor sector, there is less passion 
for the „lock-in-reform‟ agenda than for exporting labor-intensive products and 
receiving FDI.  
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CHAPTER VI - INDONESIA 
 
 Different from the previous two case studies, Indonesia is among the few 
that consistently shows reluctance to join the TPP. The behavior is quite 
surprising, given to the US‟ importance to Indonesia‟s economy. The US is one of 
Indonesia‟s biggest (and traditional) trading partner with decade-long surpluses. It 
is also from the US that Indonesia gets a significant amount of FDI. Therefore, 
one may assume that joining US-led TPP will be of logical consequences of 
Indonesia-US relations. However, it is not the case. Between 2010-2014, various 
Indonesian high-ranking officials have been voicing similar stance: Indonesia 
would not join the TPP, at least in the short-term. 
Indonesia‟s reluctance is mainly due to economic competitiveness issue 
(or rather, protectionism). However, one must take into account the very political 
position that Indonesia has within the regional politics of Asia-Pacific to better 
understand its stance. In this chapter, Indonesia is a case where foreign policy 
heavily influences trade policy, therefore incorporating international politics is 
necessary. Discussion on Indonesia even touches the very strategic relations that 
Indonesia develops with the current superpower US and the Great-Power-in-the-
making China. Specifically on TPP case, it is argued that Indonesia does not feel 
the need to forge closer relations to the US because it does not go hand-in-hand 
with its foreign policy. Seeing from the domestic angle, interestingly, Indonesian 
case also shows that long-standing unitary-state assumption in Southeast Asian 
trade politics is not always valid. It is the bureaucracy, represented by the 
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Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) and Ministry of Trade (MoT), that plays the 
key role as well traditional actor such as the domestic business entrepreneurs. 
Leader (mainly the President) also has their own agenda and heavily influences 
this process.  
     Indonesian case shows rich theoretical insight on the very nature of trade 
politics in Southeast Asia. A comprehensive approach, as proposed earlier in this 
research, is very important. The rest of the chapter discusses three issues. First, 
discussion of Indonesia‟s decision not to join TPP will be observed in closer detail. 
Second, the international aspect of Indonesia‟s motive will be discussed. As 
outlined in Chapter II, it will focus on „economic gains‟ and „political-security 
needs‟. Third, domestic aspect will be the main focus in which the relations 
among domestic political actors heavily influence Indonesia‟s stance on the TPP. 
The last section will be the conclusion. 
 
VI.1 Indonesia’s Reluctance on TPP 
Many Indonesian officials, no less than those in the high-level position, 
voice the not-to-join decision. This decision can also be consistently observed 
from 2009 to 2014, from President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) era to the 
current President Joko Widodo. On November 2009, it was no less than President 
SBY himself that announced Indonesia‟s position regarding the issue. He stated 
that Indonesia still preferred the WTO arena more than FTA since the WTO has 
more participants that Indonesia can arrange coalition with (Kompas, 17 Nov. 
2009). He also made the reservation on Indonesia‟s readiness to join highly 
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competitive FTA like TPP. In 2010, commenting on the starting of TPP 
negotiation, Coordinating Minister for Economic Affairs Hatta Radjasa made a 
statement that Indonesia prioritized to prepare itself before entering high-quality 
FTA (Xinhua News Agency, 18 Nov. 2010). In 2011 during the ASEAN Summit 
and East Asian Summit (EAS) in Bali, November 2011, President SBY again 
made a comment that Indonesia had no immediate urgency to join TPP (Asia 
Pulse Pty, 21 Nov. 2011). In January 2013, Trade Minister Gita Wirjawan also 
made the similar statement, emphasizing that Indonesia would assess whether 
TPP would leverage the country‟s economic interest (Jakarta Post, 13 Jan. 2013). 
On May 2013, he made another statement on TPP, by saying that Indonesia would 
only join if other negotiation such as the RCEP and Indonesia-Korea 
Comprehensive Economic Agreement (CEPA) made a success (ASEAN Briefing, 
8 May 2013). At the latest development during APEC Summit in Beijing, China, 
November 2014, the newly elected President Joko Widodo announced that 
Indonesia would not enter either the US-led TPP or China-sponsored FTAAP, on 
the basis that Indonesia did not want to be the mere market of big countries such 
as the US or China (Kompas, 11 Nov. 2014).  
Actually, there are several domestic groups that ask the government to join 
the TPP. Among them are the Indonesian Textile Association and the neoliberal 
academics (discussed below). However, they are only of small groups. The 
general mood in the country is of not to join the TPP. It is not only voiced by the 
government, but also by other actors such as the pro-ASEAN academics and 
NGOs (discussed below, from various interviews for this research). In fact, 
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Indonesia‟s passion is more to be of participating on the AEC and RCEP than the 
TPP, as observed by an academic from ASEAN Business Advisory Council 
interviewed for this research. The position comes without many debates in the 
domestic setting. It is very different from Malaysia‟s „noisy‟ case and bears much 
resemblance to Vietnam‟s consensual response. In fact, trade policy issue is still a 
very elitist that Indonesian general public almost has no knowledge. 
 
VI.2 International Factor 
 Indonesian case shows that the country has a relatively little motive to 
forge closer relations to the US in regards to TPP agreement. There are two 
arguments pursue here. First, Indonesia has contentious economic benefits, given 
the prevalence of „high-quality‟ element within TPP. Second, Indonesia has low 
political-security needs to engage the US because particularly in this TPP issue, 
the country feels that its regional profile is at stake. The success of TPP will 
potentially downplay Indonesia‟s ASEAN Centrality principle. Moreover in the 
lights of growing economic relations with China, Indonesia feels less pressing 
needs to reduce economic dependency, therefore, contributes to less motive to 
develop closer economic relations to the US. The case is different, for example, as 
in Vietnam in which China‟s economic might is seen as „alarming‟. 
 
VI.2.1 Contentious Economic Benefits: To Gain or Not to Gain? 
If one takes a look at Indonesia‟s economic relations to the US, one may 
anticipate that Indonesia has urgent needs to arrange FTA with the US. The US is 
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one of Indonesia‟s biggest FDI provider, along with other countries such as 
Singapore, Japan, and South Korea. As seen from Table VI.1, the US provided 
FDI as much as US$ 930 million, US$ 1,4 billion and US$ 1,2 billion in 2010, 
2011 and 2012, making it as the fourth largest FDI provider to Indonesia. In terms 
of trade, the US is one of Indonesia‟s biggest trading partner, with an overall share 
of around 9-10 percent in the late 2000s.   
 
Tabel VI.1 – FDI Realization by Country (US$ million)  
 2010 2011 2012 
Singapore 5,585.0 5,123.0 4,856.4 
Japan    712.6 1,516.1 2,456.9 
South Korea    328.5 1,218.7 1,949.7 
USA    930.9 1,487.8 1,238.5 
Netherland    606.3 1,354.4    966.5 
UK    276.2    419.0    934.4 
TOTAL 16,241.8 19,474.5 24,564.7 
Source: processed from BKPM (Indonesia Investment Coordinating Board), 2009, 2012 
 
Table VI.2 – Trade: Indonesia to the US 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Amount 
(US$ mil.) 
Share 
(%)* 
Amount 
(US$ mil.) 
Share 
(%)* 
Amount 
(US$ mil.) 
Share 
(%)* 
Amount 
(US$ mil.) 
Share  
(%)* 
Export 11,614.2 10.18 13,036.9 9.51 10,850 9.3 14,266.6 9.04 
Import 4,787.2 6.43 7,880.1 6.10 7,084.0 7.32 9,399.1 6.93 
Surplus 6,827.0  5,156.8  3,766  4,867.5  
* percentage of export to or import from the US to overall Indonesia‟s export or import. 
Soure: BPS (Indonesia Statistical Bureau), 2008, 2009, 2010 
  
More importantly, the US serves as not only a traditional export market 
but also continued surplus. As seen from table VI.2, Indonesia enjoyed the surplus 
of around US$ 3.7- US$ 6.8 billion during 2007-2010. Most of Indonesian export 
product to the US is rubber, which makes around 12 percent of overall export to 
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this country (BPS, 2011). Labor-intensive products such as apparel and footwear 
are also among the most popular products. Altogether, such products amounted to 
US$ 5 billion in 2010 or 35.4 percent of overall export to the US (BPS, 2011). 
Opportunities to arrange FTA with the US through TPP are not without 
attention. At a public discussion in Jakarta in 2012, US think-tank Peterson 
Institute for International Economics released that Indonesia's economic growth 
would increase by 1.7 percent if it joins the TPP (SEADI-USAID, 2012). 
Specifically Gary Clyde Hufbauer, also from this think-tank, mentioned that 
Indonesia‟s export would rise to 20 percent in 202 and that Indonesia would have 
leverage against competitors such as Vietnam (Jakarta Post, 17 Apr. 2013). 
     However, seeing TPP from trade and FDI angle alone is only one side of a 
coin. What bothers Indonesia at most is the very WTO-plus commitment that 
Indonesia sees as too high standard to achieve. Indonesia‟s concern is actually a 
typical developing countries response to the demand of developed countries in the 
trade negotiation. For example, Indonesia does not feel likely to cope with 
„competitive neutrality‟ principle within TPP, which outlines equal treatment 
between foreign and domestic companies. Indonesian business are still worried 
about the prospect of foreign competition, especially because after they are still in 
defensive mode after the Asian Crisis 1997-1998 (discussed in detail below). 
Even on a low-quality type FTA such as the ASEAN Economic Community 
(AEC), 44 percent Indonesian business feels threatened, as a study by Boston 
Consulting Group revealed in October 2014 (The Jakarta Globe, 7 Oct. 2014). 
Moreover, the SOE dismantling regulation within TPP is also problematic in this 
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regards. SOEs play the significant role in the Indonesian economy, especially as 
government‟s intervention tools to boost domestic economic development. SOEs 
also symbolize national pride and status. Therefore, its dismantling will trigger the 
nationalist backlash, as seen on privatization episode during the first half of the 
2000s when IMF imposed such scheme. Another politically sensitive issue is the 
need to cut energy subsidy, which is seen as a clear discriminative action. Even 
when the Indonesian government can do it on the voluntary basis, such action is 
always difficult as it involves massive demonstration rally, reduction of public 
support to the president and political attacks on the parliament. One can imagine if 
an international treaty must Indonesia dismantle the policy; an even greater 
nationalist backlash can raise. 
 
Table VI.3 – Contribution to Indonesian GDP, Demand Side (Percent)66 
Component 2010 2011 2012 
Domestic Consumption (C) 56,53 55,58 55,08 
Government Consumption (G) 8,49     8,23 7,84 
Investment (I) 23,91 24,42 25,24 
Export-Import (X-M) 10,51 11,32 9,20 
GDP (Y) 100,00 100,00 100,00 
Source: BPS (Indonesian Bureau of Statistics), n.d. 
  
 One must also take a look at the very structure of Indonesian economy. 
Different from its neighbors in Southeast Asia, Indonesia is not a trading nation. 
Indonesia relies less on trade than other countries such as Malaysia and Singapore. 
Whereas the two countries can achieve around 100 and 300 percent of trade to 
GDP, Indonesia's highest score was only 71 percent in 2000. (data.worldbank.org, 
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 The table refers to the common economic equation on factors contributing to GDP:  Y = C + G 
+ I + (X-M). Y refers to the GDP, C to domestic consumption, G to government expenditure, I to 
the investment, X to export and M to import. 
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n.d.). It means that Indonesia relies less on trade for its economic development. It 
is understandable as different from Malaysia and Singapore, Indonesia has a lot 
more population, around 230 million in 2014, making it put a lot more emphasis 
on domestic consumption. Malaysia and Singapore only have around 25 million 
and 5 million people, such small population making them rely more on the 
international market. As seen from Table VI.3, trade (export-import) only makes 
between 9-11 percent of Indonesian GDP in 2010-2012. This is in large contrast 
to domestic consumption, which makes around 55 percent of the whole GDP. 
Therefore, in theory, Indonesia can still grow although the international market is 
at despair. For Indonesia, this is also the very factor making the country survived 
the global economic crisis in 2008-2009. Given the continuing growth of domestic 
consumption, Indonesia can still perform positively along with China and India at 
that time. Relating this structural factor to TPP issue, Indonesia is at less need to 
engage FTA in comparison to other trade-dependent nations like Singapore or 
Malaysia. 
 
VI.2.2 Political-Security Needs: Defending ASEAN-Centrality  
 Perhaps one of the most important factor explaining Indonesia‟s reluctance 
is the country‟s foreign policy. Indonesia tends to see US‟ TPP proposal as an 
effort to be a dominant power in the regional dynamics of Asia-Pacific, something 
that Indonesia cannot afford. Discussion on this particular issue will begin by 
exposing Indonesia‟s foreign policy doctrine and evolution. On the other hand, 
although it is true that Indonesia suffers trade deficit with the Great Power China, 
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it is not that Indonesia seeks the US for a trade-off. In fact, Indonesia‟s response is 
more to be improving domestic economic competitiveness, therefore reducing the 
need to forge closer relations to the US. 
     Every Indonesian political science student is familiar with the so-called 
Mendayung di Antara Dua Karang. Translated as „Row between the Two Reefs‟, 
it is basically a classic notion of Indonesia‟s foreign policy doctrine developed by 
Indonesia‟s first vice President Muhammad Hatta during independence day in 
1945. It reflects the existing bipolar geopolitical setting in which the US was 
against the Soviet Union. Inspired by Indonesia‟s nationalist struggle to gain 
independence, the doctrine basically maintained that Indonesia should not belong 
to either bloc and stand by itself. It later developed into another doctrine, namely 
the Bebas Aktif or „Free and Active Foreign Policy‟. It means that Indonesia 
should be free or independent of any Great Power‟s influence and Indonesia 
should actively promote world peace. Throughout the history, it is true that the 
Indonesian government does not always strictly adhere to this doctrine.
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However, it deeply influences the very conduct of Indonesia foreign policy until 
very recently. For example, ASEAN‟s idea of non-intervention comes largely 
from this ideas, as a way to make Southeast Asia free of any Great Power‟s 
influence.  
    Within Indonesian foreign policy, another important feature is ASEAN. 
Starting during President Suharto era, ASEAN evolves as an important 
association to create peace and stability in Southeast Asia, therefore, gives 
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 For example, under the charismatic and populist President Sukarno, Indonesia tended to be 
closer to the Soviet bloc, while under the anti-communist and development-oriented President 
Suharto, Indonesia welcomed US‟ partnership. 
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countries chances to develop economically. The success continued as ASEAN 
proved credible to solve regional conflict, namely Vietnamese invasion of 
Cambodia in 1975. As international community begins approving ASEAN‟s 
achievement, it further evolves from a mere association since its establishment in 
1971 to be a full functioning regional organization by establishing a charter in 
2003 (known as ASEAN Community). Indonesia tends to see itself as a natural 
leader of ASEAN, given its dominant geography, population, and economic size, 
as well as being its founding father.  
     In the contemporary era, Indonesia sees ASEAN as a useful tool to interact 
with the surrounding Great Powers. ASEAN‟s increasing international profile is 
in coincidence with the rising China, which creates uncertainties and regional 
tension, especially with Japan and the US. ASEAN quickly grasps the opportunity 
as both Great Powers (Japan and China) are more comfortable to give regional 
leadership to the credible small and medium power countries such as ASEAN. 
Nowadays, there exists ASEAN Plus mechanism, such as ASEAN+1, ASEAN+3, 
ASEAN+6 and ASEAN+8 (or East Asia Summit/ EAS), as a way to manage 
relations among the Great Powers. Therefore, ASEAN gains more international 
confidence as it spreads the culture of cooperation, dialog, and consultation 
among them, rather than letting them trap in realist ideals of continuous conflict. 
As the result, during the first decade of 21
st
 century, the world sees a thick 
ASEAN-led regional arrangement in Asia Pacific. ASEAN even creates a „Plus 
One‟ FTA with each of the Great Powers, namely the ASEAN-China, ASEAN-
Japan, ASEAN-South Korea, ASEAN-India, and ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand 
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FTA.
68
 For Indonesia, the more ASEAN gains regional profile, the more 
Indonesia has regional standing and recognition.  
     Seen from the strategic perspective, Indonesia combines the attainment of 
the „Rowing between the Two Reefs‟ doctrine with ASEAN as the tools. The 
latter doctrine interprets that Indonesia should remain independent of any power‟s 
influence although the Cold War was over. Contemporarily, given the increasing 
„superpower‟ status between the US and China, the doctrine outlines that 
Indonesia should remain free of any of the „new reefs‟ (Novotny, 2010). Since 
their very contestation involves the Asia-Pacific, Indonesia naturally interprets 
that the country cannot withstand a single power dominating the region. Therefore, 
as argued by Lee (2013), Indonesia quests for the so-called „strategic 
independence and autonomy‟. After the pitfall of Suharto when the West (or the 
US) criticized Indonesia‟s poor human rights record and supported IMF‟s blatant 
economic recovery program, Indonesia seemed to move closer to China. At this 
time, the latter decided not to devalue its currency to help its neighboring 
countries and to provide US$ 200 million loan to Indonesia. Even during 
President Abdurahman Wahid era, Indonesia devised the so-called „Asia-first‟ 
policy by proposing triangular axis of Jakarta-Beijing-New Delhi. At other 
occasion, when China is seen to exert its regional power, such as by proposing the 
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 In the late 2000s, Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs proposed the so-called „Natalegawa 
Doctrine‟, which perfectly fits this kind of logic. Named after Indonesian foreign minister Marty 
Natalegawa, it describes East Asia as a multipolar and dynamic equilibrium site in which no single 
power dominates (Hadi, 2012). Interaction between actors is best described as a cold peace, in 
which it no longer confines to strict military relations, but more dynamic to include economic 
issue and cooperation (Hadi, 2012). In such situation, it is important to manage relations among 
the Great Powers so that it will not bring regional hostility and harm Indonesia‟s interest. 
Therefore, ASEAN Centrality is important as it gives leadership to ASEAN and opens dialogue to 
all of the Great Powers (Hadi, 2012). 
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East Asian Community in 2003,
69
 Jakarta quickly reacted (along with other power 
such as Japan), to invite more Great Powers to balance China, namely by 
proposing the ASEAN+8 scheme, or known as the EAS (Hadi, 2009).
70
 Having 
more Great Powers, including the US, means that there will be more powers to 
check China‟s growing regional profile. EAS is also put here as part of ASEAN 
Annual Summit meeting, therefore ensuring that its host will always be ASEAN 
member countries (as an „agenda-setting‟ attempt).71 
 TPP should be seen with US‟ pivot strategy in the Asia-Pacific. As 
addressed by State Secretary Hillary Clinton in  January 2011, the US will not 
only involve in „Asia-Pacific institution‟ but also provide leadership (Gao, 2012, p. 
117). Here, Indonesia has the reservation since US‟ way is very different from 
ASEAN way. Actually, existing rules within ASEAN plus X frameworks, 
including ASEAN-centered FTA, adopt ASEAN way of doing things, namely 
consultation, consensus, liberalization with respect to each country‟s capability 
and so on. However, in TPP the US tries to change these rules. With TPP in mind, 
the US imposes comprehensive liberalization, tight schedule, and legally binding 
agreement. 
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 The EAC proposal attempts to formalize the previously informal cooperation between ASEAN, 
China, Japan and South Korea. By doing so, China tries to distinguish „East Asia‟ of only 
consisting of ASEAN+3 countries, minus the US. 
70
 Beside the ASEAN+3 countries, EAS also consists of India, Australia, New Zealand, the US, 
and Russia.  
71
 The Asia-Pacific is so important to Indonesian foreign policy that former President Megawati 
changed the country‟s foreign policy priority (called the concentric circle). Under President 
Suharto, the first priority is ASEAN, followed by Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) countries, and 
Western countries. Under President Megawati, the first and third remained the same, but the 
second circle changed into countries in the Pacific Island Forums (PIFs), Northeast Asian 
countries (China, Japan and South Korea), Southwest Pacific Dialogue, and tripartite consultation 
among Indonesia, Australia and Timor Leste. Look at Chandra, 2008, p. 111. 
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This geopolitical motive is the reason Indonesia feels very reluctant to join TPP. 
Indonesia fears that ASEAN role will be downplayed in Asia Pacific.  
     Indonesia has two other agendas that it wishes to put more attention to. 
Both relate heavily to the ASEAN Centrality principle and run in parallel. First is 
the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) which will start at the end of 2015. 
AEC is such a big agenda for ASEAN regionalism that the government wants to 
prioritize. In fact, joining TPP will divert attention from the implementation of 
this particular FTA.
72
 If the priority to AEC comes pretty naturally, Indonesia‟s 
second agenda needs a lot more explanation. Another Indonesia‟s respond toward 
TPP is supporting the creation of Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership 
(RCEP). Launched in 2013, basically RCEP is a counter proposal proposed by 
China and Indonesia as a challenge toward US-led TPP. Indonesia has a lot of 
interests in its creation as ASEAN centrality is the main pillar within such 
negotiation. RCEP basically will serve as an umbrella of the existing ASEAN-
centered FTA arrangements, namely ASEAN‟s FTA with China, Japan, South 
Korea, India, Australia and New Zealand. Underlying assumption on RCEP is that 
it should be ASEAN, rather than surrounding countries that should be the „hub of 
developing wider Asia-Pacific regional architecture‟ (Basu Das, 2014, p. 25). 
RCEP is also meant to show that ASEAN can take the role of bringing in 
                                                          
72
 The view is expressed by an economist from Paramadina University speaking in a conference in 
Jakarta, February 2015 (Habibie Center, 2015). The view is also expressed during an interview 
with an IPE Specialist from University of Indonesia, in Depok, Indonesia, 23 March 2015. The 
priority to the AEC than TPP is also conveyed by an official from the Indonesian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, during a Roundtable Discussion entitled „Implikasi Kerjasama Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (TPP) Guna Meningkatkan Peran Indonesia di Kawasan ASEAN Dalam Rangka 
Ketahanan Regional’ [The Implication of TPP on Indonesia‟s Role in ASEAN and Regional 
Resiliency], in Jakarta, 16 July 2013, held by Lembaga Ketahanan Nasional [National Resiliency 
Institute] (Lemhanas, 2013). 
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cooperation, prosperity, and harmonization in Asia-Pacific. (Basu Das, 2014, p. 
25). It is explicitly stated in the first Joint Statement of Ministry of Trade Meeting 
among RCEP countries in 9-13 May 2013 in Brunei Darussalam:  
“...negotiations for the RCEP will recognize ASEAN Centrality in the emerging 
regional economic architecture and the interests of ASEAN‟s FTA Partners in 
supporting and contributing to economic integration, equitable economic development 
and strengthening economic cooperation among the participating countries...”73 
 
 Indonesia‟s commitment in RCEP (and ASEAN centrality) is addressed by 
a senior official from Ministry of Trade, Imam Pambagyo: 
“...Indonesia was currently focused on two priorities: The preparations for the 
establishment of the ASEAN Economic Community expected in 2015, and the talks 
for the regional comprehensive economic partnership...” (Jakarta Post, 31 Jan. 2013). 
  
Another important thing here is the fact the Indonesia‟s preference to RCEP 
does not necessarily mean that it is against the US. In fact, what Indonesia tries to 
do is to make sure that ASEAN Centrality (through RCEP) can live side by side 
with US‟ TPP. This is why in their various statement Indonesian leaders and 
official never directly said that TPP will hamper ASEAN solidarity or centrality 
(let alone it is a sensitive issue). There is no blatant opposition in TPP, but 
Indonesia only ensures that ASEAN Centrality will still at play. Moreover, the 
growing discourse among academic and officials is whether TPP and RCEP can 
complement each other, which in the end will lead to the creation of Free Trade 
Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP). By promoting RCEP, Indonesia makes sure 
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 Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP): Joint Statement the First Meeting of 
Trade Negotiating Commitee. Bandar Sri Begawan, Brunei Darussalam, 9-13 May 2013. 
Retrieved from  
http://www.asean.org/images/2013/other_documents/Joint_statement_1st_RCEP%20TNC_08May
2013_final.pdf 
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that ASEAN Centrality will still become relevant and not be downplayed by US-
led TPP.
74
   
 
Table VI.4 – Trade: Indonesia to China (US$ Million) 
 Source: Indonesian Ministry of Trade, n.d. 
 
On the other hand, seen from Indonesia‟s economic relations with China, 
closer economic relations to the US is not a very urgent priority. It is true that 
Indonesia is increasingly dependent on China‟s market. China is currently 
Indonesia‟s number one trading partner with total trade reaching US$ 49 billion in 
2011 (see Table VI.4). It is also true that Indonesia feels discomfort given that 
since 2008 Indonesia has been suffering continuing trade deficit, which was then 
exacerbated by the full implementation of ASEAN-China FTA in 2010. Such 
discomfort is not without reason since China mostly exports manufacturing 
products similar to Indonesian, such as textile and footwear. Therefore, it 
jeopardizes Indonesia‟s competitiveness while Indonesia can only export mining 
and agriculture products to China at the same time (Lee, 2013, p. 19).  
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 Yet, Indonesia‟s preference on RCEP does not coherent with a smooth negotiation process. 
Until now, RCEP still has difficulty to find basic modalities from where RCEP will be carried out. 
Should it include many exclusion lists like the ASEAN-India FTA? Should it be a high standard 
like TPP or ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand FTA? Or should it include economic cooperation 
such as the Japan-based CEP? Is it possible to arrange a „minus X‟ principle? The diversity among 
members makes it difficult to reach consensus. This is based on an interview with an IR specialist 
from ASEAN Advisory Business Council (ABAC) in Jakarta, Indonesia, 3 March 2015. 
Description 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Trend (%) 
’07-‘11 
Total Trade 18,233 26,883 25,501 36,116 49,153 25.59 
Export 9,675 11,636 11,499 15,692 22,941 22.45 
Import 8,557 15,247 14,002 20,424 26,212 28.80 
Balance of Trade 1,117 -3,610 -2,502 -4,731 -3,271 0.00 
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     However, as argued by Lee (2013), there is nothing alarming about 
Indonesia-China economic relations. Although trade with China is huge, 
Indonesia‟s relative open economy makes China as only one important partner 
whereas there are other states such as Japan, the US, EU, or ASEAN members. 
Dependence on China is therefore not the case in the Indonesian economy. 
Moreover, seeing from other indicator China is far from dominant. As seen in 
Table VI.7, China‟s FDI in Indonesia is consistently in small number in 
comparison to other big FDI providers, such as Singapore, Japan, South Korea 
and the US. Even when China recorded highest FDI of US$ 173 million in 2010, 
it is still a very small comparison, for example, to Singapore which recorded 
US$ 5.5 billion (BKPM, 2009, 2012). Therefore, Lee (2013) sees that: 1) China 
has no intention to use its FDI charm to attract Indonesia; and 2) Indonesia‟s open 
economic structure helps reduce dependency possibility only on China‟s economy. 
The relative absence of dominant Chinese economy is then translated into 
relatively low needs of Indonesia to engage more balancing economic relations by 
approaching the US.  
     More importantly, Indonesia‟s response to this growing trade with China 
is not through seeking remedy from other countries. It is true that trade with the 
US is at Indonesia‟s favor and has the very potentials to reduce the deficit with 
China. However, Indonesia seems not to see it that way. Rather, they are keener 
on improving domestic competitiveness. Actors within domestic setting tend to 
see the issue as rooted in the country‟s economic weakness rather than to China as 
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a threat. This point will be discussed much deeper at the domestic subchapter 
below.  
 
VI.3 Domestic Factor 
Although Indonesia is a democratic country, its trade policy is still very 
elitist. As argued by Chandra & Hanim (2010), the Indonesian government opens 
up participation from non-state actors, yet the „difficult and technical issues‟ of 
trade make only a handful of them join it. From NGOs, there are the Institute for 
Global Justice (IGJ) and Third World Network (TWN), from business sector, 
there are Indonesian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (the Kadin) and 
Indonesian Entrepreneurs Association (the APINDO), and from academics, there 
are the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and Institute for 
Economic and Social Research (LPEM). Even the Parliament has no influence on 
trade. Institutionally, parliament‟s involvement in international trade policy is 
limited under the Law No. 24/ 2000 on International Treaty. The law disapproves 
the need for the parliament to debate on FTA as ratification is only needed for 
several issues, namely politics, defense, peace and security; territorial borders; 
state‟s sovereignty; any international treaty requiring adjustment of domestic law; 
human rights and environment; and foreign debts or grants (Hadi, et.al., 2012).
75
 
 As the result, influential actors within Indonesian trade policy-maker are 
only concentrated on several actors. The are two groups within the circle with 
significant influence over the posture of trade policy. First, the „pro-ASEAN‟ 
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 Only recently Indonesia introduced Law no. 7/ 2014 on Trade, which regulates the role of 
legislature to ratify a trade agreement (Article 84). However, all of Indonesia‟s existing FTAs were 
signed before this law was enacted, therefore, it went without any scrutiny from the parliament. 
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group which consists of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA), some academics 
and leader. Second, the „protectionist‟ group occupied by the Ministry of Trade, 
most of domestic business groups and NGOs. 
 
VI.3.1 The Pro-ASEAN Group 
 The very influence of pro-ASEAN group has been well analyzed in the 
previous section. The MoFA is the long-standing supporter of this particular 
preference, given the importance of ASEAN to Indonesia‟s foreign policy. The 
very pursuance of Independent and Active foreign policy are also part of the 
tradition of MoFA. As a political actor, MoFA is particularly important since 
President Suharto era, where foreign policy was designed only by several actors 
within his circle, namely the military, the MoFA, and the think-tank CSIS 
(Chandra, 2008, p. 143). As mentioned before, it was in this era in which ASEAN 
starts getting significant priority on Indonesia‟s foreign policy. Therefore, it is not 
too much to say that such pro-ASEAN stance has been highly internalized within 
this ministry. Moreover, ASEAN profile is even so important that all key 
ministries have ASEAN unit, such MoFA, Ministry of Trade, and Ministry of 
Finance (Chandra, 2008, p. 188). It must also bear in mind that within ASEAN 
affairs, which is basically a foreign affair, the very conduct of foreign economic 
relations is very apparent, therefore making intertwining relations among the two. 
For example, when ASEAN decided to strengthen their regionalism in the early 
1990s, they did so by launching the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA). Therefore, 
it is not uncommon for the MoFA to give much influence on Indonesia‟s trade 
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relations. In fact, the MoFA is one of the several ministries to negotiate 
Indonesia‟s trade issue, along with Ministry of Trade and Ministry of Finance. 
Moreover, many of Indonesian foreign ministers have a lot of ASEAN profile in 
their previous work. Ali Alatas, Hassan Wirajuda, and Marty Natalegawa all have 
retained an important position in ASEAN-related matters.
76
 They even become 
the issue-entrepreneurs at domestic level, namely to connect ASEAN with 
domestic discourse.
77
  Within Indonesia‟s domestic political affairs, the pro-
ASEAN group is quite infuential in determining a policy outcome. For example, 
even in a case in which domestic interest was hurted by the ASEAN commitment, 
namely the ASEAN-China FTA in the beginning of 2010,
78
 no less than President 
SBY himself to state that the Indonesian government still maintained its 
adherence to ASEAN solidarity and refused to follow the populist demand to 
renegotiate the agreement (Viva News, 21 Jan. 2010).  
In regards to TPP issue, at least on the media, this ministry maintains a 
low-profile behavior without commenting much on the issue. According to a 
diplomat in Indonesian Embassy in the US Ni made Ayu Marthini, Indonesia has 
yet to join the TPP but becomes only an external observer (Kompas, 9 Dec. 2013). 
MoFA seems to let the MoT to take the lead, not only because it is under the 
latter‟s authority (MoT is still the forefront of trade negotiation), but also most 
probably since they do not want to drag the issue into a foreign politics matter. 
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 interview with an IR specialist from University of Indonesia, in Depok, Indonesia, 11 March 
2015 
77
 Ibid. 
78
 Massive surge of import from China, especially in labor-intensive sectors such as textile, toys 
and footwear, happened only a year after the ACFTA was implemented in 2010. Import volume 
increased by 34 percent in 2010, contributing to import deficit of around US$ 5 billion. See at 
Viva News. (28 Apr. 2011).  
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Pointing out the potential negative problems that TPP may inflict to ASEAN 
centrality will not bring any goods to this ministry in particular or Indonesia in 
general, since it will put the country in direct opposition to the US.
79
 Moreover, it 
is the MoFA‟s diplomatic style to maintain harmony and peaceful relations, rather 
than to harshly point out a vocal opposition to other country‟s action, let alone the 
Big Power like the US. At a less media coverage arena, the stance of MoFA is 
pretty much in line with the logic above. In a discussion in Jakarta in July 2013 on 
Indonesia‟s position on TPP, Indonesian Permanent Representative to ASEAN 
acknowledged the negative consequences TPP may cause to ASEAN centrality 
and the need for the country to focus more on AEC and RCEP. At exactly the 
same occasion, another official from Directorate for Cooperation in Asia-Pacific 
and Africa, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, expressed doubt on the conclusion of TPP 
at any time soon and pointed out other FTA beside TPP that may hamper ASEAN 
Centrality, namely the China-Japan-Korea (CJK) FTA, as it will direct attention 
from ASEAN-hub FTA into Northeast Asia.
80
 
The very view of ASEAN Centrality is also deliberated by various local 
academics, especially those with Politics or International Relations background. 
This view on ASEAN Centrality can be seen from the writing of Beginda 
Pakpahan, an IPE academic from the University of Indonesia in East Asia Forum 
website at November 2012, entitled „Will RCEP compete with TPP?‟ (Pakpahan, 
2012). Other academics voicing such concerns are Edy Prasetyono, a security 
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 This is acknowledged by the Indonesian Permanent Representative to ASEAN, who said that 
dipomatically Indonesia could not oppose to the TPP; it is more appropriate to say that it would 
join at a timely manner. The position was voiced during a Roundtable Discussion in Jakarta, 16 
July 2013 (Lemhanas, 2013). 
80
 This two comments from the MoFA are gathered from Ibid. 
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expert from the same university and Makarim Wibisono from ASEAN 
Foundation; both articulated the needs to defend ASEAN Centrality during a 
discussion in Jakarta, July 2013.
81
 Moreover, one academic from ASEAN 
Advisory Board Council (ABAC) also interviewed for this research also 
expressed similar concern. 
Such high passions on ASEAN among the MoFA and local academics 
may be lead to the internalization of the „ASEAN Centrality‟ argument into the 
government. This is acknowledged by Former Presidential Staff for Economic 
Affairs interview for this research in Jakarta on 13 March 2015. He not only 
pointed out economic reasons such as Indonesia‟s unreadiness, but also political 
reasons such as the ASEAN centrality. Moreover, this can also be observed from 
the statement of officials from Directorate of ASEAN Cooperation, Ministry of 
Trade, during a conference in Jakarta, February 2015. This official, Reza Pahlevi 
Chairul, singled out the reason Indonesia choose RCEP instead of TPP is exactly 
because of this ASEAN first reason (Habibie Center, 2015).   
Another actor that plays the role within this group is a leader (or the 
President). In a democratic presidential system of Indonesian politics, the 
president has big influences in determining the country‟s policy, including foreign 
policy. In TPP matter, there are two views that the president expressed (either 
implicitly or explicitly). First, many academics interviewed for this research 
correlates decision on TPP with the President SBY‟s personal attributes. 82 
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 Ibid. 
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 There are three academics expressing this view during interview sessions: Interview with an IR 
specialist from ABAC, Op. Cit., interview with an IR specialist from University of Indonesia, Op. 
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President SBY is well-known domestically for his „self-image‟ rather than 
policy‟s substance. In general, he will choose a policy that will improve his image. 
In foreign affairs, it is translated into Indonesia‟s activism and rising international 
profile, as can be seen from the Bali Road Map 2007 of United Nations 
Framework Conventions on Climate Change) and the G20. For TPP, these 
academics argue that if Indonesia joined it, then the country would no longer 
become the center stage like the ASEAN Centrality provides. The more ASEAN 
is on the spot, the more President SBY will be on media highlight. As TPP may 
somehow downplay the role of ASEAN, President SBY chose not to join.
83
 
Another view relates mostly to the economic sector.
84
 President SBY seemed to 
have a concern about Indonesia‟s poor performance in ASEAN-China FTA in 
early January 2010, which made him not too ambitious in concluding FTA, 
especially the one with the high standard like the TPP. As an insight from his 
closer circle, former Presidential Staff for Economic Affairs mentioned that 
President SBY gave a direction that trade policy should promote not only free 
trade but also fair trade where developing countries should benefit. Particularly to 
TPP, the president mentioned that Indonesia must not enter any FTAs only 
because there is a pressure from a powerful country to open Indonesia‟s market. 
Along with this view, Indonesia under the current President Jokowi is also 
                                                                                                                                                               
Cit., and interview with an IPE specialist from University of Indonesia, in Depok, Indonesia, 23 
March 2015 
83
 However, one academician also pointed out that under the President SBY‟s slogan of „million 
friends, zero enemy‟, somehow Indonesia‟s trade policy also moved beyond the ASEAN-
concentric principle, such as the proposal for Indonesia-EFTA bilateral FTA. Interview with an IR 
specialist from ABAC, Op. Cit.  
84
 Interview with an IPE specialist from Bina Nusantara University, in Jakarta, Indonesia, 5 March 
2015; Interview with Former Presidential Staff for Economic Affairs in Jakarta, Indonesia, 13 
March 2015. 
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predicted not to join TPP. He is more pragmatic and people-oriented, making him 
see TPP will put big pressure on Indonesia‟s economy.85  
 
VI.3.2 The Role of Protectionist Group 
Domestically, it is not that there are not any groups supporting TPP. 
Indonesian Textile Association publicly supported the country‟s participation in 
the deal, as voiced by its Chairman Ade Sudradjat Usman in April 2014. He 
commented that as a non-party Indonesian textile product will be charged a tariff 
of 12-31 pecent to the US, while a member will get the reduction to 5-12 percent 
(Kompas, 15 Apr. 2014). This is especially important since Indonesian competitor, 
namely Vietna, is already in the negotiation table. Another voice comes from 
neoliberal academic. Anwar Nasution, a professor in the traditionally liberal 
Faculty of Economics, University of Indonesia, mentioned that Indonesia must 
join TPP for market access to the US, reforming the market, and improving 
market efficiency (Kompas, 29 Jan. 2013). However, these actors are only a small 
group within Indonesian domestic setting with little political power. It is true that 
the neoliberal academic is traditionally important for the country‟s reform agenda, 
as they usually retain some economic-related posts (as a technocrat or economist) 
in the government since President Suharto ear, such as Ministry of Finance, 
Ministry of Trade, National Economic Planning Agency and Coordinating 
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 During an interview, an IR specialist from University of Indonesia mentioned that actually the 
US had a lot more opportunity to attract Indonesia to join theTPP when SBY still served as the 
president. After the Asian Crisis, President SBY is the most international figure of all presidents 
with his clear preference to Indonesia‟s rising regional and global role. The former ambassador to 
the US, Dinno Patti Jalal (also served under President SBY), also has a very strong linkage to the 
US. After these two figures stepped down, there is an even less chance for Indonesia to join the 
TPP, especially since the current government under President Jokowi is more domestic-oriented. 
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Ministry for Economic Affairs. However, their very influenced is hampered by 
two conditions: first, if they are close to the dominant political actor; and second, 
if there are economic crisis. This was the case where they could impose reform 
during economic crisis in the mid 1960s, late 1980s, and after 1997-1998; in 
which on the first and second occasion they are close to President Suharto and on 
the third to the IMF (Murphy, 2000). However outside that factors other political 
actors can outmanouver them. For example, when the IMF-backed Indonesian 
Banking Restructuring Agency (IBRA) tried to re-sell assets, the protectionist 
domestic business group took actions (such as by manipulating nationalist 
demonstration) to re-claim their former asset and to avoid it being sold to foreign 
buyers (Hadiz, 2005). Another example is their effort to reduce the fuel subsidy 
but always faced with domestic populist resistance, making it politically costly.
86
 
On the other side of the camp, there is a lot more various group. One of 
them is NGO. In an interview with NGO worker from Third World Network in 
Jakarta, at 4 March 2015, there are several objections why TPP does not fit with 
Indonesia‟s economic needs: 1) data availability and reliability is still a very big 
problem in Indonesian service sector, making Indonesian cannot measure where 
they are or whether they will benefit from liberalization; 2) there is less 
transparency in FTA negotiation than during WTO meeting, where in the latter 
NGO can come and lobby; 3) liberalization in government procurement does not 
necessarily mean corruption practice can be halted, yet it simply means 
transferring the bribery actor from local to foreign companies; 4) Indonesian 
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 A good analysis on this pro-reform and protectionist group interaction can be seen at Rosser, 
2002. 
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SMEs have no idea of going international, since they are too focus on surviving in 
the domestic market; and 5) the investor-state dispute settlement mechanism will 
undermine the sovereignty of the Indonesian government against the MNCs. This 
NGO worker also labeled TPP not as a „gold standard agreement‟, but as a 
„bronze‟ due to this imperfection to developing countries.  
A lot more powerful actor is the domestic business group, which are by 
structure and history are inherently protectionist. By structure, it means that they 
were born given to Indonesia‟s huge population, making Indonesia tends to be 
inward rather than an outward economy. As mentioned before, Indonesia‟s 
economy depends more on domestic rather than the international market. 
Naturally, this makes business groups depends more on the domestic market too. 
By history, Indonesian domestic business group was born by patron-client 
relations under the regime of President Suharto. Hadiz (2005) gives a very useful 
account on this particular issue. He argues that Indonesian business centered and 
become dependent on state economic activity. During the 1970s to late 1980s 
where Indonesian economy got a windfall profit from the oil boom, the infant 
private business received considerable support from the support. During the late 
1980s to 1990s where oil boom ended and the government needed to deregulate 
the economy, it was them to take the most advantage since they acquired what 
was previously monopolized by the state. Therefore over the time they become 
politically powerful and start influencing government policy-making process. 
They prefer protectionist policy and the extent of their influence can be traced to 
Indonesian trade policy in ASEAN. Nesadurai (2003, 2012) found that trade 
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policy in this region is made in a way that will serve the economic benefit of 
politically important domestic business sectors. This is the case in the early 2000s 
in which Indonesia postponed its AFTA‟s liberalization commitment on 
petrochemical, cloves, wheat and sugar. There was also a case where MoT 
responded to the appeal made by the Bogasari Company, who happened to lose 
market shares after the Asian crisis, by imposing standard regulation procedures 
for wheat import (Bird, Hill & Cuthbertson, 2008a). 
    Moreover, the relatively prevalent position of the protectionist, rather 
than pro-FTA business group within domestic political setting is due particularly 
to the defensive position they must hold after the Asian Crisis 1997-1998. 
Domestic business undergoes slow recovery process with a lot of limitations to 
expanding their business. Indonesian Institute of Sciences, a government-affiliated 
think tank, even warned that Indonesia showed deindustrialization symptoms, 
such a stagnant contribution of industrial sector to GDP (from 27 percent in 2000 
to 25 percent in 2009) and slow growth of employment (1.1 percent during 2000-
2009 against 5 percent during 1990-1999) (Kompas, 22 Dec. 2010). Domestic 
business climate never truly recovers as before the crisis. Infrastructure is a very 
acture issue in Indonesia in which congestion in the street, seaport and airport are 
very rampant, not to mention its poor quality and energy shortage. Non-economic 
factors such as poor law enforcement, inconsistent rules and regulation, inefficient 
bureaucracy and local autonomy also contributed as high as 60 percent of business 
loss, as compared to only 35 percent in Thailand and 23 percent in Singapore 
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(Basri, 2009, p. 251). Under such situation, it is very hard for a company to 
expand into another market since they still struggle to survive domestically. 
    Also strong proponents for this protectionist group comes from the 
government itself, namely the MoT and president. MoT is very important in 
Indonesian trade policy as they are the first line of negotiators for an FTA and 
have a lot of technical knowledge than other ministries. However, compare to the 
long-standing ASEAN-minded MoFA, this ministry lacks such consistency, the 
policy of which swings from liberal to protectionist and is very much influenced 
by the pressure group and the president‟s policy choice.87 In the first decade of 
21
st
 century, and especially in the second decade, this ministry often delivers 
protectionist policy even though their minister usually comes from the 
technocratic background. Marie E. Pangestu, Trade Minister from 2004-2011, is 
an academic from Faculty of Economics, University of Indonesia, while Gita 
Wirjawan, Trade Minister from 2011-2014, is a former investment banker at 
Goldman Sachs and JP Morgan. On 2011, the Ministry of Trade launched a newly 
licensed policy to control import to Indonesia. In 2011 and 2012, there was export 
ban to unprocessed rattan and unprocessed mineral stipulated by this ministry. 
Even before that, protectionism has been recorded on Indonesian trade policy. 
Since 2001, it implemented import quota for producer to 26 textile products and in 
2003 registration licensing for commodities under 500 tariff post (Bird, Hill & 
Cuthbertson, 2008b, pp. 9-10). Also in 2003, textile import should also be verified 
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 Another problem is the Ministry of Trade is very poor to coordinate with other stakeholders, 
such as business associations and NGOs. Until now, there is no concrete regularized system on 
this partnership; everything works only on ad-hoc and informal basis. Interview with an NGO 
worker from Third World Network in Jakarta, Indonesia, 4 March 2015. 
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in international port while the export tax was charged on leather products, cocoa, 
and rubber (Ray, 2003, p. 258). Since 2004, it imposed import ban for shrimp 
product from China as well as standardization and laboratory testing for wheat 
products (Bird, Hill & Cuthbertson, 2008b, pp. 9-10). 
    Especially in the second decade of 21
st
 century, Indonesian trade policy 
is getting domestic oriented. This is partly explained by Indonesia‟s poor result in 
ASEAN-China FTA revealed in 2010 where President SBY was reported to be 
upset and decided to change Pangestu with Wirjawan.
88
 His subsequent policy 
choice is more to be improving domestic industry‟s competitiveness, as seen from 
the export ban for rattan and unprocessed mineral ore. When the current President 
Joko Widodo was elected, he chose Rahmat Gobel as the new Minister of Trade. 
Rahmat Gobel is an important nationalist icon as he has a local company 
operating in the electronic sector under a joint venture with Panasonic Group 
Japan. Choosing a local entrepreneur for this new position, rather than an 
economist, President Jokowi gives a signal on the domestic-oriented trade policy 
of Indonesia in the future, coherent with his people-oriented economic agenda.
89
 
Therefore, it is not surprising that recently the MoT seeks to find non-tariff 
barriers (NTBs) for import restriction. One of them is the usage of SNI (Standar 
Nasional Indonesia/ Indonesian National Standard) for many kinds of goods, 
which is different from international standard.
90
 The protectionist tendency is also 
voiced by an economist from the CSIS: 
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 Interview with an IR specialist from ABAC, Op. Cit. 
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 Interview with an IPE specialist from Bina Nusantara University, Op. Cit. 
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“…There is a common perception among Indonesian policymakers and government 
officials that what Indonesia needs at the moment is to improve competitiveness, not 
to open the economy or expand market access. According to this line of argument, 
Indonesia should deal with its challenges and problems, such as inadequate 
infrastructure and high costs, before trying to maintain a more open trade regime and 
establish trade agreements. Otherwise, Indonesia will be unable to compete 
internationally and simply be an attractive market for its trading partners. This claim 
is reinforced by the perception that Indonesia‟s domestic market is big enough to 
support domestic producers provided sufficient protections are granted and facilities 
made available for their expansion….” (Damuri, 2014) 
 
Given such domestic political setting, it is understandable why Indonesia 
showed reluctance to join the TPP. TPP seems to be on the other extreme of the 
road with its „high-quality 21st century FTA‟ rhetoric. As articulated by an IR 
specialist from ABAC, for Indonesia the problem is not whether Indonesia will 
join TPP, yet about when Vietnam and Malaysia will finally realize that it is too 
high standard for them.  
Furthermore, such attitude toward TPP implicates to rather positive 
behavior on the RCEP, which is basically the contender of the former. It can be 
said that domestic business groups feel more relax with RCEP as it still entails 
ASEAN‟s way of doing FTA, namely attention to domestic business development. 
RCEP negotiation is more flexible as it recognizes a different level of economic 
development among member countries, which, therefore, will result in different 
treatment and affirmative action for less-developed countries.91  
 
VI. 4 Conclusion 
 The Indonesian experience shows a very significant linkage between trade 
and foreign policy. It also shows new finding in Southeast Asian trade policy, 
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 Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP): Joint Statement the First Meeting of 
Trade Negotiating Commitee. Op. Cit.   
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which focuses too much on domestic politics. Indonesian experience, in general, 
is more fit to the broader Asia-Pacific theoretical discussion. Here, international 
factor, namely political-security objective, fits closely with FTA behavior of Great 
Powers (such as the US, Japan, and China) and medium powers (such as Australia 
and South Korea) (Mochizuki, 2009). Practically speaking, Indonesia‟s strong 
adherence to ASEAN centrality principle brings implication to the country‟s 
commitment to ASEAN-centered FTA, rather than to engage in bilateral approach. 
Moreover, regional pattern of ASEAN-centered FTA (all partners here are the 
surrounding Southeast Asian neighbors) as well as the ASEAN plus X framework 
fit the overall political-security objective of Indonesia, namely to engage Great 
Powers within a peaceful conduct of relations (through dialogue and cooperation). 
Indonesia also actively conducts political balancing to these Great Powers 
whenever there are any attempts to dominate the regional dynamics. This is the 
reason behind Indonesia‟s reluctance to join TPP, seeing it as the US‟ attempt to 
be too dominant within the regional institutions. Moreover, this argument is 
equipped by less motive from Indonesia on economic benefits. Although it is true 
that Indonesia can get trade and investment gains just like Malaysia and Vietnam, 
the country‟s huge domestic consumption makes it less dependent on international 
market. 
     As for domestic factor, the case of Indonesia shows that within trade 
policy making the state is not a unitary actor. Two most prominent state actors 
within Indonesian domestic setting are the MoFA and the leaders (equipped with 
IR-background academics) who carry the pro-ASEAN interest. On the other side, 
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there are MoT and leaders (along with the domestic business entrepreneurs and 
NGOs) who carry protectionist policy. The Indonesian case also confirms the 
existing literature on the influential roles played by domestic business group, 
especially in pursuing protectionist policy. Therefore, they favor the ASEAN-
centered FTAs (and multilateral) to bilateral FTA since the former is usually of 
low-quality ones with a long transition period, sensitive and exclusion list. It is 
not the case for the bilateral FTA, as well as the TPP, as it usually entails greater 
liberalization scheme, including the provision of WTO-plus arrangement where 
domestic business finds very hard to comply to.  
     Seeing from this domestic angle, it is interesting to see that so far the 
interest of pro-ASEAN and protectionist groups fit in with each other. Their 
desire for ASEAN-based and low-quality FTA are reflected in the various 
ASEAN-centered FTA that Indonesia signed so far. It is also confirmed once 
again in the case of reluctance to join the TPP. In the future, it is very interesting 
to see the nature of the relations between these two groups. For example, what 
will be the outcome of Indonesian trade policy if their interests confront each 
other? This is a very likely scenario if somehow the ASEAN-US TIFA resumes or 
the US joins the RCEP. For pro-ASEAN groups like MoFA, engaging the US 
through these two schemes are a very likely goal as ASEAN will be at the driver‟s 
seat. In contrast, it is against the interest of the protectionist group since any FTA 
arrangement with the US should always entail greater domestic reforms, as seen 
in the case of NAFTA, US-Jordan and US-Peru Bilateral FTA (Aggarwal, 2007, 
2013). Whatever the outcome is, either to favor or to against, will largely reflect 
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the domestic political interaction between the pro-ASEAN and protectionist 
groups. 
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CHAPTER VII - CONCLUSION 
 
 In the existing literature on Southeast Asian trade policy, there are several 
assumptions worth mentioning here. First, it tends to be more of a domestic-based 
trade policy. Trade policy is always seen as the result of the linkage between a 
state on one hand and domestic business entrepreneurs on the other hand. Second, 
as they are mostly cautious to aggressive market opening, usually the resulting 
FTAs are relatively low-quality in nature. Low quality here means that there are 
significant exclusion list, transition periods and many other exceptions. This is 
typical of ASEAN-centered FTAs and many other bilateral FTAs conducted by 
countries in this particular region, except Singapore. 
     With this situation in mind, TPP came into world headlines in 2008. 
Contrary to the previous deals in Asia-Pacific, this particular negotiation is 
important for two reasons. First, TPP gives a different nuance as it is led by the 
current superpower: the US. It is true that it was first established by the P4 
countries in 2005 (Brunei, Chile, New Zealand, and Singapore), yet as the US 
joined in 2008, it naturally dwarfed these smaller nations. „The US factor‟ in TPP 
means that TPP should not be seen only as an economic deal, but also a political 
tool. This is especially true since TPP is part of US‟ engagement or pivot strategy 
in the Asia-Pacific, therefore, it carries a substantial politics and security objective 
in the „Asia-Pacific integration‟ rhetoric. Second, TPP promotes the so-called 
„gold-standard‟ or „high-quality‟ FTAs. Along with conventional tariff reduction 
in trade in goods, it incorporates the WTO-plus requirements, such as national 
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treatment principle, government procurement, investor-dispute settlement 
mechanism and labor and environmental standard. This is a lot more aggressive 
liberalization than Southeast Asia currently has.  
     For Southeast Asian countries, TPP provides an opportunity to observe 
their trade policy behaviors differently. The „US factor‟ embedded within TPP 
means that it should be seen from the angle of political and security objectives of 
these nations. Theoretically speaking, it is not only the domestic but also 
international factors that play an important role in the Southeast Asian trade 
policy formulation. There is always a possibility of converging or diverging 
interests among them with the US, which then leads to the former's decisions to 
join or not to join TPP. At the same, the high-quality standard that TPP offers 
means that the „state is unitary‟ and the „state-business linkage is most important‟ 
assumption should be revisited. TPP‟s high-standard should be seen in relations to 
a country‟s domestic economic reform plan, whether it is converging or diverging. 
As economic reform plan is highly debatable due to its potential wealth re-
allocation effect, a lot more various actors are involved in this policy process. 
Even within the state there are disagreements or even conflicts on whether reform 
should be carried out. In the non-state actors, business entrepreneurs are, of course, 
not the only important actor here as NGOs and academics also play roles. 
     With this situation, the research proposes four arguments on trade policy 
motives of Southeast Asian countries on TPP. The first two relate to international 
factor, namely „The Need to Forge Closer Relations to the US‟ whereas the last 
two to domestic factor, namely „Support to Economic Reform‟. The first 
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argument is basically „economic benefits‟; the more a country enjoys economic 
benefit from TPP (or more appropriately from the US, as the largest market), the 
more likely it will join. The benefits are apparent from the trade gains, investment 
gains and lock-in reform opportunity (the potential to position TPP as an external 
push for domestic economic reform process). The second argument is „political-
security needs‟, comprising both foreign and security objectives. The more a 
country has political-security needs to the US, then the more likely it will join 
TPP. This variable consists of several indicators: a) coherency with foreign policy 
objective; b) security threat from neighboring country, especially China; and c) to 
reduce China‟s economic influence. The last two arguments are „support to 
domestic economic reform‟. They postulate that the stronger the support from 
state decision-maker and societal group to economic reform, the more likely a 
country will join TPP. It gives insight into various actors and their interests in the 
domestic sphere. Within the state body, it is important to see the stances of its 
leader (President, Prime Minister, Chairman of ruling party), the ruling party, 
opposition parties and bureaucracy, while from the non-state actors there are the 
domestic business entrepreneurs, NGOs, and academics. 
 
Table VII.1 – The Motives on TPP: Experiences of The Three Case Studies 
Case 
Studies 
International Factors Domestic Factors Output 
Economic 
Benefits 
Political-
Security 
Needs 
Supports from 
State Decision-
Maker 
Supports 
from Societal 
Group 
Vietnam High High Strong Strong Joining TPP 
Malaysia High  Medium Medium Medium  
Indonesia Medium Low Weak Weak  Not Joining TPP 
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 Table VII.1 gives a summary of the experiences of all three case studies, 
namely Vietnam, Malaysia and Indonesia. They reflect pretty much the 
abovementioned logics in their experience on TPP. Vietnam has the most motives 
to join TPP as it qualifies all four arguments. The country has high economic 
benefits and political-security needs as well as strong support from state decision-
maker and societal group to conduct economic reform. Therefore, it is no wonder 
that the country decided to join TPP. Malaysia is at a lower level than Vietnam, 
but still sufficiently high to enter negotiation. Malaysia has high economic 
benefits with medium political-security needs and the medium level of support 
from both state decision-makers and societal groups to carry out economic reform. 
Indonesia presents an important negative case study as it is in contradictory 
position. The country decided not to join TPP, especially because it only has 
medium-level economic benefits, low political-security needs and weak domestic 
support for economic reform.  
     The following subsections give more detailed explanations of the 
international and domestic factors. 
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VII.1 International Factors  
Table VII.2 – The International Factors: Experiences of The Three Case 
Studies 
 Economic Benefits Political-Security Needs 
Vietnam High 
 
 Trade gains 
 Investment gains 
 Limited lock-in reform objectives 
 
 
 
High 
 
 Coherent with Vietnam‟s multidirectional 
foreign policy 
 High China‟s threat perception due to 
geographical proximity and historical 
subordination 
 To balance China by approaching the US 
in a less-threatening way 
 To correct trade imbalance with China by 
pursuing trade surplus with the US 
 To reduce dependence on China for 
imported raw materials in textile industry 
 
Malaysia High 
 
 Trade gains 
 Investment gains 
 Lock-in reform objectives 
 
Medium 
 
 To serve interests as a trading nation 
 Coherent with overall Malaysia‟s 
approach to the US 
 Relatively less viable threat from China 
(maritime Southeast Asian country) 
 Malaysia perceives economic relations 
with China positively (trade surplus) 
  
Indonesia Medium 
 
 Trade & investment gains 
 No lock-in reform objectives 
 Indonesia is less dependent on 
international trade 
 Highly cautious with high-
standard requirements 
 
Low 
 
 TPP downplays ASEAN centrality 
principle 
 Relatively less viable threat from China 
(maritime Southeast Asian country) 
 To reduce trade imbalance with China by 
improving domestic industrial 
competitiveness 
 
 
Table VII.2 gives a summary of the influence of international factors on 
the case studies‟ experience on TPP. If we see from the economic benefits 
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variable, then it is clear that Vietnam and Malaysia have high economic benefits 
to joining the TPP. In fact, it is very interesting to note that Vietnam and Malaysia 
are among the countries projected to take the most economic benefits, as 
postulated by a study from the East-West Center. The two countries have similar 
traits as they are both trade-dependent nations where the international market is 
very important. For Vietnam, the US is currently the number one trading partner 
with significant growth especially since the signing of Bilateral Trade Agreement 
(BTA) in 2001. For Malaysia, the US is among the most important traditional 
trading partners besides China and Singapore. The two countries also 
continuously enjoy substantial trading surplus with the US but without any FTA 
deals, therefore bolstering the need to join TPP. Vietnam and Malaysia have 
already secured FTAs with their other trading partners, for example, the two 
countries engaged China through the ASEAN-China FTA and engaged Japan 
through ASEAN-Japan CEPA and bilateral Japan CEPA. As for Indonesia, it is 
true that the country also has those traits. Indonesia is also forecasted to gain 
much economically through the trade and investment channel and moreover it 
also has a substantial trade surplus with the US but without any FTA deal. 
However, structurally the country is very different from the other two. Indonesia 
is less dependent on the international market since its huge population makes 
domestic consumption much more important to propel growth (with a contribution 
to as high as 55 percent of GDP). In fact, it is this very factor that enabled 
Indonesia survive the global financial crisis in 2008-2009. 
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     The investment and lock-in reform deserve special attention here as it is 
experienced differently in each country. Malaysia seems to have the most motive 
as the authority clearly links their participation in TPP to pursuing more 
aggressive reform. Currently, Malaysia struggles very hard not to be in 
the ‟middle-income‟ trap situation. Incoming investment from TPP is expected to 
bring the country to the next level, both in terms of industrial technology and 
income level. In a way, it is interesting that Malaysia now chooses a neoliberal 
approach, like FTA participation, for their growth strategy, since in the past the 
country adheres very much to Japan-inspired developmental state strategy (or 
Looking East Policy). At the same time, while it is true that Vietnam also 
anticipates incoming FDI from TPP, their very expectation is different than in the 
Malaysian case. This country seems to have more expectation on the higher 
number of labor-intensive exports, such as from textile, footwear and food 
processing industries than to link domestic reform measures with the international 
agreement. Therefore, the anticipated FDI is expected to boost this low-value 
chain export products. TPP is less seen as a chance for external reform pressure 
like Malaysia does. However, this difference is understandable as they are in a 
different developmental stage. Malaysia is at the medium-level while Vietnam is 
at the low-level of the development ladder. In this case, Vietnam is in a similar 
position with Indonesia, which has no intention to treat TPP as an external push to 
reform. 
     In the political-security needs, comparison among the three case studies 
shows that all of them link decision on TPP with their foreign policy objective. In 
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the case of Indonesia, this reason is among the ultimate one causing the country 
not to join. In Indonesia‟s point of view, TPP somehow downplays the central role 
that ASEAN has played so far in Asia-Pacific regional dynamics. In TPP, ASEAN 
is no longer at the driver‟s seat. Consequently, it is understandable that the 
country pushes for the RCEP, another mega-regional trade agreement among 
ASEAN and six neighboring partners but with ASEAN in the central position. For 
Vietnam and Malaysia, on the contrary, participation in TPP is, in fact, coherent 
with the foreign policy priorities. After the Cold War, Vietnam engages 
multidirectional foreign policy to survive in the globalization era. Engagement 
with the US is one of the most important pillar here as it provides Vietnam with 
lucrative economic opportunities as well as a necessary hedging strategy to move 
away from being over-dependent to China (discussed below). For Malaysia, 
trading nation status is always an important element in its foreign policy, therefore 
pushing the country to seek international market opportunities constantly. 
Moreover, as a small country Malaysia needs a channel to engage the US 
constantly. For Vietnam and Malaysia, engaging the US in economic tools like 
TPP is also consistent with their overall approaches in political and security arena. 
Here, they have intensive low-level military cooperations in training, disaster 
management, and so on. 
     The threat element, namely how the TPP is positioned within the China 
threat dilemma, provides a different nuance among the three case studies. 
Actually, the whole Southeast Asia now feels uncertain on whether China will 
become an aggressive Great Power. There is indeed a wide consensus that China 
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is more likely to be, at best, a threat in the medium and longer term rather than the 
short-term. However, seeing from country to country basis there are clear 
differences in threat perceptions. Vietnam as a mainland Southeast Asian country 
perceives China‟s threat theory in a much stronger sense. Vietnam shares land 
borders with open terrain with the Great Power, which makes a military attack 
theoretically possible, especially since historically the former was the colony of 
the latter. Therefore, Vietnam sees TPP as a way to further approach the US, 
especially as it is a less-threatening means than the more vivid security treaty. 
Vietnam still has an underlying fear of provoking China, which is also another of 
Vietnam‟s foreign policy objective. Interestingly, the US through TPP also creates 
means for Vietnam to reduce dependency on China. First, Vietnam can 
compensate trade deficit from China with continuing trade surplus from the US. 
Second, the yarn forward rule in the textile sector gives way for Vietnam to 
reduce its dependence on China-origin raw material. Here, Vietnam can channel 
the supply through investment from other countries or more preferably through its 
own domestic supplies.  
     Malaysia and Indonesia somehow respond to this China threat differently. 
As maritime Southeast Asian countries, these two nations have a relatively lower 
threat perception than Vietnam especially since China‟s navy is still in under 
development. Therefore, the two countries do not position TPP as a way to 
mitigate China‟s threat. In fact, Malaysia sees closer relations with China as a 
positive impetus for growth with its continuing trade surplus. Whereas in 
Indonesia, although the country is just like Vietnam in experiencing trade deficit 
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with China, its overall response is to develop domestic industrial competitiveness 
rather than to channel it to the surplus-generating country like the US (discussed 
below).   
  
VII.2 Domestic Factors 
Table VII.3 – The Diverging Actors on TPP 
 Level of 
Support (In 
General) 
Pro-TPP Anti-TPP 
Vietnam Strong  Leaders (intra-VCP 
reformist faction); 
 Ministry of Trade & 
Industry; 
 Export-oriented business 
entrepreneurs 
 
Silent resistance: Subnational 
government & SOE manager 
Malaysia Medium  Leader (PM); 
 Ministry of International 
Trade & Industry (MITI); 
 Export-oriented business 
entrepreneurs 
Vocal Resistance 
 Several bureaucratic agents; 
 Intra-UMNO business-politician; 
 Opposition parties; 
 NGOs 
 
Indonesia Weak  Liberal academic; 
 Textile association (export-
oriented business 
entrepreneurs) 
 
Pro-ASEAN group: 
 IR-background academic; 
 Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(MoFA) 
 
Protectionist group: 
 Leader 
 Ministry of Trade (MoT) 
 Domestic business entrepreneurs 
 
 On the domestic side, Table VII.3 summarizes the situation in each case 
study. It is clear that there are variations among the observed cases on the level of 
support to economic reform. Vietnam and Malaysia have strong and medium level 
of support causing them to join TPP, whereas Indonesia only has weak support 
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leading to its not-to-join decision. In Vietnam, the voice for support is quite 
dominant from the state actors while the opposition is almost unheard of, probably 
because the one-party system causes the former to be the only ultimate voice. In 
Malaysia, the supporter and challenger are on equal par. The situation leads to a 
different domestic atmosphere in both countries. In Vietnam, it is no less than 
enthusiasm to TPP with its potential to export more labor-intensive products to the 
US, but without sufficient balancing views. After the global financial crisis that 
weakened Vietnam‟s economic performance, the country also aggressively 
engaged in many FTA negotiations along with TPP. Now, it negotiates the 
Vietnam-EU, Vietnam-EFTA, Vietnam-South Korea, Vietnam-Russia-Belarus-
Kazakhstan Custom Union FTA and RCEP. It is important to note here that the 
perception of the VCP, especially from the reformist faction, that global economic 
integration will ensure the very survival of the regime. In their mind, it 
continually provides economic growth and employment and, henceforth, 
performance legitimacy in the eye of the Vietnamese. Vietnam seems to show a 
hasty, if not reckless, behavior in this regard since economic globalization does 
not always lead to the intended result. Unfortunately, without any challengers 
willing to speak up, there is nothing stopping, or at least moderating, the optimism 
and passion of the Vietnamese leader. The only challenge appears on silent 
resistance from subnational government and SOE manager, but only later when 
Vietnam finds it difficult to implement TPP‟s reform measures. Meanwhile in 
Malaysia, the nuance is of both optimism and skepticism. Optimism is casted by 
the leader (especially PM Najib) and MITI while skepticism is voiced by the 
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intra-UMNO business politician, opposition parties, and NGO. Therefore in 
Malaysia, there is a lot more balanced view on responding to TPP unlike in the 
Vietnam case. Malaysia appears to be a lot more cautious with many articulating 
demands for a longer transition period, flexibilities, or even rejection. It is also 
worth noting that in Malaysia, unlike in Vietnam, the leader has institutional 
constraints in two ways. First, as the opposition parties improve their electoral 
performance, the ruling party (UMNO) can no longer easily implement any 
desired policies. Sensitive issues like TPP that can be easily manipulated into a 
political attack. Second, as the high-quality TPP gives a potential threat to the 
intra-UMNO business politician, the leader (PM Najib) must also consider not 
antagonizing the traditional Bumiputera constituent if he wants both to remain in 
power and to sustain the political regime.  
     Another important finding is the fact that the state should not be seen as a 
unitary actor, as assumed before in many existing literature. In the TPP case, the 
state is far from unitary with many competing ideas and stances among their 
components. This is very clear in the Malaysian case where the leader and MITI 
are in one camp, while intra-UMNO business-politician, opposition parties, and 
several bureaucratic agencies are in the other. The so-called reform measures 
entailed within TPP actually trigger such division, which in the past state‟s 
components were in stable relations under the dual approach of export-oriented 
industry and bumiputera policy. The case is also very clear in Indonesia where 
there are two important views, the pro-ASEAN and the protectionist group, which 
luckily desire similar outcomes for not participating TPP. State apparatus like the 
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MoFA is on the pro-ASEAN camp while another like MoT and leader are on the 
protectionist (or nationalist) camp. It is interesting to observe other cases where 
these two groups have diverging stances and how it leads to the outcome.
92
 Even 
in the one-party rule of Vietnam, such state division is also observable although 
less clear. According to Masina (2006) and Painter (2006), Vietnam‟s authority is 
more of a decentralized nature than centralized one that leads to the silent 
resistance from the subnational government (and SOE manager). They might not 
articulate opposition to TPP by the time the decision was taken (pre-negotiation) 
since it would put them in undesired opposition with the leader. However, they 
are expected to cast resistance once TPP is implemented. 
     As for the non-state actor, there are several actors worth mentioning here, 
the domestic business entrepreneur, NGO and academic. For domestic business 
entrepreneurs, it is clear that their view on TPP is divided: the export-oriented 
industry supports the TPP while domestic-oriented one does not support it. This is 
very clear in Malaysia and Indonesia but only to a lesser extent in Vietnam. 
However, in the latter country there are still reservations on how TPP may affect 
the SMEs. The influence of domestic business entrepreneurs on trade 
policymaking is also worth mentioning here. Vietnam is a case where their voice 
is not very important since in their system such private entity only lives as the 
state allows them to. In Indonesia, they are of a lesser importance than the state 
since there are many precedences in which state can act on its own without full 
acknowledgment from a business. In Malaysia, business entrepreneurs have a 
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 A potential case study for the diverging interest is the ASEAN-China FTA where, on one hand, 
protectionist demanded for renegotiation and, on the other hand, pro-ASEAN group wished for 
continued implementation. 
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much stronger position since they heavily intrude into the political sector by 
becoming a UMNO member. For NGOs, their very influence in the observed case 
studies is even less. This is very true in Vietnam and Indonesia. For the former, it 
is very understandable under the one-party system while, for the latter, there are 
other actors such as leaders and bureaucratic agents voicing their stances more 
vocally. However, it must be noted that the relatively calm behavior of NGOs in 
Indonesia in the TPP issue is not necessarily because they are impotent. It is more 
because they do not feel the need to put pressure as the state already acts in line 
with their interest. There is a possibility that they will be more active if the state 
commits a controversial action, such as joining the TPP. For Malaysia, although 
NGOs here are very dynamic in voicing opposition thanks to the government‟s 
decision to join TPP, their relative importance is quite moderate. They function 
well to give technical input to government and promote awareness to the people, 
yet not necessarily to influence the trade policy making itself as they face many 
constraints under the authoritarian system of Malaysia. As for academics, it is 
particularly dynamic only in the Indonesian case, especially within the pro-
ASEAN group. In democratic Indonesia, academics relatively enjoy more room to 
exert their influence as opposed to Vietnam and Malaysia where academics must 
fully comply with the state‟s interests.   
 
VII.3 Further Research 
 There are at least four areas where the research can be expanded in the 
future. 
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     First, there should be follow-up research focusing on other countries in the 
region. With four arguments proposed here (the economic gains, political-security 
needs, and the level of support for domestic economic reform from state decision-
maker and societal group), it will be very interesting to see how other countries 
respond to TPP, especially since they have their own international and domestic 
priorities. Within Southeast Asia, it is important to see the experience of the 
Philippines and Thailand. The Philippines is a country with a traditional alliance 
with the US, yet it decides not to join the negotiation until the time being. 
Thailand is also important as a country being equally close to both China and the 
US and has a trading nation status but without the decision to join TPP. Outside 
Southeast Asia, it will also be important to see how the framework is implemented 
in US-ally countries such as Australia, Japan, and South Korea. These three 
countries have rather different approaches on TPP, with Australia being so quick 
to announce participation in 2008, Japan being late to announce participation in 
mid-2013 and South Korea not joining until now. Another important country to 
observe is China itself, as it becomes the so-called constrained or left-out country. 
From studying these countries, there will be richer insights on how trade policy is 
being formulated in Asia-Pacific. 
     Moreover, adding more countries to the discussion is important for 
methodological consideration. Although using four independent variables 
(„economic benefits‟, „political-security needs‟, „support from state decision-
maker‟ and „support from societal group‟), there are only three case studies used 
here. As the number of case is lower than the number of variables, then the result 
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of the thesis should be treated as a temporary finding. Therefore, more research is 
needed to test whether similar results can also be found in other countries. 
 Second, it is important to expand the role of other actors in influencing 
trade policy in Southeast Asia. Important in this regard is the role of foreign 
companies and foreign academics in influencing domestic stakeholders. The role 
of foreign companies especially is important as they are among the few actors 
possessing access to the TPP negotiation. They also retain a sufficient degree of 
power since the Southeast Asian development process relies pretty much on FDI, 
not to mention they have direct access to government officials as well. In this 
research, the focus is still largely on the domestic actors. Research on foreign 
academics will also be interesting in two important respects: a) in developing 
countries where there are only limited local human resources, foreign academics 
play an important role as a source of knowledge, and, therefore, they can cast 
ideological discourse such as neoliberalism; and b) foreign academics (or rather, 
economists) always links heavily with other powerful actors such as the World 
Bank or IMF as they share similar interests. 
     Third, as time goes by, there will be more areas that will be feasible for 
research activity. TPP is now committing a very secretive process without much 
information available to the public. In this research, this is part of the difficulty as 
it is not always easy to discover a state‟s stance in the negotiation process. 
However, as time evolves and more information is available to the public, it will 
no longer become a problem especially if TPP can finally reach the conclusion. 
Some areas like studies on negotiation process will be very likely. For the same 
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reason, it will be a lot more feasible in the future to conduct research on the issue-
specific area. Several chapters in TPP, such as the IPR, investment, and 
government procurement are very likely to be research topics, given their „new 
trade issue‟ nature and political aspect it links. Further research can focus on 
countries‟ response on each of those issues, negotiation and bargaining process as 
well as the domestic political debate. 
     Fourth, there is a chance for another variable explaining the motive of 
trade policy in Southeast Asia. Especially the domestic factor, this research 
focuses mostly on agent-based approach. There is an indication that an 
institutional-based approach will also be important to influence this trade policy 
making. This is very apparent in the Vietnam and Malaysia case, the former being 
a one-party rule system and the latter being an electoral authoritarianism country. 
Even in this research, it is shown that agents are largely bounded by these 
institutional constraints. Vietnam‟s strong support for economic reform is possible 
only because there is no strong opposition in the domestic arena. In Malaysia, the 
medium level of support can also be explained by the dual difficulties that the 
leader face from opposition parties and intra-UMNO business politicians. The 
dynamic role of academics in Indonesia in influencing policy making is also part 
of this process, as the country is under a democratic political regime. 
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APPENDIX – LIST OF INTERVIEWS 
 
No. Date Place Interviewees Affilliations 
1. 23 Feb. 2015 Office of Malaysian AIDS 
Council, Kuala Lumpur (KL), 
Malaysia 
Ms. Fifa Rahman Malaysian AIDS 
Council 
2. 23 Feb. 2015 Universiti Kebangsaan 
Malaysia (UKM), Selangor, 
Malaysia 
Mr. Ravichandran 
Dhakshinamoorthy 
UKM 
Mr. Guido Benny 
3. 24 Feb. 2015 Office of Institute for 
Strategic and International 
Studies (ISIS), KL, Malaysia 
Ms. Juita Mohamad ISIS 
Mr. Firdaos Rosli 
4. 25 Feb. 2015 Monash University Malaysia, 
Selangor, Malaysia 
Ms. Helen Nesadurai Monash University 
Malaysia 
5. 3 Mar. 2015 ASEAN Secretariat, Jakarta, 
Indonesia 
Mr. Alexander 
Chandra 
ASEAN Business 
Advisory Council 
(ABAC) 
6. 4 Mar. 2015 Office of Institute for Global 
Justice (IGJ), Jakarta, 
Indonesia  
Ms. Lutfiyah Hanim Third World 
Network 
7. 5 Mar. 2015 Bina Nusantara University, 
Jakarta, Indonesia 
Mr. Tirta N. 
Mursitama 
Bina Nusantara 
University 
8. 11 Mar. 2015 University of Indonesia, 
Depok, Indonesia 
Ms. Evi Fitriani University of 
Indonesia 
9. 12 Mar. 2015 Paramadina University, 
Jakarta, Indonesia 
Mr. Firmanzah Paramadina 
University (Former 
Presidential Staff for 
Economic Affairs) 
10. 23 Mar. 2015 University of Indonesia, 
Depok, Indonesia 
Mr. Beginda 
Pakpahan 
University of 
Indonesia 
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